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THE TRADITION OF PREJUDICE VERSUS
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY:
HOMOSEXUALS AND HEIGHTENED EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY AFTER BOWERS V.
HARDWICK
We believed in the Constitution. Guess what? It doesn't mean 7.1s.
Lesbian activist Pat Norman after Bowers v. Hardwick.'
Pervasive prejudice, unfounded stereotypes, and invidious pub-
lic and private discrimination severely victimize gay males and les-
bians in the United States. 2 Through violence and discrimination,
society robs those it perceives to be homosexual of the liberty to
pursue a meaningful and happy life without fears State and federal
institutions, in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, are
prime instigators and facilitators of this invidious discrimination. 4
This governmental discrimination impairs homosexuals' ability to
be employed, to raise children, to live together as couples, and to
engage in consensual, private, sexual activity. 5
The courts have generally rebuffed attempts by homosexuals
to seek redress through statutory and constitutional claims." In
' Press, A GOVeIllUIP111 in the Bedroom, NEWSWEEK, J uly 14, 1986, at 36.
2 See It. MooR, GAvs/jusTicr; 27-30 (1988). This note will generally use the term
homosexual, though with reluctance. Most persons within the homosexual Community refer
to themselves as gay men and lesbians. Unfortunately, these terms are not only awkward,
but also only refer to those persons who identify themselves as homosexually-oriented. Many
persons who do not consider themselves gay or lesbian, such as persons who engage in
occasional same-gender sexual activity, are nonetheless injured by prejudice and discrimi-
nation. Although the exact meaning and scope of the term homosexual in this note will often
depend on the context, it will generally refer to either those persons who engage in some
homosexual conduct, or to those persons victimized because of society's perception of them
as homosexually-oriented.
3 See id. at 22-31.
See id. at 30.
5 See id.
5 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (no privacy right to engage in
homosexual sodomy); Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 120
(1967) (homosexual aliens seeking to enter country can be excluded); Acanfora v. Board of
Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 856-57 (0. Md. 1973) (homosexual activism may be grounds for
dismissal of public school teacher without violating first amendment); Singer v. Mara, 11
Wash. App. 247, 254-60, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974) (state could deny marriage license to
same-sex couple).
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1986, the United States Supreme Court, reasoning that the ability
to engage in homosexual conduct was not an interest protected by
the federal constitutional right of privacy, held in Bowers v. Hardwick
that states could criminalize same-sex sodomy.? As a result of the
apparent exclusion of homosexuals from substantive due process
protections, homosexuals increasingly are challenging government-
sponsored discrimination through the equal protection principles
contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution.°
The principle of equal protection of the laws requires that the
government treat all persons equally and fairly, and not invidiously
or arbitrarily.9
 Although the courts usually only require the govern-
ment to provide a rational justification for classifications, the courts
subject certain classifications to heightened scrutiny because of a
presumption that the government classified invidiously.° The
courts establish this presumption when a class faces pervasive socie-
7 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
" See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-
344); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1361, 1368, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Section one of the fourteenth amendment states that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
US. CossT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Section five states: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. at § 5.
The fifth amendment provides that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.
U.S. Colvs•r. amend. V (emphasis added).
According to the United States Supreme Court, the fifth amendment contains an equal
protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
9 See W. NELSON, -I-HE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 13-18 (1988).
10 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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tal antipathy and political powerlessness because of traits that do
not relate to individual responsibility or capabilities.'''
This note examines whether, consistent with equal protection
precedent, and in light of Hardwick, the courts should presume that
the government classifies homosexuals for invidious or arbitrary
reasons that the constitutional principle of equal protection prohib-
its. Section I examines the prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina-
tion that homosexuals in the United States face, with particular
attention to government-sponsored discrimination and its conse-
quences for the lives of homosexuals. 12 Section II discusses the
principle of equal protection as it has developed since the ratifica-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, concentrating on the criteria
that the Supreme Court has articulated for determining whether a
class requires heightened protection because the government pre-
sumably disadvantages it invidiously. 13 Section III first discusses
Hardwick," followed by recent federal court decisions that have
considered whether homosexuals constitute a class needing height-11ened judicial protection.'' Section IV then argues that homosexuals
fulfill the criteria for status as a protected class under equal protec-
tion precedent, and that those courts that have relied on Hardwick
to hold that the courts should not protect them have used reasoning
that is superfluous and even antithetical to equal protection juris-
prudence. 16
I. THE STATE OF AMERICA FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS
Homosexuals face a vast array of official and unofficial forms
of discrimination that, argue observers of the homosexual com-
munity, affect every aspect of a homosexual's life.' 7 Although hom-
osexuals constitute a sizeable minority of the population, commen-
tators argue that the risks attendant to identification as a
homosexual are so severe and pervasive that homosexuals are often
forced to hide their identities as homosexuals."' Discrimination and
prejudice against homosexuals have a long history, scholars note,
See id.; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938).
12 See infra notes 17-154 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 155-293 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 294-347 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 348-526 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 527-618 and accompanying text.
17 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 27-30.
15 See id.
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and remain pervasive and destructive features of homosexuals'
lives.' 9
 Much of this discrimination is not only condoned but actively
promoted and implemented by state and federal governments in
such areas as public employment, the military, family law, and crim-
inal law, while the courts have mostly allowed this discrimination in
the face of various legal attacks. 2° As a result of this state-condoned
and pervasive discrimination, commentators argue, homosexuals
not only hide their homosexuality, but also are unable politically to
prevent discrimination or counter popular but factually unsup-
ported stereotypes about homosexuals:2 ' According to these com-
mentators, society justifies this discrimination through notions of
morality, tradition, and the protection of the family, as well as the
stereotypes of homosexuals as psychologically ill or sexually crimi-
nal. 22
 Homosexuals therefore find themselves the victims of state-
condoned and state-enforced discrimination in many aspects of
their lives. 23
Studies of sexuality indicate that a substantial minority of per-
sons in the United States are exclusively homosexual in experience
or orientation, and that as many as half of males and. a quarter of
females have been sexually aroused by persons of the same gender. 24
19 See id.
211 See id.; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
21 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-23.
22 See id. at 23, 31-34; J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 228 (1983).
See R. Mona, supra note 2, at 30.
24 Id. at 21; Developments in the Law--Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1511 It. I (1989) [hereinafter Developments]; see Note, Repealable Rights: Municipal Civil
Rights Protection for Lesbians and Gays, 7 LAW AND INEQUALITY 441, 441 (1989) [hereinafter
Repealable Rights] (Twenty million homosexuals in United States). Alfred Kinsey's 1948 study
of male sexuality found that as many as half of the white male population had experienced
some form of overt or fantasized homosexual stimulation during their adult lives, and that
50 percent of the white male population that remained single until age 35, and 37 percent
of the total white male population, had at least one overt homosexual experience to the point
of orgasm between adolescence and old age. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN TILE HUMAN MALE 650 (1948) [hereinafter MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR]. KiIISey
also found that 25 percent of the white male population had more than incidental homosexual
experience or reactions, and 18 percent had at least as many homosexual experiences or
reactions as heterosexual, for at least a three-year period between ages 16 and 55. Eight
percent were exclusively homosexual for at least three years, and four percent throughout
their adult lives. Id. at 650-51. Kinsey's study group was composed of 5300 white males. Id.
at ix. A 1988 survey of male sexuality by the National Academy of Sciences also found that
at least 20 percent of males have had a homosexual experience, and that at least six percent
had homosexual encounters at least occasionally. Fay, Turner, Klassen, & Gagnon, Prevalence
and Patterns of Same-Gender Sexual Contact Among Men, 243 SCIENCE 338-48 (1989); see also
Knox, Gay contacts seen in 20% of US men, Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
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These studies suggest that the population cannot statistically be
separated into mutually exclusive groups of homosexuals and het-
erosexuak; because individual sexual experiences and responses
range across a continuum from exclusively heterosexual to exclu-
sively hornosexua1.25 Commentators note that equating sexual ori-
entation with sexual conduct is inaccurate, because many who have
engaged in sexual activity with persons of the same gender do not
consider themselves homosexual, while others who consider them-
Kinsey's 1953 study of female sexuality correspondingly found that between one and
three percent of unmarried women were exclusively lesbian, and that between three and
eight percent were store hornosexually than heterosexually oriented. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY,
C. MARTIN, & P. GERHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 473-74 (1953) [here-
inafter FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR]. Kinsey also found that 13 percent of women had expe-
rienced sexual contact. to orgasm with other females. Id. at 454. He found that 19 percent
of females had experienced sonic physical, sexual contact with another female, and that 28
percent had been erotically aroused by another female. Id. at 453. His female study group
involved 5940 white females. id. at 22. Studies suggest that primarily homosexual women
are less likely to he exclusively homosexual than are homosexual men. D. WEST, HOMOSEX-
UALITY RE-EXAMINED 168-69 (1977). Researchers also report that lesbians experience their
first homoerotic feelings later than do gay males, and that most lesbians have experienced
heterosexual intercourse, Id. at 172. Like gay males, a lesbian's first homosexual experience
usually occurs in the context of prior emotional or erotic attachments, and so lesbian seduc-
tions do not apparently cause a lesbian orientation. Id. Unsatisfactory heterosexual experi-
ences, however, often confirm a pre-existing lesbian orientation and may direct some females
away from heterosexual development.. Id.
Kinsey's lindings, however, have been questioned, because his subjects were not randomly
chosen, and disproportionately represented certain groups, such as college professors. See
Booth, Asking America About Its Sex Life, 243 SCIENCE 304 (1989).
Research indicates that same-gender sexual activity occurs in nearly every species of
mammal. FINALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at 448-51. Kinsey reasoned that mammals were
capable of responding to any sexual stimulus, and that exclusive heterosexuality or homo-
sexuality only arose because of experience. Id. at 450.
'25
 MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, .supra note 24, at 636-55; FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 24, at 468-69. Kinsey concluded that a considerable portion of the male population
had a combined history of both homosexual and heterosexual experiences or psychic re-
sponses, that some males have an exclusively homosexual history, while half of all males have
neither overt nor psychic homosexual experiences after the beginning of adolescence. MALE
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 639,650. Similarly, between eleven and twenty percent
of unmarried females, and eight to ten of married females, had experienced at least incidental
homosexual contacts or responses over a period of years. FEMALE SEXUAL. BEHAVIOR, supra
note 24, at 472. Kinsey further argued that his findings suggest that the ability to respond
erotically to any sort of stimulus, whether from the same or opposite sex, is basic in the
human species. Id. at 660. Some have similarly questioned the prevalent conception in the
United States of homosexuality as an orientation distinct from heterosexuality, noting that
other societies do not distinguish persons or conduct by the gender of the sexual partner.
Developments, supra note 24, at 1517-18. They reason that the distinction between heterosexual
and homosexual orientation is a social construct originating in institutional heterosexuality.
Id.
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selves homosexual have not engaged in homosexual conduct. 26
Homosexuals, according to studies, can be consistently found across
all social categories, including geographic areas, race, religion, ed-
ucational background, and social and economic class."
Research into the potential causes of sexual orientation suggest
that genetics, early family or other childhood conditions, or a mix
of those factors primarily determine a person's sexual orientation,
although factors later in childhood or in adult life may also have
an impact. 28
 Most persons, commentators note, become aware of
26 Developments, supra note 24, at 1511 n.l; SEx RESEARCH: STUDIES FROM THE KINSEY
INSTITUTE 203-04 (M. Weinberg ed. 1976) thereinafter SEx RESEARCH].
27 See Developments, supra note 24, at 1511 n.1; MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24,
at 625-31. With slight variations, Kinsey found that, concerning males, these statistics were
generally constant across social categories, including geographic and educational background.
Id. at 625-31. Kinsey did note some variations, including somewhat lower incidence figures
for males with college educations, as well as males who were more active in religion, much
higher figures for males who reached puberty at an early age, and lower figures for married
or older males. Id.
Concerning females, however, Kinsey did find a considerable difference based on edu-
cation levels, with greater percentages of more educated women having experienced hom-
osexual arousal and conduct. FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 959-61. Higher
degrees of religious activity also lessened the percentage of females with homosexual expe-
riences. Id. at 463-66. Single women were much more likely to have experienced homosexual
arousal or activity. Id. at 453-54. Nonetheless, Kinsey noted that women who had experienced
homosexual contact and intended to do so again were represented on all economic and social
levels. Id. at 478.
28 R. MOHR, so/Ira note 2, at 39; E. Hooker, Homosexuality, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY: FINAl. REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS
12-14 (J. Livingood ed. 1976) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]; Money, Sexual Dimorphism and
Homosexual Gender Identity, in TASK FORCE, supra, at 42.
As one medical psychologist noted, a person's homosexuality "may be a product of the
confluence of heredity and environment, constitution and learning, biology and sociology."
Money, supra, at 42. Research on whether biology or genetics determine sexual orientation
have concentrated on possible differences in hormones and genetics, with inconclusive results.
See D. WEST, SEXUAL CRIMES AND CONFRONTATION: A STUDY OF VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 97-
119 (1987); Money, supra, at 42-52. West noted intriguing evidence that homosexuality ran
in families, and particularly that identical twins were likely to have the same sexual orienta-
tion. D. WEST, supra, at 109-10. Research involving the effects of doses of estrogen on
hormone levels, according to West, also suggested that homosexual males experienced hor-
mone changes similar to females given the same doses, but other research reached conflicting
conclusions. Id. at 107-09. Other research has concentrated on possible sociological or en-
vironmental bases for sexual orientation, such as the effects of family relationships, or the
degree of sexual repression and rejection during childhood and early puberty, with equally
uncertain results. Id. at 1 11-19. In analyzing the early life histories of homosexual men and
women, West observed, researchers found that many homosexuals showed signs of devel-
oping homosexuality in early childhood, including early homosexual encounters with friends
of the same age, inability to meet social expectations for their gender, and unsatisfactory
heterosexual encounters. Id, at 1 12-13. West suggested that biological factors might be more
relevant to "primary" homosexuals, those who never had been aroused by members of the
opposite sex, whereas sociological and psychological factors might be more important for
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their sexual orientation even before they reach puberty, while others
remain unsure of their orientation even into adult life:29 Therapists
and others have attempted to treat homosexuals who have sought
conversion to heterosexuality through persuasive or authoritarian
instruction, behavioral modification involving aversive or reinforc-
ing techniques, psychotherapy, and physical treatments such as hor-
mones or even castrations."" Observers disagree on the success rates
of these methods, but some of the methods appear to have some
success for persons with some heterosexual experience, whereas
those homosexuals with significant heterosexual experiences. Id. at 102; see Schur, Sociocultural
Factors in Homosexual Behavior, in 'TASK FORCE, supra, at 32-33 (arguing that the development
of homosexual orientation may represent a deflection of early childhood sexual-object choice
from the usual pattern).
Kinsey, in his study of male sexuality, noted that male homosexuals tended to have
reached adolescence at a relatively early age, MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, Supra note 24, at 315,
(130. Kinsey, and later his institute for Sex Research, found a relation between early adoles-
cence and greater sex drive, and the Institute also suggested that homosexuality could arise
in these males because their heterosexual drives were blocked by societal sanctions of sexual
activities at younger ages. M. at 630; P. GE.miARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY, & C. CIIRISTENSON,
SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS Or TYPES 444 (1965) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDERS).
Although not minimizing the importance of biological and early childhood factors, others
argue that the sociological development and interactions of a person through the entire life
cycle also were factors in a person's sexual self-identification. Schur, supra, at 31-35. They
contend that the unavailability of heterosexual outlets, or poor heterosexual experiences that
result in feelings of inadequacy or of fear of the opposite sex, could be factors in a person
turning toward homosexuality. Id. at 34-35. They nonetheless recognize a distinction between
persons who engage in homosexual activities but who are predominantly heterosexual (such
as many prisoners), and those with a strong psychodynamic homosexual orientation, though
they argue that sociocultural factors throughout life can also affect the homosexual activities
of the latter group. Id. at 36-37.
These sociocultural factors may be more important for lesbians than for male homosex-
uals, because lesbians generally experience their first homosexual feelings and acts later than
male homosexuals, and are less likely to he exclusively or permanently homosexual, D. WEST,
supra note 24, at 177,189-92. Research into the potential causes of lesbianism is considerably
more scant than of male homosexuality. Id. at 168.
For a detailed overview of the various theories on the causes and development of
homosexuality, see id. at 59-118.
29 D. WEST, supra note 24, at 247. West also asserts that most homosexuals experience
homoerotic Feelings long before adolescence, and that they usually identify themselves as
homosexuals or at least non-heterosexual before puberty passes. Id. at 16. These feelings
arise before any homosexual activity, including seduction by an older person, occurs. Id.
Adolescent homosexual sex play and other experiences, researchers concluded, are very
common among males, and somewhat less so among females. N. These early homosexual
experiences, they found, do not predict later homosexual activity. Id. at 16-22. The persist-
ence of homosexual interests and the corresponding lack of development in heterosexual
interests appear to distinguish those destined to become primarily homosexual from others.
Id.
3" Id. at 247-275; Frank, Treatment of Homosexuals, in TASK FORCE. supra note 28, at 63—
68.
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predominantly homosexual persons rarely alter their sexual orien-
tation. 3 ' Though these methods may sometimes be successful, even
observers who in some circumstances advocate the availability of
these treatments for homosexuals who wish to convert argue that
the low rate of success, and the often futile disturbances caused to
many who undergo these treatments, make large-scale efforts at
conversion too costly, uncertain, and risky. 32 These observers argue
that therapists should instead concentrate on helping disturbed
homosexuals to accept their sexual identity, and on reducing their
guilt and anxiety."
Some commentators also maintain that, regardless of whether
or not some homosexuals can successfully convert and cease homo-
sexual activities, one's sexual orientation is not a matter of choice."
They describe a person's self-identification as a homosexual as the
discovery of a material condition and fact of life, not a choice that
comes out of a set of alternatives among which a person freely
chooses. 35
 Finally, according to these scholars, even if individuals
can alter their sexuality, the general existence of homosexuality
"' D. WEsT, supra note 24, at 247-75; Frank, supra note 30, at 66-67. The chances of a
conversion depend on the person's degree of homosexual orientation, desire to change, and
willingness to cooperate with any procedure to achieve that goal. D. WEST, supra note 24, at
265, 269, 275. There are some reports of supposedly exclusive homosexuals converting to
heterosexuality. See id. at 247-48, 263-64, 267-68, 273. But many who appeared to convert
either later reverted or suffered through unhappy and sexually frustrating heterosexual
relationships to keep up appearances. Id. at 249-50,264-65,274-75.
Kinsey noted that some men's sexual orientation may switch from predominantly hom-
osexual to heterosexual, or vice-versa, during their lives, but he also suggested that many
homosexual males who consciously attempt to switch to heterosexual relations find the
attempt too costly, and renew their homosexual activities. MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note
24, at 629-30, 633, 639.
" D. WEST, supra note 24, at 270; Frank, supra note 30, at 67.
WEs -r, supra note 24, at 270. As one observer pointed out, the suffering of
homosexuals would also be more adequately dealt with through the abolishment of legal
sanctions and the reduction of social stigma aimed at homosexuals. Frank, supra note 30, at
67.
"4 R. Montt. supra note 2, at 39-40.
35 Id. at 40. Mohr noted that most homosexuals discover themselves having homosexual
encounters or desires, and initially strongly resist the idea that they might be homosexual.
Id. With courage, luck, and effort, Mohr argued, some homosexuals come to accept their
orientation and freely act within their sexual identity. Id. at 40,42. Mohr further noted that
what sexually arouses someone was nut subject to one's will, and that even if someone could
choose his or her sexual orientation, few would make a choice that could lead to violence,
discrimination, and the disruption of one's life. Id. at 39-41. Others argue, however, that a
person might choose a homosexual orientation to avoid the pain of failed heterosexual
experiences and the responsibility of marriage and parenthood. See Schur, supra note 28, at
35.
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within society appears to be a permanent and constant phenome-
non.""
Historical and anthropological records appear to indicate that
homosexuality has been present in every society, in various guises
and with Varying degrees of tolerance and repression by those
societies. 37 Research into the opinions of persons in the United
=11' See MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 665. Sexual orientation appears im-
mutable both on a societal and individual level, Kinsey argued. Id. He further noted that.
society would have to isolate !Imre than a third of all males if it wanted to reach all those
with homosexual capacities, or over tell million mates (in 1948), even if only those who were
predominantly homosexual were "treated" or otherwise isolated. Id. Even if eliminated in
one generation, Kinsey argued, homosexuality would very likely recur in the next generation,
because homosexuality has been a significant and basic part of human activity throughout
human history. Id. at 666.
37 See FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 477 n.22; K. DOVER, GREEK Homo-
SEXUALITY (1978); 1. SLOAN, HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE LAW 1-4 (1987); D. WEST, Supra
note 24, at 119-36; Hooker, Hamosexualay, in 1'Asx FORCE, supra Dole 28, at 11-21.
"Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is aboinination." Leviticus 18:22.
"IT a man also lie with mankind, as with a woman, both of them have committed an
abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall he on them." Leviticus 20:13.
See Genesis 19, Leviticus 18:7, Judges l9, 1 Kings 22:47, 11 Kings 23:7, Romans 1:27, I
Corinthians 6:9, 1 Timothy 1:9-10, Talmud passim. But some scholars argue that Jewish religious
ceremonies before the Babylonian Exile included oral sodomy and homosexual activities.
FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 482. The strong Jewish condemnation of hom-
osexuality, they argue, arose after the Exile, when Jewish leaders tried to distinguish them-
selves from their neighbors, who also included homosexual activities in their religious cere-
monies. Id.
Sloan states that the earliest legal argument fur outlawing homosexuality is found
Plato's Laws. I. SLOAN, supra, at 1. Both Plato and the statements in the Old and New
Testaments suggest that the most objectionable aspect of homosexuality was that it involved
the degradation of a man to the status of a woman. Id. Others note that the Jewish condem-
nation of homosexuality, which carried over into Christian theology, arose because the Jews
identified homosexuality with the "idolatrous" religious practices of other ancient Near East
cultures. FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 482-83. The introduction of Christianity
in European cultures brought severe state and ecclesiastical penalties for homosexual offen-
ses, often including death. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 126-27. During this millenium,
homosexuality in Christendom has been punishable by burning, hanging, or burying alive,
though usually the actual penalties were less severe, consisting of exile, castration, corporal
punishment, or exclusion from the sacrament of communion. 1. SI.OAN, supra, at 1-2; see 1).
WEST, supra note 28, at 123-24. Despite these penalties, homosexual acts continued to be
common, as evidenced by recurring scandals that often included prominent persons and
heads of state. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 128-32: Islamic theology officially condemns
homosexuality, though less vehemently than Judeo-Christian doctrine, while secular Moslem
literature often contains strong homocrotic content. Id. at 121. More recently, homosexuals
were severely persecuted in the Soviet Union under Stalin and in Cuba under Castro, and
were often killed in Nazi Germany and Khomeini's Iran, I. SwAN, supra, at 124.
Evidence of the existence and comparative tolerance of homosexuality in ancient cultures
may be found in the histories of early Chinese emperors, in Greek mythology and Classical
Greek literature, in Roman history and literature until Constantine's conversion to Chris-
tianity, and even in one of the most-ancient extant poems, the Epic of Gilgamish. See D. WEST,
supra .note 24, at 122-26. Studies of contemporary primitive cultures indicate that many
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States about homosexuality indicates that a majority hold strong
negative views." Among the widely held beliefs researchers found
in a comprehensive 1970 study were that homosexuals are mentally
ill, are dangerous, especially to children, are effeminate, or are
unnatural, vulgar, and obscene." Many believed that older homo-
sexuals spread homosexuality to younger persons, and most be-
lieved homosexuals wish to seduce children or colleagues. 4° Most
also supported the criminalization of all homosexual contact, as well
as their exclusion from occupations involving authority or public
responsibility, while many opposed allowing homosexuals to exer-
cise various rights enjoyed by heterosexuals. 4 '
Very few persons were free of all antihomosexual attitudes, the
researchers found, and even those with few negative attitudes often
believed that homosexuals are a danger to children. 42 Although the
age, race, religious background, and education of the surveyed
individuals each affected the forms of attitudes and stereotypes they
held about homosexuals, the belief that homosexuality is abhorrent
permit sonic form of homosexual behavior for some members, and some require and -even
ritualize certain homosexual acts. Alternatively, other cultures discourage or punish homo-
sexual acts. Id. at 133-36. The degree of permissiveness of homosexual and heterosexual
activities did not necessarily coincide in these societies. Id. at 136.
These studies, however, indicate much less lesbian than male homosexual activity in
these societies. Id, at 134. Fewer historical references to lesbianism exist than to male hom-
osexuality, probably because of the greater attention generally paid to masculine affairs. Id.
at 177. The earliest historical artifacts of lesbianism are the surviving fragments of Sappho's
poetry from the sixth century B.C. Id. at 178. Literary references, usually negative or
scandalous, are also found in romantic literature of the middle ages, and more recent works
often display lesbian affairs ending in tragedy. Id. at 178-79.
Although all human societies have marital and family institutions, as well as incest taboos,
regulation of homosexual and heterosexual activities vary enormously. Id, at 136. Although
a society's degree of tolerance toward homosexuality may affect the forms and amount of
homosexual practices, homosexuality appears to be present in all societies. See id. at 119-36.
One study, relied on by a court, indicated that two-thirds of the societies studied showed no
evidence of homophobia (an exaggerated fear of homosexuals) and permitted some form of
homosexuality. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1145 n.59 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd,• 769
F.2d 289 . (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
For discussions of attitudes toward homosexuality in Judaic and Christian religious law
and history, see D. WEST, supra note 24, at 119-21, and Katz, Notes on Religious History,
Attitudes, and Laws Pertaining to Homosexuality, in TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 58-62.
'8 A. KLASSEN, C. 'WILLIAMS, & E. LEvrrr, SEX AND MORALITY IN THE U.S. 17-18, 166-
76 (1989) [hereinafter SEX AND MORALITY].
39 Id. at 166-68.
40 Id. at 170-73.
4 ' Id. at 173-76.
42 Id. at 178-81.
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was consistent across all demographic groups." These opinions,
according to these researchers, appeared to come from deep fears
and antipathy instilled by childhood teaching, and that were related
to traditional and authoritarian beliefs about gender roles, the fam-
ily structure, and sexual variation.'"
Although recent media polls suggest a substantial softening of
negative opinions toward homosexuals, they also indicate that an-
tipathy remains prevalent. 4 ' Some analysts of United States society
assert that its citizens are uniquely obsessed with homosexuality, and
that they generally see homosexuality as a personal threat, and so
react not just with distaste but with panic.`'" They suggest that the
panic arises from the fear by males of their own potential homo-
sexuality. 17 One study also found that heterosexuals experience less
discomfort with homosexuals as their exposure to homosexuals in-
creased.48
Public and private discrimination against homosexuals contin-
ues to prevail in the United States. 49 One study concluded that
44 Id. at 192-97.
41 Id. at 225-29, 241-44. The researchers concluded that childhood teaching instills
antihomosexual attitudes because an individual's early sexual experiences and level of edu-
cation correlate with the degree of that person's antihomosexual attitudes. Id. at 242-43.
See Homosexuals Gain More Acceptance, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A24, col. 1 (Gallup
poll indicated that 47 percent believed consensual, private homosexual relations should be
legal, and that 36 percent opposed legalization; although 71 percent supported equal em-
ployment rights for homosexuals, less than half believed homosexuals were appropriate
teachers or clergy); Alpern, A Newsweek Poll: Sex Laws, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at 36 (fifty-
seven percent opposed criminalization of private homosexual conduct, 74 percent opposed
criminalization of private heterosexual conduct; 44 percent avoided places where homosex-
uals might be, 25 percent avoid persons suspected of being homosexual, and 67 percent
claimed not to have friends or acquaintances who were homosexual).
4" Schur, supra note 28, at 33.
47 Id. at 33-34.
49 Lance, The Effects of Interaction With Gay Persons on Attitudes Toward Homosexuality,
HUMAN RELATIONS, June 1987, at 329.
49 See generally SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE Law (R. Achtenberg ed. 1987) [hereinafter
SEXUAL ORIENTATION] (discussing discrimination against homosexuals and providing a guide
to attorneys representing homosexual clients); R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-31 (discussing
contemporary discrimination against homosexuals); 1. SLOAN, supra note 37 (canvassing var-
ious areas of legal discrimination); Swisher, Gays in the 90's: Into the Mainstream?, Washington
Post, July 25, 1989, at C5, col. I (painting stark picture of ignorance of and antipathy toward'
homosexuals, especially outside more progressive urban areas).
The forms of discrimination, however, according to some scholars, have changed with
the evolution of the prevalent conceptions of same-sex sexual activity in the United States.
Developments, supra note 24, at 1512-18. They note that the society of the United States
through the late nineteenth century did not conceive of persons having different sexual
orientations, and instead simply considered all nonprocreative sexual conduct to be immoral
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homosexuals are probably victimized more often than any other
minority group in the United States. 5° A 1984 study by the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force indicated that ninety percent of gays
and lesbians had been victimized in some manner on the basis of
their sexual orientation. 51 According to the survey, twenty percent
of gay males and almost ten percent of lesbians reported physical
assaults because of their homosexual orientation. 52
 Some violence
against homosexuals leads to death." Commentators note that this
violence injures all homosexuals by perpetuating prejudice against
homosexuals, and by intimidating them." As many as seventy-live
percent of those homosexuals attacked did not report the assaults
and criminal. Id. at 1512. This society believed that everyone was capable of committing these
sins, including homosexual sodomy, and that any transgressor could repent. Id. at 1512-13.
These scholars argue that this conception of homosexual conduct as a sin explains why
lesbian conduct was generally tolerated and not criminalized in nineteenth century society,
because religious and moral condemnations of homosexualit y generall y did not include
women, and because society considered women to be asexual. Id. at 1512 n.9, 1513 &nn.1 fi-
17.
The current prevalent conception, according to scholars, is of homosexuality as part of
a person's identity. Id. at 1514. The negative version of this concept is of homosexual
orientation as an illness that afflicts a distinguishable class, which has led to the criminalization
of specific homosexual acts, and of other discrimination against homosexuals. Id. at 1514—
15.
s° Developments, supra note 24, at 1541 (citing study commissioned by National Institute
fur justice). Violence against homosexuals appears to be increasing. Id.
51 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 27-28 (citing NATIONAL. GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VICTIMIZATION (1984)); Developments, supra note 24, at 1541 (also citing
Task Force Survey).
52
 Developments, supra note 24, at 1541; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 27-28. Twenty-live
percent also reported incidents of objects being thrown at them. A third reported being
chased, and another third being sexually harassed. Fourteen percent reported tieing spit on.
Id, A survey of homosexual men in Great Britain found that 49 percent of gay Merl had
been physically attacked at least once because of their homosexuality, usually by an unknown
assailant or assailants. D. WEST, supra note 28, at 127 (citing "Thompson, West, & Woodhouse,
Socio-Legal Problems of Male Homosexuals in Britain, in SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 127 (D. West ed.
1985)).
" R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 28-29. Groups of young men targeting another man
perceived to be gay and beating him unconscious, sometimes to death; is a common form or
violence against homosexuals. See id. at 28-29; Repealable Rights, supra note 24, at 442 n.10
(young gay male in Maine thrown off bridge and killed, while going home from church, by
youths yelling "Hey, let's kick the shit out of this fag."); Some say antigay bias led to fatal
Dorchester beating, Boston Globe, Feb. 8,1990, at 1, col, 3 (residents and friends say gay male's
beating death likely because of his homosexuality; homosexual community leaders report
"huge increase" in attacks on homosexuals by teenagers); Two sentenced in Conn. beating,
Boston Globe, fan. 6,1990, at 43, col. 3 (four teenagers arrested during wave of beatings of
gay men in Hartford sentenced for several assaults and a hornocide).
54 Developments, supra note 24, at 1541-42.
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to law enforcement authorities, because they feared exposure, and
because the authorities themselves often victimize homosextials. 55
Homosexuals also face discrimination in private employment'"
and private housing.'' Homosexuals, particularly gay males, also
experience difficulties in securing health and life insurance, in part
because insurers perceive them as having an increased likelihood
of contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
related illnesses. 58 Absent statutory, regulatory or collective bargain-
ing prohibitions of discrimination against homosexuals, there are
no legal restraints to these forms of private discrimination. 59 Only
Wisconsin and Massachusetts, along with several counties and mu-
nicipalities, prohibit private discrimination against homosexuals in
such areas as employment, housing, and public accommodations.°
In a few states, executive orders or court decisions also prohibit
some forms of discrimination against homosexuals."'
The government also discriminates against homosexuals in a
variety of ways."2 Although homosexual federal civil servants enjoy
55 Id. at 1541-42 & n.152.
56 See, e.g., SEXUAL ORIENTATION, Supra note 49, § 5, at 5-4; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at
30; I. Si.oAN, supra note 37, at 21-23. Nearly a third of gay men reported being discriminated
against in some manner at their employment, and seventeen percent reported losing or being
denied employment because of their homosexuality. Developments, supra note 24, at 1575.
Nearly a quarter of lesbians also reported discrimination in the workplace. Id. The forms of
discrimination inFluded firings, refusals to hire or to promote, and harassment by co-workers
and supervisors. Id. at 1575 n.141; see also D. WEST, supra note 28, at 125 (surveys of male
homosexuals suggested that their sexual orientation stood as a barrier to career advance-
ment).
57 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 30; Developments, supra note 24, at 1612-18; see also SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro-2.
58 Developments, supra note 24, at 1663-66.
59 Id. at 1575-83, 1667-70.
w See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro-2, §§ 5.0312][cl—Idl, at 5-26 to 5-27,
§ 5.03[2][c] n,36; Repealable Rights. supra note 24, at 441, 445. Wisconsin prohibits employment
discrimination against homosexuals. Wis. STAT, ANN. § 111.31 (West 1988). Massachusetts,
as of February 13, 1990, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
employment, insurance, and housing, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151 B, §§ 1-18 (Supp. Dec. 1989),
and public accommodations, MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (Supp. Dec. 1989). The
statute, however, will likely face a referendum. Dukakis signs gay rights law; opponents vow to go
to voters, Boston Globe, Nov. 16, 1989, at 39, col. 1. See Developments, supra note 24, at 1668
n.50, for list or cities and counties with some form of regulation prohibiting discrimination
against homosexuals.
6 ' Developments, supra note 24, at 1667-68. See id. at 1668-70 for discussion of problems
some of these antidiscrimination measures lace.
57 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 30; Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 803-04
(1984) [hereinafter Heightened Scrutiny].
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some protection from employment discrimination, 63
 the federal
government explicitly discriminates against homosexuals in the mil-
itary, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the National Security Agency, and the State Depart-
ment." Military contractors are also forced to discriminate against
homosexuals because of the federal government's reluctance to give
security clearances to homosexuals. 65 The federal government may,
at its discretion, also deny entry to persons applying for immigration
status who "admit" to being homosexual, and may deport those
aliens whom the government admitted but subsequently discovered
were homosexual, if they were admitted when all homosexuals were
excludable. 66
The military has a long tradition of discrimination against horn-
osexuals. 67 Currently, the military administratively discharges any-
65
 SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 5.03(21[a], at 5-18; Developments, supra note 24,
at 1556-59. Achtenberg notes that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 requires that a
federal agency may only take action against a civil service employee because of that employee's
conduct if that conduct is shown to harm the work performance of the employee or other
employees. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1982). This protection
does not apply to non-civil service employees. Id.
" R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 30; Developments, supra note 24, at 1556.
65
 R. MOHR, 54111 note 2, at 30; see SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 5.04[2], at 5-
48.
66 SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 7.01, at 7-2 to 7-16; Developments, supra note
24, at 1660-63; see Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(West 1988) (denies entry into United States of persons "afflicted with psychopathic person-
ality, or sexual deviation"); Bout .ilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118,
120 (1967) (all homosexuals excludable because Congress intended to include them in cate-
gory of psychopathic personality).
67 See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 6, at 6-I to 6-52; Developments, supra note
24, at 1554-55. During the 1970s, the military discharged, less than honorably, 2,000-3,000
individuals annually for reasons involving sexual orientation. Estrich & Kerr, Sexual Justice,
in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS 128 (N. Dorsen ed. 1984) (citing C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY 28 (1971)). More current estitnates indicate that the military
discharged 15,000 persons between 1975 and 1985, and 4,600 between September, 1984 and
September, 1987, on grounds of homosexuality. Developments, supra note 24, at 1554 n.3.
Even so, statistics suggest that over three quarters of homosexuals in the military complete
their enlistments without problems. Estrich & Kerr, supra, at 128; SEx RESEARCH, supra note
26, at 234. Observers note that the military discharges women ten times more frequently
than men for same-gender sexual activity, suggesting that the military selectively enforces
these policies against women. Developments, supra note 24, at 1521 n.9, & 1554 n.3. Women
in the military have also claimed that male colleagues have used accusations of lesbianism to
coerce the women into having sexual relations, or to retaliate if they refused. Keen, Navy
Moves to Oust Three More Female Crew Members, Washington Blade, June 16, 1989, at 1, cal. 2.
Great Britain has a similar policy concerning homosexuals in the military. D. WEST, supra
note 28, at 121. See SEx RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 233-42, for study of homosexuals in
the military.
Historically, homosexuality and the military have not been mutually exclusive. For in-
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one who, prior to or during a period of military service, engaged
in or attempted to engage in a homosexual act, stated that they
were homosexual or bisexual, or married or attempted to marry a
person of the same sex."' The military, however, can retain some
who commit homosexual sodomy if it concludes that the act was an
aberration and that the person was not actually a homosexual."
Commentators note that the government justifies discrimina-
tion against homosexuals in the military and other positions requir-
ing security clearances because homosexuals are allegedly suscep-
tible to blackmail, and because they will damage morale and
discipline.'" The commentators note, however, that no evidence
supports the claim that homosexuals are especially susceptible to
blackmail."' The military's arguments that homosexuals damage
military performance, furthermore, are contradicted by studies
commissioned by the military that found that homosexuals perform
as well, or better, than other personnel, and do not cause problems
of morale or discipline. 72 Two recent studies commissioned by the
military but later quashed, in particular, found that homosexuals
stance, the Sacred Battalion of Thebes, composed of pairs of lovers, fought to the death at
Chaeronea, and Plato believed that homosexual liaisons between soldiers contributed to
martial valor. D, WEST, supra note 28, at 111; see V.L. BULLOUCH, SEXUAL VARIANCE IN THE
Socirry AND HISTORY 106 (1976).
" SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 6.03 (citing 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. I,
14.1.c(1)—(3) (1989)). The military regulation gives as a rationale for the restriction of hom-
osexuals in the military that the presence of homosexuals, including those who through
statements demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the
accomplishment of the military mission. Id. at pt. 41, app. A, pt. 1, 1.1.1. The military argued,
among other things, that the presence of homosexuals harms morale and discipline, military
flexibility, the recruitment arid retention of military personnel, and the prevention of breaches
in security. Id. As Great Britain has liberalized its laws concerning homosexuals, surveys of
homosexuals indicate less fear of or actual threats of blackmail, D. WEST, supra note 28, at
125.
69 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. I, H.1 .c(1) (1989). The military may retain a person who
commits a homosexual act if a strict set of guidelines are met that indicate that the conduct
or statement is a departure from the member's usual behavior, is not likely to recur, and is
not accomplished by force or intimidation, that the member's continued presence in the
military is consistent with the interests of the military, and that the member does not desire
to engage in future homosexual acts. Id. See also infra note 396 for additional information
on the Army regulations.
Developments, supra note 24, at 1560-61.
71 Id. None of the recent significant espionage cases involved homosexuals who were
blackmailed. Id. at 1560 (citing SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM,
S. Hac. No. 166, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-87, 913-26 (1985)).
72 Developments, supra note 24, at 1561-62. A 1957 Navy study found that homosexuals
displayed superior performance to Navy personnel in general. Id.
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are as or more suited to military service than the average hetero-
sexual."
State and local governments commonly practice employment
discrimination against homosexuals, especially in the fields of teach-
ing, law enforcement, fire prevention, social work, and other profes-
sions that deal with the public." In addition, some states, through
licensing laws, officially bar homosexuals from many professions."
In a few states, organizations promoting the interests of homosex-
uals have experienced difficulty incorporating,"
In the area of family law, many states disadvantage homosex-
uals through statutory or case law. 77
 No state recognizes as legal the
marriage of same-sex couples, and therefore most same-sex couples
cannot enjoy many of the benefits that marriage confers." Similarly,
71 1989 LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 65-66 (December, 1989). The first of the unclassified
reports, Nonconforming Sexual Orientation and Military Suitability, noted that leading authorities
describe sexual orientation in terms of gradations, not exclusive categories, that homosexual
orientation is not a mental illness, and that society treats homosexuals in a manner similar
to women and racial minorities. Id. The study then found that few homosexuals in the
military are separated from the military because of their orientation, and that homosexuals'
suitability for, and performance in, the military is satisfactory. Id. at 66. Other paramilitary
organizations such as the San Franscisco Police Department, the report noted, had success-
fully integrated homosexuals. Id. The underlying reason for the military's rejection, according
to the first report, is the false stereotype of homosexuals as "polluting the social environment
with unrestrained and wanton expressions of deviant sexuality." Id. The report concluded
that sexual orientation is unrelated to military performance, and that the military assertion
of intolerance of homosexuals causing morale problems could rapidly change. Id. The second
study, Preservice Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Military Accessions: Implications for
Security Clearance Suitability, applied factors considered predictive of military performance to
homosexuals and heterosexuals, and concluded that "homosexuals show preservice suitability-
related adjustment that is as good or better than the average heterosexual." Id. See Nickel,
Get a Jump on Life—Unless You're Gay, Daily Free Press (Boston University), Nov. 3, 1989, at
9, col, 1 (discussing several discharges of homosexuals, including a Congressional Medal of
Honor winner, and a West Point cadet who was sent to a military prison for a year and
dishonorably discharged; also notes that Marines were trying to discharge a woman for
"astociating with known lesbians"); Military seeks third study of policy on gays, Boston Globe,
Nov. 2, 1989, at 1, col. I (military orders another study after rejecting first two).
" K. MOHR, supra note 2, at 30.
7" Id.; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, .supra note 49, § 5.04[3], at 5-48.
76
 Developments, supra note 24, at 1666.
" See Estrich & Kerr, supra note 67, at 124 .-26; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49,
§§ 1-3, 5.
" Estrich & Kerr, supra note 67, at 124-26; see Developments, supra note 24, at 1605-11;
Note, From This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J.
1783 (1988).
In Singer v. Hara, the appellate court held that Washington denied marriage licenses to
same-sex couples not because of their gender, which would violate the equal protection
clause, but because of the impossibility of reproduction front their marriage. 11 Wash. App.
247, 254-60, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974). Commentators note, however, that many hetero-
sexual couples cannot, or choose not to, have children, while homosexual couples can through
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many jurisdictions impose limits on the ability of unrelated persons
to live together, which provides a legal basis for discrimination
against homosexuals in housing.'" The states' refusal to provide
legal recognition of same-sex marriages also excludes homosexuals
from other benefits that married couples enjoy in such areas as
property and inheritance rights, social security and pension entitle-
ments, workers' compensation, standing to sue for wrongful death
and other torts, and state and federal taxes. 8"
Some states recognize the homosexuality of one partner in a
marriage as grounds for divorce, which can affect the division of
marital assets.'" All states allow homosexuality to be a factor in
determining the custody of children or visitation rights, while some
states deprive homosexual parents of custody even with no evidence
of actual or potential harm to the child." States often do not allow
same-sex couples to adopt, though some allow for adoption by
homosexuals who are in a heterosexual marriage."
Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia con-
tinue to impose criminal sanctions for some forms of consensual
sodomy.84 Seven of these states proscribe only homosexual so-
domy." Commentators argue that even statutes that proscribe all
artificial insemination or surrogacy, Developments. supra note 24, at 1608-10. The New York
Court of Appeals has held that homosexual couples living together ntay constitute a family
for purposes of rent control regulation. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543
N.E.2d 49, 55, 544 N.Y.5.2c1 784, 790 (1989). A few jurisdictions allow homosexual couples
to establish a legally recognized family relationship through the adoption of one partner by
the other. Emrich & Kerr, supra note 67, at 125; see Developments, supra note 24, at 1623-28
for a discussion of contracts and adult adoption as possible legal remedies to these disadvan-
tages.
Estrich & Kerr, supra note 67, at 125; Developments, supra note 24. at 1612-18.
°') Estrich & Kerr, .supra note 67, at 125; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro-
1; Developments, supra note 24, at 1611-23; see Reynolds, Gay couples redefine family, Boston'
Globe, Oct. 5, 1989, at 101, col. 4 (some municipalities, businesses, and employers beginning
to give homosexuals same benefits that married couples receive).
RI
 SEXUAL ORIENTATION, sUpra note 49, §§ 1.0211H21, at 1-4 to 1-6.
82
 Estrich & Kerr, .supra note 67, at 126; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 1.03, at
1-7 to 1.9; Developments, supra note 24, at 1629-42; see D. West, supra note 28, at 149-50;
see also GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (F. Bozett ed. 1987) (essays discussing various problems
and virtues related to homosexual parenting).
" SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 1.04[2], at 1-74 to 1-76; see Developments, supra
note 24, at 1642-48. California and several other states allow homosexuals to adopt. Adams,
Gay couples begin a baby boom, Boston Glolx, Feb. 6, 1989, at '2, col. 3. Despite the barriers
that homosexual couples face in seeking to adopt or to provide foster care, many homosexuals
succeed in doing so. Developments, supra note 24, at 1645.
84 I. SLOAN. supra note 37, at 7; Developments, Apra note '24, at 1519-20 & 11.2.
85 Developments, supra note 24, at 1520 & n.5. The seven states are Arkansas, Kansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and Texas. Id. Some states may apply neutral sodomy
392	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:375
sodomous activity disproportionately affect gay males, because the
statutes prohibit the primary form of sexual activity for them while
only affecting a portion of the sexual activities of heterosexuals. 86
Others note that, although rarely enforced, public officials and
private persons often invoke sodomy statutes to justify discrimina-
tion because of a presumption that they engage in prohibited so-
domy.87 In 1986, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of statutes criminalizing homosexual sodomy, rea-
soning that no privacy right exists to engage even in private, con-
sensual, homosexual sodomy."
Commentators further argue that the courts have applied dif-
ferent standards and distorted legal precedents in cases involving
homosexuals," These scholars note, for instance, that courts have
held that public employers who fire homosexuals for belonging to
homosexual organizations or advocating homosexuals' rights do not
violate the first amendment rights of the discharged employees. 60
statutes only against homosexual sodomy because of judicial invalidation of the statutes as
applied to heterosexual sodomy. Id.
as Heightened Scrutiny, .supra note 62, at 801-02; see also United States v. Lemon, 697 F,2d
832, 838 (8th Cir. 1983) (homosexual convicted of sodomy for oral sex in public bathroom;
held no violation of equal protection because heterosexual sodomy in public also equally
punishable); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490-92, 415 N.E.2d 936, 942-43, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 952-53 (1980) (state sodomy statute violated right of privacy and equal pro-
tection rights of unmarried persons). But see Developments, supra note 24, at 1521 & n.11
(cautioning against overemphasizing sodomy as form of homosexual conduct because deval-
ues importance of love and companionship for homosexuals, and ignores nonsodomous
forms of sexual activity engaged in by homosexuals); see also id. at 1525-37 (discussing equal
protection and state constitutional challenges to sodomy statutes).
DeVelopments, supra note 24, at 1520-21.
8"
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see infra notes 298-347 and accom-
panying text for discussion of Hardwick.
"9 See SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 9, at 9-1 to 9-52; J. 13AER, supra note 22, at
231, 237-42; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 28-29; Note, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the
Court System; Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 497 (1984).
"" See J. 11 milt, supra note 22, at 243-49; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, § 9.02[ 11(gb
at 9-12 to 9-16.2; see also Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 856-57 (D. Md.
1973) (homosexual activism may be grounds for dismissal). But see National Gay Task Force
v. Board of &Inc., 729 F.2d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir, 1984) (part of statute prohibiting teacher
from advocating or promoting homosexual activity violated first amendment).
The courts have generally, on first amendment grounds, not allowed public universities
to deny recognition to homosexual student organizations. See Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A.
& M. Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1330 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Lib. v. University of Missouri, 558
F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977), cell denied, 434 U.S. 1080, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 981 (1978);
Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students
Organization of the Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974);
Developments, supra note 24, at 1587-89. Courts have generally not allowed public schools to
restrict homosexual students from politically expressing their sexual orientation. Id. at 1586—
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Some courts also have held that the solicitation to engage in non-
commercial homosexual acts is not protected speech under the first
amendment, even when the conduct itself is not illegal."'
Commentators observe that in criminal cases, the courts often
punish crimes against homosexuals less severely," 2 while the hom-
osexuality of criminal defendants can prejudice their defense."
Police and juries sometimes discount the witness-statements and
testimony of homosexuals."4 The police also selectively enforce.crim-
inal statutes against homosexuals, frequently through entrapment,
and often harass and assault homosexuals."5 Thus, commentators
87; see Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381,384 (D.R.1. 1980) (male student bringing male
date to prom constituted protected expression); see generally Developments, supra note 24, at
1585-95, for a discussion or hoinusexuai students' first amendment rights.
Teachers' first amendment rights, however, are much more restricted, and they have
been fired even for private statements of homosexual orientation. Id. at 1595-1603; see
Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444,446 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding firing
of public school guidance counselor because she expressed that she was homosexual), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
01
 Developments, stqoa note 24, at 1538-40. One rationale for placing homosexual solic-
itation outside first amendment protections is that the speech is likely to offend the "average"
(i.e., heterosexual) person and cause that person to react violently, so that solicitation amounts
to fighting words. Id. at 1539-40; see State v, Phipps, 58 Ohio St, 2d 271,389 N.E.2d 1128
(1979).
92 R. Mona, supra note 2, at 28-29; Developments, supra note 24, at. 1542-48. According
to Mohr, the courts often construe assaults or murders of gays as justified self-defense or a
panicked response to sexual overtures. R. Montt, supra note '2, at 28-29. In December, 1988,
a Texas district court judge gave the convicted murderers of two gay men 30 year sentences,
instead of the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Panel to Examine Remarks by Judge on
Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,1988, at A16, col. 5. He explained the sentence by saying
that he "put prostitutes and gays on about the same level," and that he would be "hard put
to give someone life fi n killing a prostitute." Id. The judge also stated that he did not "much
care for queers cruising the street picking, up teen-age boys." Id. Similarly, a Florida judge,
during the trial of two men for killing a homosexual, expressed disbelief when told that
beating a homosexual was a crime. Repealable Rights, supra note 24, at 445 n.22.
93 Developments, supra note 24, at 1551-53.
54 R. Mona, supra note 2, at 28-29.
95 Id.; see Developments, supra note 24, at 1533 (sodomy statutes selectively enforced); id.
at 1537 (solicitation statutes selectively enforced); id. at 1542 (police harassment and violence
against homosexuals). To avoid vagueness challenges to solicitation statutes, some courts have
interpreted those statutes to criminalize only the solicitation of illegal sexual activity, including
noncommercial, consensual homosexual activity. Id. Even where sodomy is legal, moreover,
some courts have nonetheless applied solicitation statutes to solicitations to commit sodomy.
Id. at 1538.
A 1988 survey indicated that twenty percent of homosexuals suffered police harassment.
Repealable Rights, supra note 24, at 442 n.10. The Institute for Sex Research found in 1965
that roughly twenty percent of males convicted or sexual offenses involving consenting or
non-consenting male partners age sixteen or older were arrested by means of plainclothes
policemen or other persons who made themselves available for homosexual solicitation, and
who usually encouraged the solicitation, SEX OFFENDERS, supra note '28, at. 354. One-third of
394	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:375
argue, the courts depart from precedent to deny homosexuals the
fundamental rights that all other citizens enjoy,96 and create a special
dogma that devalues the life and liberty of homosexuals. 97
Commentators, including Professor Tribe, also emphasize that
the severe consequences homosexuals face if they publicly identify
themselves as homosexuals cause them to conceal their sexual ident-
ities from society." These commentators note that these conse-
quences effectively force homosexuals .to become an invisible mi-
nority, unable to complain of discrimination without inviting even
more discrimination." Government officials, according to observers,
also face political risks if they politically support homosexuals.m
the arrests were the results of the police viewing the offense, and in nearly one-fifth of the
arrests the police discovered the conduct during other investigations. Id. Only eleven percent
of arrests were reported by the partner, nine percent by friends or relatives of the partner,
and five percent by witnesses. Id. By comparison, forty-seven percent of arrests of males for
offenses involving consenting female partners over age sixteen were reported by friends or
relatives of the female, eighteen percent by police as a byproduct of investigation, sixteen
percent by the female partner, eleven percent by witnesses, and seven percent by the wife of
the offender. Id. at 130-31. The Institute noted that the prevalence of the targeting and
entrapment of homosexual males by the police had led to extortion scams, in which the
extortionist posed as a police officer, "arrested" a homosexual who solicited him, and extorted
money from the victim in exchange for releasing him. Id. at 354-55. The use of force in
homosexual offenses, according to the Institute, was very rare. Id. at 11, 324,
se J, BAER, supra note 22, at 231.
. See id. at 249; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 29; Developments, supra note 24, at 1511-12.
Commentators also note that legal scholars often are stigmatized by their peers for addressing
homosexual issues, and that the legal community often trivializes and ignores legal issues
involving homosexuals. Id. at 1512 n.4.
sa See J. BAER, supra note 22, at 226; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 27; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1434 Sc n.93 (2d ed. 1988); Estrich & Kerr, supra note 67, at 102;
Developments, supra note 24, at 1541-42; see also Alpern, A Newsweek Poll: Sex Laws, NEWSWEEK,
July 14, 1986, at 38 (sixty-seven percent claimed not to have homosexual friends or acquain-
tances).
9' R. MOOR, supra note 2, at 27. The fear of society publicly labeling someone a homo-
sexual not only silences homosexuals, but also silences male victims of sexual assaults by other
males. R. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 76-77 (1979); S.
GOLDSTEIN, THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT,
INVESTIGATION, AND INTERVENTION 35, 60 (1987). Geiser observes that although adults fear
that a young female victim of sexual assault will be repulsed by sex because of the trauma
of the assault, they conversely fear that male victims will be turned toward homosexuality, as
if the experience had been pleasant. R. GEISER, supra, at 76-77. According to Geiser, this
phenomenon is indicative of "the American male's excessive dread of anything that smacks
of homosexuality," because of his belief that if someone is exposed at all to homosexuality,
he will become one. Id. at 77. Geiser describes this as the basic tenet of homophobia, "the
fear that if you try it, you'll like it," which, in Freudian terms, supports the theory that
homophobia is a defense against,underlying homosexual wishes and fantasies. Id.
1011 See Homosexuals Are Target of Courter in New Jersey, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at 13 I ,
col. 2 (gubernatorial candidate advocates restrictions on homosexuals as teachers, foster
parents, or other positions dealing with children; political observers state that candidates
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Commentators also assert that the legal sanctions and social op-
probrium aimed at homosexuals undermine many homosexuals'
morale and psychological health, increase their anxiety, and make
them vulnerable to exploitation, while apparently not deterring
homosexual acts.'°' This intense antipathy, they note, causes many
homosexuals to experience guilt, fear, or negative opinions about
their own sexuality, with resulting psychological and sexual prob-
lems.'°2 Professor Tribe observes that the choice of whether to
reveal one's homosexual orientation to others is of substantial im-
portance.'°3 Although doing so, he notes, may bring enormous
social and economic costs, not doing so may exact a tremendous
price in self-esteem and fulfillment. 1 °4
opposing Courter's position risked being associated with outspoken homosexuals); Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (prejudice forced politicians
to appear not to be concerned for homosexuals), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir, 1989) (en bane). Public officials are not the only ones who face risks if they appear to
support homosexuals. See "Thirtysomething" episode lost ads, Boston Globe, Nov. 17, 1989, at
46, col. 6 (half of show sponsors pulled advertisements because of scene showing two hom-
osexuals in bed together).
151 Schur, supra note 28, at 38-41; see D. WEST, supra note 24, at 192-208. But see SEX
RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 247-49 (greater rejection of homosexuals in United States than
in Europe not found to cause greater impairment to homosexuals' psychological health).
1" SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 207-08.
In our society—which does all it can to drive homosexuals underground and to
instill fear in those who seek out sexual partners, which endows furtive, imper-
sonal sexual encounters with survival value, and which attempts to inculcate
negative views of homosexual behaviors to which homosexuals themselves are
frequently not immune—the kinds of sexual problems many homosexuals re-
port are not at all surprising.
Id.; see Adams, For many gay teenagers, torment leads to suicide tries, Boston Globe, Jan. 3, 1989,
at 1, col. 2.
Other scholars argue that sonic homosexuals, ashamed of their inclinations, try desper-
ately to suppress and deny them, arid often violently condemn other homosexuals. D. WEST,
supra note 24, at 2. Kinsey notes that the police and judges who enforce laws against
homosexuals, and the clergy and members of other groups who condemn homosexuals, are
RS likely to have homosexual experiences as other groups. MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 24, at 665. These persons, Kinsey argues, are not hypocrites, but instead victims of the
mores that society demands they protect, despite the gap between custom and actual societal
behavior, Id.; see Hitchens, It Dare Not Speak Its Name: Fear and Loathing on the Gay Right,
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Aug. 1987, at 70 (several leaders of virulent antihomusexual political
movement themselves are homosexual).
That many homosexuals suffer psychological harm because of discrimination and prej-
udice, however, does not mean that homosexuals are more likely to be psychologically ill.
See infra note 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of correlation between
sexual orientation and psychological health.
in L. miBE, supra note 98, at 1434.
101 Id.; sea D. WEST, supra note 24, at 161. For a discussion of the experiences of particular
homosexuals in admitting to themselves and others that they were homosexual, see Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1126-28 (MD. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir, 1985) (en
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Scholars further observe that the consequent invisibility of
homosexuals to the rest of society increases society's ignorance of
homosexuals.'" The void created by that ignorance, these scholars
argue, is filled by various stereotypes that in turn serve to justify
discriminationi 06 Some of the stereotypes the commentators iden-
tify include the perception of homosexuals as child molestors or
sex-crazed criminals, as neurotics or psychotics, 107 or as likely to
alter the sexual orientation of children with whom they come in
contact. 1 b" Another prevalent stereotype, which commentators ob-
serve often justifies discrimination against homosexuals, is that they
presumptively engage in criminalized sodomy.'"
These scholars note, however, that the American Psychiatric
Association and other professional organizations no longer consider
homosexuality to be a psychiatric disorder, and that many homo
sexuals live happy, well-adjusted lives despite the opprobrium
banc); Deacon, Tyranny of the Closet, Boston Phoenix, Sept. 1,1989, at section 1, p. 7, col. 1
(account of Rep. Barney Frank); R. Mona, supra note 2, at 157-61 (account of Rep. Gerry
Studds),
tos R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22. West suggests that many of the stereotypes concerning
homosexuality arise from its more public manifestation, such as homosexual clubs and steam
baths, from the often radical and occasionally outrageous activities of homosexual activist
groups, and from the camp mannerisms and dress often found when groups of male
homosexuals congregate. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 136-157. (See id. for a critical discussion
of these forms of homOsexual activities as observed in the mitt-1970s.) West goes on to argue
that only a tiny fraction of persons predominantly homosexual participate in homosexual
organizations or regularly patronize homosexual gathering places. Id. at 157. The vast, silent
majority of primarily homosexual persons, West reasons, are as different From each other in
terms of beliefs, intelligence, interests; and sexual behavior, as are heterosexuals. Id. West
concludes that many homosexuals enjoy stable relationships or live happy and fulfilled lives.
See id. at 157-61,
'°6 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-23. Stereotypes of homosexuals and the effects of
homosexuality can take outrageous forms, as in a seventeenth-century Lutheran professor's
claim that homosexuality results in "earthquakes, famine, pestilence, Saracens, floods, and
very fat, voracious field mice." B. CARPZOV, PRACTICA RERUM CRIMtNALIUM, as quoted in
Katz, supra note 37, at 61.
Kinsey suggests that, if school officials, prison administrators, judges, police, military
officers, and members of the community keep in mind that between a quarter and a third
of all males have some homosexual experience, they might begin to view and treat homo-
sexual individuals they encounter in more adequate and positive ways. MALE SEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR, supra note 24, at 663-65; see Lance, The Effects of Interaction With Gay Persons on Attitudes
Toward Homosexuality, HUMAN RELATIONS, June, 1987, at 329 (1983 research study found that
heterosexual discomfort with homosexuals decreased with exposure).
'° R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 23; MALE SEXUAL BEllAvioR, supra note 24, at 659-60. For
a discussion of sexual attacks in prisons, and of homosexual prostitution, see D. WEST, supra
note 28, at 142-46,150-54.
m" See D. WEs -r, supra note 28, at 150; J. BAER, supra note 22, at 246.
1,9 Developments, supra note 24, at 1520-21.
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caused by their sexual orientation that results in increased anxiety
for some."° They further observe that studies indicate that gay men
11, See D. WEST supra note 24, at 241-46; SEX RESEARCH, SUpTa note 26, at 211-12,246—
57.
.. if homosexuality itself is a pathological condition, then it must be one of
the most common psychological disorders known. It would be an illness from
which over a million men and probably as many women were suffering, and
would constitute a far bigger health problem than cancer, heart conditions or
any other disease . . . .{Tlhe increasingly prevalent idea of referring to homo-
sexuality as a sickness is part of a common approach in modern society to regard
non-conformity and mental illness as synonymous.
M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL. ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1965), as quoted in M. SCHOFIELD,
THE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUNG ADULTS 196 (1973).
Kinsey also argues, given the incidence and frequency of homosexual acts and feelings
in the population, that homosexual impulses could not be considered as evidence of psychoses
or neuroses, or even as abnormal or unnatural. MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at
659-60. Later studies by the Institute for Sex Research found no correlation between sexual
orientation and psychological functioning. SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 211,249. Al-
though the studies found that some homosexuals develop sonic psychological problems
correlating to fear of disclosure, lack of self-acceptance, or other factors related to societal
opinions of homosexuality, they also found that many other homosexuals are better adjusted
than the average population. Id. at 249-57. Noting that the level of negative societal reactions
does not seem to weaken the psychological adjustment of homosexuals as a group, the
Institute reasoned that homosexuals are no more likely to be psychologically maladjusted
than are heterosexuals. Id. at 211,247,249-50. Psychological research of lesbians, although
widely at variance, provides no evidence of generalized neurotic disturbances among lesbians,
and even suggests that lesbians are more independent and aggressive than heterosexual
women. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 180-89.
Some modern psychiatrists have described homosexuals as mentally ill, miserable, and
frustrated, symptoms that they argue arise from an inability to find genuine love or social
acceptance, and from the disillusionment with the promiscuity, loneliness, and self-disgust
of the homosexual lifestyle. Id. at 241-44. Other, more sympathetic psychiatrists, although
not maintaining that homosexuality is inherently a mental disorder, believe that homosex-
uality often leads to feelings of insecurity, inadequacy, and self-rejection because of society's
strong condemnation, and that therefore psychiatrists should steer persons toward hetero-
sexuality where feasible. See id. at 245-46; Marmor, Notes on Some Psychodynamic Aspects of
Homosexuality, in TASK FORCE, supra note 28, at 55. Psychiatrists who argue that homosexuals
show a variation in psychological health similar to heterosexuals criticize these psychiatrists
for using non-representative samples, such as their own patients, or persons referred by the
courts, to reach their results. See Schur, supra note 28, at 30. West notes the quote by Van
Den Haag, who, in response to a colleague's remark that "all my homosexual patients are
quite sick," retorted "so are all my heterosexual patients." D. WEST, supra note 24, at 244-
45. They argue that studies with representative samples of homosexuals indicate that hom-
osexuals are not consistently different from heterosexuals in their psychiatric functioning,
and that many homosexuals enjoy happy and psychologically healthy lives. See id. at 244-45;
Hooker, supra note 37, at 15-16; Schur, supra note 28, at 30; Marmor, supra, at 55.
In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association adopted a resolution that:
Whereas homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability,
reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities, therefore, be it resolved
that the American Psychiatric Association deplores all public and private dis-
crimination against homosexuals in such areas as employment, housing, public
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are less likely to be child molestors than are heterosexual men,'"
accommodation and licensing and declares that no burden of proof of such
judgment, capacity, or reliability shall be placed upon homosexuals greater than
that imposed on any other person. Further, the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion supports and urges the enactment of civil rights legislation at the local,
state, and federal level that would offer homosexual citizens the same protec-
tions now guaranteed to others on the basis of race, creed, color, etc. Further,
the American Psychiatric Association supports and urges the repeal of all dis-
criminatory legislation singling out homosexual acts by consenting adults in
private.
D. WEs .r, .supra note '14, at 241-42. At the same time, the Association removed homosexuality
from its list of mental disorders, while retaining under "sexual orientation disturbance" those
persons who were primarily homosexual and who were disturbed by or wished to change
their orientation. Id. at 242. The Association therefore no longer advocates the treatment of
homosexuality unless a homosexual is disturbed by his or her orientation or wishes to change
it. Id.
See A. BURGESS, A. GROTH, L. HOLMSTROM, & S. SCRIM, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS 3-5 (1978); V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES
ColvevirrrEo BY ADULTS vii, 38,69-70 (1969) (study shows that the vast majority of sex crimes
committed by adults against children are committed by men against girls); Groth, Adult Sexual
Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, in 7 ARCHIVES or SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 175-81
(1978); Developments, supra note 24, at 1639-40.
Statistics compiled by the Institute for Sex Research in its 1965 study of males charged
with various sexual offenses involving both consenting and non-consenting partners suggests
that male offenders involving children or minors are more concerned with the age than the
sex of the object, and that pedophilia rather than sexual orientation often determines whether
a male would attempt sexual contact with a child or minor of either sex. SEX OFFENDERS,
supra note 28, at 294, 297. The Institute found that males convicted of sexual offenses
involving either resisting or non-resisting male children (below age 12) and minors (between
ages 12 and 15) are less homosexually-oriented than those whose offenses involve consenting
male adults (age 16 or older). Id. at 624-38. The Institute's findings also indicate that
homosexuals are no more likely to have relations with or be attracted to children than are
heterosexuals. The findings indicate that males convicted of offenses involving either male
or consenting female adults (age 16 or older) are unlikely to commit later offenses against
children. Id. at 715-16.
Robert Geiser more recently argued that homosexual pedophilia is not synonymous with
homosexuality, and that homosexuals attracted to adults are apparently extremely unlikely
to engage in sexual acts with children. R. GEISER, supra note 99, at 78. He observed that
studies indicate that males who sexually abuse male children are more likely to have a
heterosexual history and orientation than a homosexual one, and that a quarter of males
imprisoned for sexual offenses involving boys also had committed offenses with girls. Id. at
75. Geiser cited a study that found that of 27 males who had committed sexual offenses with
only male or with male and female children, and who were primarily attracted to adults,
nineteen were bisexually oriented, while none were primarily homosexual. Id. at 78 (citing
Groth Sc Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7 ARCHIVES OF
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 178 (1978)). As for those offenders against male or male and female
children who were primarily attracted to children, the study indicates that although they
were somewhat more likely to choose males, they were mainly attracted to the "feminine"
qualities of young boys; the study also noted that these offenders expressed strong aversions
to adult homosexuality. Id. Geiser also stated that males who were sexually attracted to teenage
boys were usually bisexual or heterosexual, and, unlike homosexuals, tended to view the
sexual activity not as part of a lifestyle but instead as recreational. Id. at 80-81.
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and as a group are not prone to crime, including violent crimes and
public sexual activity. " 2 They also argue that the sexual orientation
West also noted recent studies that support the conclusions of the Institute, particularly
research that found that homosexual men are less aroused by pictures of male children than
are heterosexual men by pictures of female children. I). WEST, supra note 28, at 49 (citing
Freund, Assessment of Paedophilia, in ADULT SEXUAL INTEREST IN CHILDREN (M. Cook & K.
Howells eel, 1981)). West also observed other studies that indicate that heterosexuals are
more likely than homosexuals to sexually involve themselves with children when frustrated
in contacts with adults. Id. (citing Newton, Hoinosexual Behavior and Child Molestation: A Review
of the Evidence, ADOLESCENCE 13, 29-54 (1978), and Caul) & Birnbaum, Adult Sexual Orien-
tation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 175-81 (1978)).
West concluded not only that most pedophiles seek females, but that homosexuals do not
pose a greater risk to children than do heterosexuals. Id. at 45, 49. For a general discussion
of research concerning pedophilia, see generally id. at 40-74. See also S. GoLosTEIN, supra
note 99, at 30-31 (sexual offenders of children were pedophilic, which was a completely
separate issue from gender and sexual preference, though pedophilic offenders did have
identifiable age and sex preferences).
" 2 SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 28, at 357, 716, The Institute for Sex Research concluded
that males convicted of sexual offenses involving older boys and men pose no criminal threat
to society. Id. The Institute found that persons convicted of multiple homosexual offenses
involving consenting adult males are the most likely of any studied category not to have
other convictions for offenses involving force or minors. Id. at 706. The Institute reasoned
that 85 percent of arrests leading to convictions for homosexual offenses involving adults
arose from situations where arrest was improbable or unlikely, indicating that the homosexual
offender made efforts to he discrete. Id. at 354. A relatively high percentage of these arrests,
however, arose from activities outside residences, such as in restrooms and outdoors, as
compared to arrests for heterosexual offenses involving consenting adult females. Id. at 353,
765-69. The Institute reasoned that prevalent social tolerances, such as the acceptability of
heterosexual courtship in the home, and the resulting location of potential sexual partners,
cause homosexuals to seek partners in more public places. Id. at 765-69. Other factors
causing this difference include that twenty percent of homosexual offenses involving males
do riot involve any physical contact, with most of these instances involving solicitation,
suggesting that many arrests occur before the offender could go to a residence. Id. at 353,
765, The Institute also found that the use of narcotics during homosexual offenses involving
adults was insignificant, while alcohol played a small role in these offenses compared to other
sexual offenses. Id. at 353.
The Institute also found that of homosexual offenses involving adults, 93 percent in-
volved a male partner who encouraged or was passive to the conduct, while three percent
involved physical duress. Id. at '354, Homosexual offenses, according to the Institute, have
very low relative incidences of force or threat, especially those offenses involving adults. Id.
at 788, 790-92. Similarly, homosexual offenders in general had the smallest proportion of
non-sexual crimes involving violence or threats of harm of any class of sex offenders,
according to the Institute, while homosexual offenders also convicted of non-sexual crimes
likely were convicted for crimes of' vagrancy and disorderly conduct. Id. at 703-04, The
predominance of arrests of homosexuals for vagrancy and disorderly conduct, the Institute
suggested, was because of methods many homosexuals use to meet potential sexual partners,
and also because the police use these charges as convenient ways to pick up and hold people.
Id. at 702-03. These findings indicate that males convicted of homosexual offenses show no
greater likelihood of committing non-sexual crimes or any crimes involving force. See D.
WEST, supra note 28, at 139-42.
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of parents"' and teachers" 4 has no effect on the sexual orientation
of children. Studies further indicate that homosexuals are as capable
as heterosexuals of good parenting. 115
Commentators also observe that those jurisdictions that have
decriminalized homosexual conduct or protected homosexuals from
discrimination show no evidence of increased criminal behavior," 6
nor an increase in the spread of diseases such as AIDS." 7 Although
seventy-three percent of known AIDS cases in the United States
involve gay and bisexual males, experts argue that new cases of
AIDS have ceased to be an epidemic for gay males."" Commenta-
tors also note research that shows that homosexuals are not exces-
sively and stereotypically interested in sexual activity, and that hom-
osexuals also enjoy nonsexual and long-term sexual relations." 9
The degree of sexual interest and activity for homosexuals, like
heterosexuals, they reason, varies greatly between individuals.' 20 To
113 Developments, supra note 24, at 1638-39 & n.76. Approximately three million homo-
sexuals in the United States are parents, and homosexual households raise more than eight
million children. Id. at 1629. West noted that the courts, although becoming more open to
granting custody to a homosexual parent, remain concerned about children in a household
with a homosexual couple developing confused gender identities or sexual orientation, or
facing embarrassment and social problems. D. WEST, supra note 28, at 150. He noted,
however, surveys of lesbian households in which the sexual orientation of the single parent
or lesbian couple had little apparent affect on the child's sexual identity development or
social functioning. Id.
114 J. BAER, supra note 22, at 246 (arguing that because studies indicate that sexuality is
determined no later than the fifth year of life, the sexuality of teachers probably could have
no affect on the sexuality of students). Geiser also argued that it was unlikely that simple
contact with a homosexual by a boy over six years of age would change an already established
sexual preference. R. GEISER, supra note 99, at 92. Because male teachers attack more female
than male students, and because homosexuals apparently pose no sexual threat to boys,
Geiser advocates that pedophiles pose the true risk to children in the classroom. Id. at 93.
Geiser noted, however, that reports of sexual abuse of male students continue to cause efforts
to root out homosexual teachers. Id. at 92.
" 5 Developments, supra note 24, at 1636 n.57.
"" R. Mona, supra note 2, at 43. Mohr argues that, when a 'heterosexual commits a
crime, society perceives it as a crime, but when a homosexual commits a crime, society
perceives it as a homosexual crime, especially if the crime is sexual. Id. at 25.
n' Id. at 43. Mohr noted that strongly anti -gay cities such as Houston and Miami have
been hit heavily by the AIDS crisis. Id. Prohibitions of homosexual sodomy to control AIDS
ignores that not all sodomous activity is at high-risk of spreading AIDS, and that the act
itself, not the gender of the participants, determines the risk. Developments, supra note 24, at
1529-30. Lesbian sexual conduct, moreover, apparently is at extremely low risk of transmit-
ting AIDS. Id. at 1529 & n.75. The government can also deter AIDS transmissions through
less intrusive means than criminalizing certain forms of conduct. Id. at 1530 & n.77.
''" Developments, supra note 24, at 1663 & 1666 n.39. Commentators attribute this to gay
males themselves modifying their sexual practices. Id. at 1529 n.74.
" 9 See SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 140-53; SEX AND MORALITY, supra note 38, at
166-73.
120 SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 205-07.
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the extent that researchers have found some gay males to be pro-
miscuous, they attribute this to the common male tendency to seek
out sexual opportunities, and to the difficulties homosexuals face
in establishing stable relationships because of societal prejudice."'
Finally, they note that not all homosexuals engage in sodomy, that
homosexual sexual activity is not limited to sodomy, 122
 and that a
majority of heterosexuals also had engaged in sodomy. 12 '
Researchers into sexuality conclude that the personalities, social
adjustments, and sexual functioning of homosexuals are as diverse
as those of heterosexuals."' They argue that a person's sexual
orientation does not predict anything about the person aside from
that he or she becomes sexually aroused by, or engages in sexual
behavior with, persons of the same gender."' The label of homo-
sexual, they reason, is essentially arbitrary, because exclusive hom-
osexuality and heterosexuality merely occupy the extremes of a
sexual orientation continuum, and meaningless, because the label
indicates very little about the individual. 12" Even the bases upon
which individuals self-identify themselves as homosexual, according
to these researchers, differ for each individual.'"
121 Id. at 208-09. These researchers also stress that, like heterosexuals, individual hom-
osexuals exhibit varying degrees of sexual activity. Id. at 206, 208-09.
122
 Developments, supra note 24, at 1521, 1568-69. This is especially true for lesbians,
whose sexual conduct the courts often consider outside the scope of prohibited sodomy. Id.
at 1525 n.44.
123 Id. at 1568-69 & n.98 (citing statistics that 96 percent of males had orally stimulated
female partners, that 85 percent of women, had at least occasionally orally stimulated their
husbands, and that 20 percent of women had engaged in anal intercourse with their husbands
more than once); SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 72-73 (60 percent of males found to have
engaged in heterosexual oral sex); Sex I.D. Is Poor Predictor of AIDS Risk, Study Shows, Wash-
ington Blade, June 16, 1989, at 10, col. 1 (39 percent of heterosexual women and 27 percent
of heterosexual men have engaged in anal sex).
' 24 SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 202.
There is no such thing as homosexuality. By this 1 mean that the homosexual
experience is so diverse, the variety of its psychological, social, and sexual
correlates so enormous, its originating factors so numerous, that to use the word
"homosexuality" or "heterosexuality" as if it meant more than simply the nature
of a person's sexual object choice is misleading and imprecise . . . .To put it
another way, there are as many different kinds of homosexuals as heterosexuals,
and thus it is impossible to predict the nature of any patient's personality, social
adjustment, or sexual functioning on the basis of his or her sexual orientation.
Id.
125 Id.
126
 Id. at 202-04, 212.
127 Id. at 203-04. For instance, some persons engage in sex with persons of the same
gender but do not consider themselves homosexual, while others who have engaged in little
or no same•gender sexual activity nonetheless define themselves as homosexual. Id. at 204,
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Another societal stereotype commentators identify is that hom-
osexuals not only do not desire to live within the traditional family
structure, but also actually threaten the institution of the family. 128
Those who believe that homosexuals threaten the family structure,
these scholars note, argue that the weakening of the family by
homosexuals could lead to a weaker society, because the family in
their view serves as a foundation for American society.' 2" They also
argue that homosexuality, by weakening the traditional gender
roles, also weakens the traditional family structure that is based on
those gender roles.'"
Commentators argue, however, that evidence does not support
the claim that homosexual conduct weakens heterosexual mar-
riage."' The commentators reason, moreover, that many homosex-
uals would form families if legally allowed and if a lessening of
discrimination made the family endeavor less risky.' 32 They argue
that the law artificially prevents homosexuals from forming families
by proscribing marriage and restricting the ability of homosexuals
to adopt children, live together, or engage in private sexual activ-
ity.' 33
 Despite these barriers, observers of the gay community report
a large increase in the number of gays parenting or adopting chil-
dren and raising them within a family setting.' 34
'" J. BAER, supra note 22, at 228. West noted that, for varying reasons, many homosex-
uals enter into heterosexual marriages, though the marriages often have problems. D. WEST,
supra note 28, at 147-50.
129 See I BAER, supra note 22, at 228.
' 3" See Developments, supra note 24, at 1527-28 & nn.61-63.
131 See id. at 1529 (claims that anti-sodomy laws strengthen heterosexual marriage dis-
credited).
'a2
	 BAER, supra note 22, at 236-37; R. Moult, supra note 2, at 43-44; Developments,
supra note 24, at 1610 & n.46. Homosexuals who live as couples face increased disapproval
by neighbors and families, and discrimination by landlords and employers. Id. at 1610 n.46;
see SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 208-09 (discusses types of homosexual relationships, and
problems that long-term relationships experience). The desire by homosexuals to live in a
family setting, however, is by no means universal. Some more radical homosexual activists
oppose the family institution and decry those homosexuals who attempt to settle down with
a steady partner. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 145. West also noted, however, a 1960 English
study that indicated that a quarter of homosexual males surveyed had lived together in
homosexual couples for at least five years. Id. at 164 (citing G. WEsTwoon, A MINORITY
(1960)).
'" R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 43-44. Some observers question whether the apparent
disinclination of homosexual males to have long-term relationships could be wholly explained
by these legal and social sanctions, and instead suggest that some homosexual males prefer
to retain their sexual and social freedom which a long-term relationship or a family would
restrain. D. WEST, supra note 24, at 163-65.
' 5' See Adams, Gay couples begin a ball boom, Boston Globe, Feb. 6, 1989, at 2, col. 3;
Fadiman, The Double Closet, LIFE, May 1983, at 76.
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Commentators note that many in society justify discrimination
against homosexuals on the grounds of the perceived immorality
of homosexuality.' 35 In 1957, Great Britain instituted the Wolfen-
den Committee to study whether Great Britain should extinguish
laws proscribing homosexual conduct and prostitution.' 3" The Wol-
fenden Committee argued that private morality should not influ-
ence the criminal law unless that morality endangered public order,
the safety of citizens, or caused persons to risk exploitation or
corruption by others.'" The Committee then concluded that private
sexual activity between consenting adults, including homosexuals,
should be beyond the state's power.'" In the United States, the
American Law Institute recognizes a role for morality in the crim-
inal law, but argues that prohibition of conduct solely because it is
inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of acceptable behavior
sacrifices personal liberty.'" Commentators have cited H.L.A.
Hart's argument that there is no evidence that those who deviate
from conventional sexual morality are in other ways - hostile to so-
155 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 31.
156 REPORT OF 'till''. COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL. OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, GREAT
BRITAIN 19 (Amer. ed. 1963) [hereinafter WOLFENDEN REPORT].
1157 J. BAER, supra note 22, at 228 (citing WolizENDEN REPORT, supra note 136, at 48). The
decisive factor for the Committee in recommending decriminalization of private homosexual
relations was ''the importance which society and the law ought to give to individual freedom
of choice and action in matters of private morality." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL.
CODE AND COMMENTARIES 213.2, at 372 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE] (quoting
WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 136, at 52).
155 J. BAER, 54111 note 22, at 233 (citing, WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 136, at 23-24).
Great Britain decriminalized private consensual homosexual acts between two males over 21
in the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967. D. Wm., supra note 28, at 1, 12. Homosexual acts in
which one or more males are below 21, and lesbian acts in which one or both females are
below sixteen, remain illegal. Id. at 11. Britain continues to prosecute adult homosexuals,
however, for acts of public indecency involving conduct which heterosexuals may commit
without risk, including even public kissing or embracing. Id. at 12. The act of soliciting a
male for a sexual act, even if the act itself is legal and no payment is involved, also remains
criminal in Britain under the Sexual Offenses Act of 1956. Id. at 13. ironically, though anal
sex between consenting adult homosexuals is now legal, the same act between a male and
female, even if married, remains criminal but no longer prosecuted. Id. at 5.
1  MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 137, § 213.2, at 369, 372. The Institute argued that.
homosexuality could he viewed as a biological or psychological disease, which would exempt
homosexuals front criminal liability, or as simply a different way of life, which also should
be outside the scope of the criminal law, or as a moral failing, which arguably could allow
criminal sanctions. Id. at 367-69. But the Institute identified several reasons why the "hom-
osexuality as immorality" approach fails to justify the criminalization of homosexual acts,
including the practical limits of the criminal law, the costs of enforcement, and the lack of
consensus concerning the immorality of homosexuality. Id. at 369-72. Given the importance
of' protecting personal liberty, the Institute decided not to recommend sanctions for private,
consensual acts between homosexual adults in its Model Code. Id. at 372.
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ciety.'" Hart also argues that a change in morality does not mean
society would collapse, but only that society had changed, and that
society should not necessarily fear such changes."'
Other scholars further argue that, if the lawmakers base some
laws on a concept of morality related to current norms and customs
of society, morality provides no guidance. 142 They note that even
Nazi society had a morality composed of norms and customs, but
that most would find Nazi morality normatively lacking.'" Morality
as the basis of law, these commentators argue, must somehow be
justifiable, and must be consistent, fair, and equally enforced.'"
Moral rules, for these theorists, must apply to all, including the
rulemakers, and must avoid prejudice and rationalization. 145 On
this basis, they dismiss tradition as a foundation for moral rules,
for American society has rejected many traditions, such as slavery,
as immoral."" These scholars note, moreover, that societal and even
Judeo-Christian traditions were not uniformly negative toward
homosexuality.' 47
"0 J. BAER, supra note 22, at 229 (citing H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 51
(1963)).
14 ' Id. at 229-30 (citing H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY, at 51-52); see also
Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("only a stagnant society remains unchanged").
140 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 31.
140 Id.
144 Id.; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 255-56 n.92 (1980) (laws based on
morality not infirm if generated by sincerely held moral view of act, but use of immorality
claim cannot justify law motivated merely by desire to injure disfavored class). '
145 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 31.
146
 Id. at 32.
"7 Id. at 32-34. Mohr argued that the Bible may not be as anti-gay as generally assumed.
Id. at 32-33, He noted that Jesus never mentioned homosexuality, that the destruction of
Sodom was probably due to inhospitality, not homosexual behavior, and that some of the
condemnations in the Old Testament appear to be aimed at competing cultures that accepted
homosexual practices. Id.; see also D. WEST, supra note 24, at 120. He also noted that those
who cite Leviticus when condemning homosexuality are likely not following the myriad of
other rules, mainly dietary and hygienic, laid out in the Torah. R. MOHR, supra note 2, at
33. Mohr therefore argues that those who condemn homosexuality read the Bible very
selectively, and use their prejudices to interpret the Bible, not the Bible to guide their moral
beliefs. Id. West also notes that Biblical rules on fornication, money-lending, circumcision,
witchcraft, diet, and Sunday observance are often disregarded, and argues that the Bible's
condemnations of homosexuality therefore could not be the entire reason for society's hos-
tility to homosexuality. D. WEST, supra note 28, at 123. Kinsey similarly notes that religious
literature does not discuss the sinfulness of homosexuality as frequently or openly as the
sinfulness of masturbation and of pre-marital intercourse. MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 24, at 483. Some theologians, clergy, and denominations that continue to view homo-
sexuality as unnatural and sinful, and as requiring treatment and repentance, nonetheless
oppose the criminalization and societal repression of homosexuals. See Katz, supra note 37,
at 61-62.
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Scholars argue that the government's stated moral interest in
deterring homosexuality cannot be separated from prejudice
against homosexuals. 148
 They compare justifications for discrimi-
nation against homosexuals based on morality with moral justifica-
tions for racial discrimination.m° This morality, they reason, is the
promotion of particularly heterosexual value judgments about hom-
osexuality and gender roles, and is therefore the imposition of a
particular group's morality on another, weaker, class because of
prejudice. 15°
Finally, commentators argue that the massive legal discrimina-
tion against homosexuals indicates that, like African-Americans
during the period of legally recognized segregation, the govern-
ment does not consider homosexuals to be entitled to the same
respect as others within society.' 5 ' These commentators observe that
what the law or lack of law recognizes, condones, or requires greatly
affects the minds of those governed, for law is the symbol of ac-
ceptable attitude and ideology. 152
 The current state of the law con-
cerning homosexuals, these commentators argue, reinforces the
homophobic attitudes and prejudices that exist in American society,
and implies that homosexuals' rights are not worth protecting, 158
These commentators also note that the legal and private discrimi-
nation homosexuals face affects every facet of their lives, including
the primary components of a meaningful life such as employment,
family, and sexual intimacy. 154
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
After the Civil War, Congress and the states ratified the four-
teenth amendment, which enacted into constitutional law the prin-
ciple of equal protection of the laws.' 55
 In enforcing and interpret-
ing the principle of equal protection as contained in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, courts have established a doctrine by
which to determine whether a classification is unconstitutional be-
148 Developments, supra note 24, at 1528 n.68.
"9 Id.
159 See id. at 1528-29 & n.69. These commentators argue that homosexuality is viewed
as deviating from the traditional roles of males and females in procreating, in the family,
and in society. See id, at 1527-28.
151 J. BAER, supra note 22, at 34.
159 SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro 2.
i" Id.
' 54 R. Mona., supra note 2, at 30.
155 See W. NELSON, supra note 9, at 58-59 (1988).
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cause it is based on invidious intent.' 56
 In particular, the courts have
developed a set of criteria by which they determine whether certain
classifications should be presumed invalid and subjected to height-
ened scrutiny; to rebut such a presumption, the government must
show an important goal to be accorhplished, and a strong relation-
ship between that goal and 'the classification.' 57
In 1866, the United States Congress passed and submitted the
fourteenth amendment to the states, who ratified the amendment
in 1868. 158
 Section one of the amendment declares that all persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to United
States law, are citizens of the United States and of the states in which
they live.' 59
 Section one then declares that no state may make or
enforce laws that abridge the "privileges and immunities" of citizens,
or deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.' 6°
Section five gives Congress the power to enforce legislatively the
amendment's provisions.' 611
Historians have observed that Congress and the states ratified
the fourteenth amendment', primarily in response to slavery, and to
the many state laws passed after the Civil War that curtailed the
rights and liberties of African-Americans.' 82 Some historians and
legal commentators thus argue that the fourteenth amendment's
framers intended that the amendment only apply to state discrim-
ination against African-Americans.'" Some further argue that the
framers did not intend, to grant voting rights to African-Americans,
or to eliminate segregation or miscegenation statutes.'"
Other commentators and historians, however, argue that the
framers intended the amendment to have a broad meaning that
would not only prohibit all legal discriminations against race, but
'" See City of Cleburne v. Clebuine Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
157 See id.
'" E.g., W. NELSON, supra note 9, at 58-59. For a discussion of the legislative history
and ratification process, sec generally id.; J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956); Commager, Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 14-28 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter Commagerl.
'" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I!
Id.
11)1 Id. at	 5.
162 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 9, at 45; see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36,70 (1873).
	 1
163 See, e.g., Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1,1-65 (1955). For a general dis'cussion of the scholarship in this area, see W. NELSON,
supra note 9, at 2-8.
164 See Bickel, „supra note 163, at 58.
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would also prevent invidious non-racial discriminations. t65
 These
historians note that the fourteenth amendment's framers purposely
did not limit the terms of the amendment to racial discrimination. 160
These scholars observe that the framers, before the Civil War, had
been activity involved in the abolition movement.' 1 i 7 The abolition-
ists promoted a natural law theory of equality that held that all
humans are naturally equal without regard to abilities, traits, or
merit.'"
These historians and commentators therefore argue that the
framers intended the equal protection clause td prevent the states
from infringing any person's : natural entitlement to equality of
rights.'"" The framers, these scholars reason, intended the equal
protection clause to articulate the moral principle that all persons
have a right to be treated fairly and equally by the states without
regard to personal characteristics.'" They further argue that the
framers understood that, because the fourteenth amendment was
a constitutional provision and therefore part of the nation's organic
law, future courts would interpret the equal protection clause ac-
cording to changing circumstances and beliefs."' Thus, the framers,
according to these scholars, purposely constructed the equal pro-
tection clause in broad and prohibitive terms, with enforcement
mechanisms given to both Congress and the courts.' 72
The United States Supreme Court has also noted that the pri-
mary intent of the fourteenth amendment was to protect African-
Americans from state laws that discriminated against them.'" The
i "5 See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 9; j. BAER, supra note 22; Commager, supra note 158.
' 6" See, e.g., Commager, supra note 158, at 23-24. The earliest version of the equal
protection clause stated that all laws, state and national, shall operate impartially and equally
on all persons without regard to race or color." Bickel, supra note 163, at 30.
"l' See, e.g., j. BAER, supra note 22, at 57-72; Graham, Oar "Declaratory" Fourteenth
Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV., 3-39 (1954), reprinted in H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION
298-336 (1968) [hereinafter H. GRAHAM]; Tussman and tenBrock, The. Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949).
i" See, e.g., j. BAER, supra note 22, at 38-56; EL GRAHAM, supra note 167, at 298-304.
" See, e.g., El. GRAHAM, supra note 167, at 157-85; Tussman and tenBrock, .supra note
167, at 341.
' 71 See, e.g., W. NELSON, Supra note 9, at 13-18.
0 ' Id. at 45-61.
172 See id. Historians note that early drafts of the amendment limited its scope to race,
to certain rights, or to enforcement only by Congress, not the courts. Id. at 45-61, 145.
' 73 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1880); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-81 (1873). But see
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-08, 310 (Court also stated that if an African-American majority
discriminated against whites, or a law discriminated against Celtic Irish, those actions would
also fail to provide equal protection).
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Court has also observed, however, that Congress worded the
amendment in general and comprehensive terms that implicitly
protect the equal enjoyment of many unenumerated rights, among
them the right to equal legal protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty.'" The equal protection clause's "broader, organic purpose,"
according to the Court, is the elimination of government-sponsored
arbitrary and invidious discrimination) 75
The spirit of the equal protection clause, the Court therefore
observed, is that all persons retain a positive immunity, or a right
to be exempt, from unfriendly legislation that asserts their inferi-
ority, stimulates prejudice, or impedes equal enjoyment of rights
and liberties) 7" The Court has thus held that a bare legislative desire
to harm a politically unpopular class violates the principle of equal
protection of the laws.' 77 The Court has also held that classifications
that assert a stigma or a sense of inferiority deprive the stigmatized
class of equal protection. 178
Nor, according to the Court, do government classifications
based on archaic and stereotypic conceptions about a class fulfill
equal protection requirements) 79 The Court also prevents the gov-
ernment from disadvantaging a class because of the negative effects
of discrimination on the class, as when a court removes child custody
from a parent because of prejudice against the race of the parent's
companion.' 8" Although the Constitution, the laws, and the courts
174 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
175 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 23
(1948); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 - 45 (1880). Conversely, the Court has held that
classifications that disadvantage even a racial class, under some circumstances, may be per-
missible if the government did not classify with an invidious purpose. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19, 223 (1944) (military order restricting japanese-Amer-
icans from area not a violation of equal protection clause; order based on legitimate military
concerns, not prejudice or hostility); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 728 (1982) (classification favoring a gender constitutional if intentionally and directly
assists disproportionately burdened gender, and classification counters that disadvantage).
As organic law, the Court has also reasoned that the framers' intent is both difficult to
determine, and ()lien immaterial because of changes in society since its ratification. See Crown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90, 492-93 (1954).
17" Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-08.
177 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
178 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95; see McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (statute criminalizing interracial cohabitation, although providing
same penalty for each without regard to race, violated equal protection clause).
179 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25, 731; see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (legislative
classifications based on gender carry inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about women).
"" Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985) (community prejudice against mentally
retarded could not justify classification burdening them); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
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cannot control private prejudice, according to the Court, those legal
institutions may not directly or indirectly give those prejudices ef-
fect.' 81
The Supreme Court has not restricted the equal protection
clause's prohibition of invidious classifications to those based on
race, 182 nor only to classifications instituted by state governments. 18"
Classifications that the Court has declared invidious have included
classifications disadvantaging women,'" men,'" hippies,' 86 certain
types of felons,'" alien children,' 88 and the mentally retarded.' 89
The Court has also declared that classifications by the federal gov-
ernment that invidiously discriminate violate equal protection prin-
ciples implicitly contained in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.m
217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (government cannot avoid constitutional duty by
bowing to hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526,
535 (1963) (African-American access to public parks could be denied because of "hostility to
their assertion or exercise."); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963) (possibility of
disorder by whites could nut justify exclusion of African-Americans from public parks, nor
their arrest for breach of the peace for using public park); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S.
154, 156 (1962) (breach-of-peace convictions of African-Americans for refusing to use seg-
regated waiting room to buy interstate bus tickets violated equal protection); Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174 (196!) (breach-of-peace convictions for sitting peacefully at
segregated cafe counter violated equal protection clause); Buchanan v. Watley, 245 U.S. 60,
80-81 (1917) (residential segregation, which state justified as preventing race conflicts, held
to violate equal protection clause).
161 Pahnore, 466 U.S. at 433-39.
112
 See, e.g., Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion). But
see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880), where the Court reasoned that the
fourteenth amendment's purpose was to prevent state discrimination because of race and
color, and that the amendment's application to other classifications would therefore require
a strong justification. The Court refused to hold explicitly, however, whether the amendment
might have other purposes. Id.
1 " Bolling v. Sharpe, 357 U,S. 497, 499 (1954),
184 Id.
186 Mississippi Univ. for Women v, Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982); Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U,S. 380, 394 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 940 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
186 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 538 (1973),
1 " Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
188 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24, 230 (1982).
89 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
iuu Bolling v. Sharpe, 357 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Court precedent before Bolling had held
that the fourteenth amendment applied only to the states, while the fifth amendment, which
does not include an equal protection clause, applied to the federal government and the
District of Columbia, Id. at 498-99.
The Court treats fifth amendment equal protection claims identically with claims under
the fourteenth amendment. Weinberger v. Wicsenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). But see
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S, 67, 84-85 (1976) (applied different equal protection analysis to
federal classification disadvantaging aliens than to similar state classifications invalidated in
cases such as Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
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The Court has held government actions that disadvantage a
class to be arbitrary or invidious not only when classifications explicit
in a statute or regulation are invidious on their face, but also when
a classification's administration' 9 ' or legislative history' 92 reveals in-
vidious motives against a class. The Court has held government
application of laws that are fair on their face to be invidious and a
denial of equal protection if the application is "with an evil eye and
an unequal hand" against a class.' 93 The Court, however, has held
that classifications that have a disparate impact on a class will only
be invalidated if the Court holds that the adverse impact reflects
purposeful invidious discrimination.' 94 Legislative history indicating
that a legislature instituted a classification because of a desire to
harm a politically unpopular group has also caused the Court to
invalidate a statutory classification.' 96
The equal protection clause, according to the Court, therefore
prohibits the government, not from treating different classes in
different ways, but instead from treating different classes differ-
ently for reasons unrelated to the achievement of a legitimate gov-
ernment objective.' 96 The Court presumes the constitutional validity
of most governmental classifications, and will sustain those classifi-
cations if they are rationally related to a legitimate government
interest) 97
 This standard, according to the Court, only requires that
the Court determine if any possible basis exists for concluding that
a classification serves a rational purpose.' 98 The Court, when apply-
ing this rational-basis standard of review, allows the government
191 Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U S. 356, 373 (1886).
192
	 States Dep't. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
199
	 Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74; see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
194
 Personnel Adm'r of Massacl usetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
196
	 413 U.S. at 534.
19e1
 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920).
197 E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533; San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 55 (1973); see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1938) (presumption that legislation affecting commercial transactions rests on rational
basis within knowledge and experience of' legislators, and so not unconstitutional).
1 " Loving v. Virginia, 388 U S. 1, 8 (1967). The Court gives economic and social
classifications particular deference under the rational-basis test. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; see
Massachusetts Rd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(economic classifications always upheld); New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976)
(overturning Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the only modern case that held an
economic classification to violate equal protection principles).
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considerable latitude in its choice of how to pursue a legitimate
government interest, and will not closely scrutinize the basis or
effectiveness of that choice.' 99 The Constitution presumes, accord-
ing to the Court, that democratic processes will eventually rectify
even improvident government actions.m°
The Court, however, has refused to presume that a government
based a classification on rational, not invidious purposes, when the
classification affects certain classes or restricts certain liberties, and
the Court therefore subjects such classifications to heightened scru-
tiny.201 Certain classifications, according to the Court, themselves
provide a reason to infer that the government so classified out of
antipathy to a class, 202 and that the class thus requires "extraordi-
' 9g See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, 446; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314; see also Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (under rational-basis test, equal protection clause not
violated merely because classification imperfect); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (equal protection clause does not require that classification be "made with
mathematical nicety").
2D0 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Although this rational-basis review is
deferential, the Court on some occasions used it to hold that a classification violated the
equal protection clause. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
448 (1985) (no rational reason related to legitimate government purpose for city to prevent
group home for mentally retarded); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533-38 (government failed to show
legitimate government interest that was rationally promoted by excluding certain types of
households from food stamp program).
201 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). The Court has held that it will more closely scrutinize classifications that
restrict a class's access to a constitutional right to insure that those classifications are not
invidious. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (law
limiting who may vote in school district elections subject to "close and exacting examination");
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (state could not penalize welfare applicants
who exercised right to move from state to state); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (sterilization of certain classes of felons not presumed constitutional because marriage
and procreation are fundamental rights).
The Skinner Court overturned an Oklahoma state court judgment ordering the steriliza-
tion of Skinner, pursuant to an Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of two-
time felons, except those felons guilty of embezzlement, political offenses, and several other
categories of felonies. 316 U.S. at 537, 542 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-195 (West
1935)). The Skinner Court reasoned that the statute differentiated between types of felonies
that were intrinsically similar in quality. Id. The Court held that sterilization laws infringed
on the right to procreate, and that therefore classifications in a sterilization law must face
strict scrutiny. Id. at 541. The Skinner Court further reasoned that the classification warranted
strict scrutiny because a state could use the power to sterilize to discriminate invidiously
against certain groups, with devastating effects on that class as well as on the sterilized person.
Id. Applying strict scrutiny to Oklahoma's classification between Felons, the Skinner Court
held that Oklahoma failed to justify the classification sufficiently, and therefore held that
Oklahoma violated the equal protection clause by invidiously discriminating between persons
who committed substantially the same type of offense. Id.
202 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Palmore v. Sidoti, 966 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Personnel
Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
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nary protection from the majoritarian political process." 2°3 The
Court, because of this inference of invidiousness, subjects classifi-
cations affecting those classes to more searching scrutiny, and re-
quires the government to show persuasive justification for the clas-
sification to insure that the government did not classify out of
antipathy to the class. 204
The Court has therefore held that government classifications
based on the race, gender, national origin, alienage, or illegitimacy
of a class must pass a heightened level of scrutiny for the Court to
uphold the classification. 2°' For classifications based on race, na-
tional origin, and alienage,'which the Court refers to as suspect, the
Court utilizes strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification bear a
necessary relation to a compelling government interest, 206 Gender
and illegitimacy classifications, referred to as quasi-suspect classes,
receive intermediate scrutiny, with which the Court requires that
the classification be substantially related to an important govern-
ment interest.207
202 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
204 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41, 443; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Court has noted
that "heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative
decisions. . : ." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
205
	
473 U.S. at 440-41. Concerning race, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Bolling v, Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943).
On national origin and ethnicity', see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 645-46 (1948);
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
On gender, see Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981);
Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273; Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
On alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish
Sc Game Comm's, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
On illegitimacy, see Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347, 351-53 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 429 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 537-38 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-76 (1972). For
discussions of current equal protection and heightened scrutiny jurisprudence, see Ellis, On
the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 375 (1986); Erler,
Equal Protection and Personal Rights: The Regime of the "Discrete and Insular Minority," 16 GA. L.
REV. 407 (1982); Farrell, Equal Protection: Overinclusive Classifications and Individual Rights, 41
ARK. L. REV. 1 (1988); Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 1184 (1986).
2°6 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
202 Id. at 440-41.
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The Court has established several factors that it considers when
determining if it should replace the normal presumption of a clas-
sification's validity with a presumption of an invidious or arbitrary
basis for a classification. 208 Among these factors, the Court considers
whether a class has experienced a history of pervasive societal dis-
crimination or false stereotypes, 2" and the degree to which the
defining characteristics of a class are immutable, outside the class
members' control, or unrelated to the member's abilities. 210 The
Court also analyzes whether a class constitutes a discrete and insular
minority unable to command respect by the government. 2 " An
additional factor occasionally considered by the Court is whether
classifications involving a class often stigmatize the class or relegate
it to an inferior legal or social status without regard to the class
members' actual abilities. 212
One group of factors the Court has identified is evidence that
society has subjected a class to a history of intentional and pervasive
unequal treatment or unique disabilities because of pervasive antip-
athy, or because of stereotypes that fail to indicate, with accuracy,
individual abilities or class members. 2 ' 3 Pervasive antipathy and
stereotypes, according to the Court, require it closely to scrutinize
classifications affecting these classes because of the likelihood that
the government acted out of prejudice or unreasoned habit. 214
The Court's consideration of whether a class has experienced a
history of discrimination because of antipathy has led, in part, to
holdings that women, 215 but not the elderly216 or the mentally
'"" Id. at 440-46; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28,
21" E,g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
216 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
2" Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
212 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (actual classification being
challenged subject to heightened scrutiny because would stigmatize undocumented alien
children with illiteracy).
213 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973); San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 306-09 (1880) (fourteenth amendment to protect African-Americans from per-
vasive and habitual discrimination and antipathy).
2 " See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520-2 i ( 1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 684-86.
215 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86, 688.
x16
	
427 U.S. at 313. In holding that a state statute requiring state police officers
to retire at the age of fifty did not deny officers over fifty equal protection of the laws, the
Murgia Court refused to hold the class of police officers over fifty to be a suspect class. Id,
at 313, 317. Although acknowledging that the aged have experienced sonic history of dis-
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retarded, 217
 constitute classes reqUiring judicial protection from
the democratic processes.
In holding that women constitute a protected class, the United
States Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973,
reasoned that the history of discrimination in United States society
clearly justifies the Court's heightened scrutiny of gender class&
cations. 2" Frontiero held that a federal statute providing for in-
creased housing allowances and medical and dental care for mem-
bers of the uniformed services with dependents violated the equal
protection requirements of the fifth amendment, because the statute
required female members, but not males, to establish that a spouse
depended on the member for over one-half of his support. 219 Fron-
tiero, a female member of the United States Air Force who failed
to establish that her husband relied on her for over one-half of his
support, sued claiming that the statute unreasonably discriminated
on the basis of gender. 22°
The Frontiero Court agreed, holding that classifications based
on sex, like race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently sus-
pect and therefore subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 221 Ob-
serving that the government justified the classification based on
administrative convenience, the Frontiero Court reasoned that this
justification for the additional burden placed on female uniformed
service members could not .sustain the classification under height-
ened scrutiny.222
 The Court therefore held that the classification
was an arbitrary legislative choice prohibited by equal protection
principles. 223
The Frontiero Court reasoned that gender-based classifications
are suspect by analyzing several factors, among them the extensive
history, of sex discrimination in the United States. 224
 The Court
crimination, the Court reasoned that society had not subjected the aged to purposeful
discrimination "on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abili-
ties," Id. at 313.
217
 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442,443 (1985). The
Court partially based its holding that the mentally retarded were not a suspect class on its
observation that positive legislative responses to the plight of the mentally retarded belied
continuing antipathy that would justify more intrusive judicial oversight. Id. at 443.
2 I" Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
219 Id. at 679-80.
2" Id. at 680.
22]
 Id. at 682.
222
 Id. at 690.
223 Id. at 690-91.
224 Id, at 684.
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observed that pervasive notions of "romantic paternalism" resulted
in many statutes containing stereotyped gender distinctions that
placed women, during the nineteenth century, in a position com-
parable to that of African-Americans before the Civil War. 223 These
classifications, which "put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage,"
prevented women from holding public office, voting, serving on
juries, bringing judicial suits, or, if married, conveying property or
serving as legal guardians of their cliiklren. 226 Although, the Court
reasoned, women's position in society had markedly improved, the
Court observed that women continue to face pervasive discrimina-
tion in education, employment, and politics, in part because of the
visibility of gender characteristics. 227 The Court therefore held that
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect, because of
the likelihood of invidious motives for the classification. 228 Thus,
the Court subjected the uniformed services' additional gender-
based requirement for increased dependent's benefits to heightened
scrutiny. 229
In considering whether it should subject a classification to
heightened scrutiny, the Court also considers whether the unique
characteristics of an affected class are relevant to a class member's
ability to perform or contribute to society. 23° If the characteristics
are rarely relevant to capabilities, the Court reasons that govern-
ment classifications based on those characteristics more likely con-
stitute invidious discrimination. 23 ! Additional factors the Court con-
siders when looking at the defining characteristics of a class include
not only whether the classification reflects stereotypes about the
capabilities of a class, but also whether the defining characteristics
are immutable or outside the class member's contro1. 232
In holding that a federal classification that placed additional
burdens on female members of the uniformed services before they
225 Id. at 684-85.
226 Id, at 685.
227 Id. at 685-86.
225
 Id. at 688.
229 Id.
2" Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686-87 (1973); see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(aged not burdened because of "stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities").
" I City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985);
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87.
252 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
223 (1982) (classification imposes hardship on children not accountable for their disabling
status as illegal aliens).
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could receive additional benefits for dependents denied those fe-
males equal protection of the laws, the Frontiero Court subjected the
classification to heightened scrutiny in part because gender char-
acteristics are immutable accidents of birth usually unrelated to
actual capabilities. 233
 The Court noted that gender is similar to race
and national origin because, like those classifications, gender is im-
mutable and established randomly. 234
 If the government burdens a
class because of gender, the Court reasoned, it violates the concept
that legal but-dens should relate to individual responsibility. 235
 The
Court also distinguished gender from intelligence, physical disabil-
ity, and other non-suspect status defined by immutable character-
istics outside the control of the class members, by reasoning that
gender characteristics frequently bear no relation to individual ca-
pabilities to perform or contribute to society. 288 The Court therefore
held that gender classifications usually invidiously relegate females
as a class to inferior legal status without regard to individual capa-
bilities."'
The Court conversely has held that the mentally retarded are
not a class requiring heightened judicial protection, because they
have distinguishing characteristics that impair their abilities and to
which the government could legitimately respond. 238 -The Court
reasoned that the government has a legitimate interest in providing
in the law for mental retardation, and that the difficult and technical
task of so providing belongs to the legislatures, not the courts. 239
Classifications based on mental retardation, according to the Court,
233
 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
23•
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 686-87.
238
 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 444 (1985). The
mentally retarded, the Court reasoned, have impaired capabilities that affect, with wide
variations between individuals, their ability to function. Id. at 442. The city required a special
use permit for the construction of hospitals for the insane, "feeble-minded," alcoholic, and
drug addicted, and also for prisons. but not for other group homes or health care institutions.
Id. at 436, 447. The city determined that the Cleburne Living Center constituted a hospital
for the "feeble-minded," and subsequently denied the required permit. Id. at 436-37. The
Court held that, because the government. may legitimately take mental retardation into
account, it would only subject such classifications to rational-basis scrutiny and presume their
constitutional validity. Id. at 446. The Court nonetheless found that the city required the
permit because of irrational prejudice, not because of any legitimate government interest
rationally related to the additional permit requirement, and therefore held that the permit
requirement as applied to the Living Center denied to the mentally retarded equal protection
of the laws, Id. at 448, 450.
235 Id. at 442-43.
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reflect the distinctive characteristics and needs of the mentally re-
tarded. 24° Reasoning that these classifications are usually not only
legitimate but desirable, the COurt noted that heightened judicial
scrutiny of these classifications might dissuade government bodies
from providing for mental retardation at all or restrict the govern-
ment's flexibility in dealing with the wide variation of needs and
abilities of the mentally retarded."' The Court has therefore estab-
lished that classifications affecting a class with distinguishing char-
acteristics relevant to legitimate state interests should only undergo
rational-basis scrutiny. 242
Even when the government has a legitimate interest in penal-
izing a class's distinguishing characteristics, however, the Court has
provided heightened protection if the class is not responsible for,
or has no control over, those characteristics. In Plyler v. Doe, decided
in 1982, the United States Supreme Court subjected Texas's denial
of free public education for alien children who illegally entered the
United States to heightened scrutiny, and held that Texas violated
the children's equal protection rights. 2" Plyler concerned Texas
statutes that withheld state funds from local school districts for the
education of children not legally admitted into the United States,
and that authorized the districts to deny public school enrollment
to those children."' After holding that the equal protection clause
protects illegal aliens, 245 the Court reasoned that the children's lack
of responsibility for their illegal status, and the importance of ed-
ucation to the children and society, required that Texas demonstrate
that the denial of public education to undocumented alien children
furthered some substantial state goal."" The Plyler Court held that
Texas failed to show any substantial state goal furthered by denying
24" Id. at 444.
191 Id. at 444-45. The Court also observed that if it held the large and amorphous class
of the mentally retarded as a class requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, other classes with
perhaps immutable disabilities and other similar indicia of political weakness and prejudice,
such as the aged and mentally ill, could also successfully claim heightened protection. Id, at
445-46.
2" See id. at 441-42.
'45 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,205,230 (1982).
2" Id. at 205.
24s Id. at 210. The Court rejected Texas's argument that illegal aliens were not "within
its jurisdiction" arid therefore had no right to equal protection of the laws. Id. The Court
reasoned that the fourteenth amendment's requirement that states not deny to "any person
within its jurisdiction" equal protection extended to anyone present in a state and therefore
subject to its laws. Id. at 215.
246 Id. at 223-24.
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these children an education, and ruled that Texas violated their
equal protection rights. 247
In reasoning that Texas's classification was subject to height-
ened judicial scrutiny, the Plyler Court nonetheless noted that adult
illegal aliens are not a suspect class, because they voluntarily enter
into a class defined by its illegality. 248 The Court noted that illegal
alien status is not constitutionally irrelevant, because the status re-
lates to spheres of authority, such as over foreign policy, constitu-
tionally granted to the federal government. 24" Status as an illegal
alien, the Court further observed, is not immutable, because the
status is a product of a conscious, unlawful act, and because the
status could be removed by leaving the United States. 25° Adult illegal
aliens therefore, according to the Court, although protected from
governmental invidious discrimination, are not a suspect class re-
quiring heightened judicial protection, and could be penalized by
the government for their voluntary and illegal status, if justified by
legitimate government interests. 25 '
The Plyler Court observed, however, that the minor children
of illegal aliens are not responsible, nor could they alter, their status,
and that they therefore have little control over their status as un-
documented aliens:252 Noting that legal burdens should relate to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing, the Court reasoned that
Texas likely could not provide a rational justification for discrimi-
natorily burdening undocumented children not responsible for
their disabling status.253 Further observing that Texas's policy de-
nied to those children a basic education, and therefore imposed a
lifetime hardship on a class not responsible for their defining, illegal
characteristic, the Plyler Court held that Texas had to show that the
statutes furthered a substantial state goal. 254 The Plyler Court there-
fore provided additional protection to undocumented alien children
247 Id. at 230.
248 Id. at 219-20 & n.19, 223.
249 Id. at 219 n.19, 223.
25° Id. at 220.
25'
	 at. 210, 219-20, 223; we Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (fifth amendment
protects illegal aliens from invidious discrimination by federal government).
252
	 v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982).
253 Id. at 220-22 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972).
254 Id. at 223-24. The Court refused to hold that public education is a fundamental
right, but reasoned that education plays a fundamental role in the future opportunities of
the child and the health of the nation. Id. at 221-23 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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that it. did not provide to undocumented alien adults, because those
children were not responsible for, and could not alter, their status
as illegal aliens:255
Another factor the Court considers is whether a class has been
relegated to a position of political powerlessness that necessitates
extraordinary judicial protection from the democratic process. 25" In
particular, the Court has identified discrete and insular minorities
unable because of prejudice to secure, through the democratic pro-
cess, political protection from invidious government classifications
to be classes requiring heightened judicial protection. 257 The Court
reasons that politically powerless classes that face societal prejudice
are unable to counter invidious or arbitrary government actions, or
to cause the democratic political system to rectify quickly those
classifications.258
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court first suggested in
United States v. Carotene Products Co. that prejudice against "discrete
and insular minorities" might reduce the Court's usual presumption
of the constitutionality of state actions. 259 Although the Court ob-
served that it usually presumes a rational and legitimate basis for
legislation, the Court specified, in footnote four, several areas where
the Court. might narrow the presumption of rationality and consti-
tutionality. 25" The Court in particular reasoned that prejudice
255 Id. at 219-24.
"" Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
257 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); United
States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
258 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985);
Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
25" Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Carotene Products Court upheld the Filled
Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1923), a federal statute that prohibited the shipment in
interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with fat or oil, in the face of a challenge
that the Act violated the equal protection of the law, the due process clause of die filth
amendment, and transcended the poWer of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Car-
otene Prods., 304 U.S. at 145-54. The Court rejected the equal protection claim, which rested
on Congress's failure to extend its prohibition to other similarly-adulterated dairy products
such as margarines, by noting that the fifth amendment did not contain an equal protection
clause, and that even the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause did not require
the government to choose between prohibiting all similar evils or none of them. Id. at 151.
The Carotene Products Court further observed that it did not require the government to show
facts supporting its legislative judgment, for the Court presumed the existence of the sup-
porting facts unless the Court became aware of or assumed facts that precluded the pre-
sumption of a rational basis for the legislation. Id. at 152.
25" Id, at 152 & n.4. Some of those areas included when legislation on its face seemed
to violate constitutional provisions, or restricted the political processes that could be expected
to cause repeal of undesirable legislation.
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against religious, national, or racial minorities, as discrete and in-
sular minorities, might seriously hamper and curtail those political
processes that normally protect minorities, and therefore might
constitute a special condition requiring heightened judicial inquiry
into government actions directed at those minorities. 26 ' The Carolene
Products Court therefore suggested that the Court could narrow its
presumption that legislation is constitutional when prejudice against
a discrete and insular minority existed that could cause the failure
of those political processes that usually protect minorities. 262
In determining whether a class is politically powerless, the
Court has considered not simply whether a class can exert direct
political influence on the government, but also whether the class
has the ability to attract the attention of lawmakers. 263 In holding,
for instance, that the mentally retarded do not constitute a class
requiring increased judicial protection, the Court noted in part that
government actions protecting the mentally retarded indicate that
they are not politically powerless. 261 The Court reasoned that these
government actions could only have occurred with public support,
and that the mentally retarded are not politically powerless because
they could attract the attention of the government. 265 Any minority,
according to the Court, may be considered powerless to assert direct
control over the democratic process, and the Court therefore rea-
soned that requiring heightened judicial scrutiny simply because a
class is a minority would endanger much social and economic leg-:
islation. 266
 The Court therefore held that the mentally retarded,
although not able to exert direct control over the government, are
politically powerful enough to attract legislative attention, and so
are not a class needing heightened judicial protection. 267
The Court, however, has also reasoned that legislative efforts
to protect a class from invidious discrimination provides a basis for
the Court to grant that class heightened judicial protection as wel1. 268
In Frontier°, one of the factors the Court considered in holding
26 ' Id. at 153 11.4; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (aliens a
prime example of discrete and insular minority needing heightened.judicial protection).
262 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
268 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
264 Id.
266 Id.
ter
262 Id.; see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976)
(the aged not a discrete and insular group needing heightened judicial protection from
democratic processes because most persons will eventually become members of that class).
268
 Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973).
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women to be a class needing increased judicial protection was that
Congress had prohibited various forms of public and private dis-
crimination based on gender.'" The Court reasoned that Congress,
by manifesting an increased sensitivity to gender classifications, had
concluded that those classifications are inherently invidious. 2" This
conclusion by a coequal government branch, according to the Court,
provides some guidance in the Court's own inquiry of whether
gender classifications are inherently invidious and therefore subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny. 27 '
In determining the level of judicial scrutiny the Court will
apply, as well as the application of that scrutiny, the Court also on
occasion considers the stigmatizing affect of classifications directed
at a class. 272 The Court reasons that classifications stigmatizing or
asserting a class's inferiority impede that class's enjoyment of equal
rights and liberties. 2" Classes that often are stigmatized or relegated
to an inferior legal status, without regard to individual capabilities,
according to the Court, might need heightened judicial protec-
tion. 274 The Court also has applied heightened scrutiny to specific
classifications that themselves would impose a stigma or disabling
hardship on a class because of a characteristic outside the class's
control.'"
By considering each of these factors, the Court determines the
degree of judicial scrutiny to which it will subject a classification.'"
This determination, the Court notes, does not depend on whether
the particular government action based on a classification in question
might be invidious. 277 Instead, the Court first considers whether all
269
 Id. at 687. The Frontiers Court took notice of Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (b), (c) (1982), the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1982), and the Equal Rights Amendment, which Congress passed in 1972, H.R.J. Res. '208,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The states failed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment after
Frontiers was decided.
27° Frontiers, 411 U.S. at 687.
27 ' Id. at 687-88.
272
	 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 223 (1982) (denial of education to illegal alien
children would stigmatize them, so the denial had to further substantial state goal); Frontiers,
411 U.S. at 686-87 (gender classifications often invidiously relegate women to inferior legal
status without regard to individual capabilities).
275 Brown v, Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954); . Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
274 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973).
275 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
276 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); Sari
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
277 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
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classifications that disadvantage a class are likely to be invidious, as
a general matter, by analyzing whether the classification has in the
past been based on factors the Court believes to be invidious or
arbitrary, and whether the characteristics defining a class are likely
to be relevant to legitimate government interests. 278 These criteria,
Justice Marshall argued, do not compose a checklist, each of which
must be sufficiently met to establish heightened protection; they
instead, he reasoned, along with the Court's experience, guide the
analysis of whether a class is likely to be the target of invidious
classifications. 27" These considerations, according to the Court, then
determine the presumption of constitutional validity, and thereby
the level of scrutiny, to which the Court will subject the specific
classification being challenged. 2"
Applying these factors, the Court subjects classifications based
on race, alienage, and national origin, to strict scrutiny, and requires
the government to show that these classifications bear a necessary
and suitably tailored relation to a compelling government inter-
est. 281 The government therefore has the burden of showing that a
compelling government interest justifies a challenged, suspect clas-
sification, and that the classification is necessary to the accomplish-
ment of that interest. 282 The compelling interest, the Court reasons,
must be independent of the invidious discrimination prohibited by
equal protection principles. 2" The Court also requires that the
government show it structured the classification with precision, and
that it narrowly tailored the classification and thereby chose the
least intrusive means to achieve its compelling objective. 284
The Court also subjects classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy to an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, which re-
quires that the government show that a classification is substantially
272
 See id.
279 Id. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
280 Id. at 446; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16.
221 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 16-17; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See supra note 205 for
cases applying strict scrutiny to classifications involving race, national origin and ethnicity,
and alienage.
282 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33.
288
	 id. at 433-34 (racial prejudice cannot justify classification disadvantaging racial
class); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (government cannot avoid consti-
tutional duty by bowing to effects of racial prejudice); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which
justified miscegenation statute).
281
	
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
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related to an important government interest. 289 The Court reasons
that characteristics defining these classes rarely relate to an individ-
ual's abilities, and instead usually rest on outmoded generalizations
that do not comport with fact. 286 The government, according to the
Court, must provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a
classification subjected to intermediate scrutiny. 287 The Court re-
quires that the government carefully tailor these classifications to
insure that they do not perpetuate stereotypes about the affected
classes, and to insure that other non-suspect classifications could
not also achieve the pursued government interest. 288 The Court has
rejected government justifications of these classifications on grounds
of administrative convenience; the Court, however, has noted that
administrative convenience could conceivably justify a classification
when it does predict some class difference related to an important
government interest, and a neutral classification would substantially
raise inconvenience and cost to the government or to individuals. 289
The Court has refused to subject classifications based on gender
and illegitimacy to strict scrutiny because several Justices reason that
those classifications are not invariably invalid. 290 They note that men
and women, for instance, are not in some circumstances similarly
situated, and that statutory classifications realistically based on those
differences do not violate equal protection principles. 29 ' Similarly,
the Court has reasoned that the irrationality of some classifications
based on illegitimacy does not indicate that other classifications
based on illegitimacy are inherently irrational.292 Noting that dis-
crimination against illegitimates has never been as severe as discrim-
285 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41. Sec supra
note 205 for cases discussing scrutiny to be applied to classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy.
286 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 431-32; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (legislatures
must adopt procedures to identify when gender generalizations comport with individual
characteristics relevant to government interest).
287 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982); Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979).
288 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
289 Wengler v. Druggists Mm. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980); Craig, 429 U.S. at
197-98; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1973).
29" Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, J.).
291 Caban, 441 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Parham, 441 U.S. at 354; see Schle-
singer v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (Stewart, J.) (Navy promotion rule that distin-
guishes between males and females justified because genders not similarly situated with
respect to service opportunities).
592 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (197(i).
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ination against African-Americans and women, the Court has held
that classifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to strict
scrutiny. 295
The Court, in enforcing the constitutional principle of equal
protection, has therefore established a set of criteria that guides its
analysis of whether it should presume that the government disad-
vantages a class for reasons that violate equal protection. These
criteria include whether a class suffers from pervasive societal an-
tipathy and unfounded stereotypic notions, whether the distinguish-
ing characteristics of the class are irrelevant to individual abilities
or outside the control of those individuals, and whether the class is
politically powerless to prevent government discrimination that stig-
matizes the class, In recent cases that have considered whether
homosexuals constitute such a protected class, however, several
courts have not considered these criteria, and instead have relied
on factors extraneous to equal protection jurisprudence.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LITIGATION ASSERTING THAT
HOMOSEXUALS WARRANT HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL PROTECTION
In the last few years, several claims have been litigated con-
cerning equal protection issues relating to homosexuals, with widely
varying results.294 Two decisions, one of whose reasoning did not
survive an en banc rehearing, have held that homosexuals constitute
a class requiring judicial protection from pervasive governmental
discrimination, because of the strong presumption that state and
federal governments invidiously discriminate against homosex-
uals. 295 Most courts, however, have held that discrimination against
"3 Id. at 506.
2'34 See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Watkins II],
aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) [hereinafter Watkins III];
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Hardwick's holding that homosexual conduct not constitutionally protected did not
reach issue of whether government can discriminate because of orientation; case remanded
to district court for consideration of that issue), aff'd in part sub nom, Webster v. Doe, 108 S.
Ct. 2047, 2054 (1988).
295
 Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1349, 1352; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see Swift v. United States, 649 F.
Supp. 596, 601-02 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("government may not discriminate against homosexuals
for sake of discrimination or for no reason at all;" case remanded for consideration of
homosexual's equal protection claim under rational basis test); see also Rowland v. Mad River
Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014-16 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.). Justice Brennan argued that homosexuals should be accorded heightened judicial
protection, noting that homosexuals constitute a large and insular minority, that they lack
political power because of prejudice and discrimination inflicted on publicly identified horn-
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homosexuals is permissible, and have rejected their equal protec-
tion, and particularly suspect class, claims. 296 A primary reason for
osexuals, and that discrimination against homosexuals likely reflects embedded hostility and
prejudice rather than rationality. Id. at 1014. He also observed that sexual preference dis-
crimination infringes upon various fundamental constitutional rights. Id. at 1015. The lower
court decision is at 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
296 Paula, 822 F.2d at 103-04; Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (en
banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986), Other courts
holding that homosexuals are not a suspect class include Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735
F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270,
1'273 (10th Cir. 1984); Todd v. Navarro, 698 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Gay and
Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 656 F. Supp. 1045, 1056-57 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
The United States District Court fur the Northern District of Texas, using reasoning
that closely related to the criteria for heightened equal protection scrutiny, held that Texas's
statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, Tex. PENAL, CODE ANN. 21.06, § 12.23 (Vernon
1974), did not rationally further any legitimate state interest. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986). In ruling that the statute violated the equal
protection clause even under a rational-basis analysis, the court found that sexual orientation
is usually determined before age six by either biological or environmental factors, that
individuals most likely cannot choose or alter their orientation, and that homosexuality is
not a mental disorder or disease. Id. at 1129-30, 1143-44. The court further noted that the
criminalization of homosexual acts does riot deter or eliminate homosexuality, but does cause
homosexuals to experience stigma, emotional distress, discrimination, and alienation from
society. Id. at 1130. The Baker court finally noted that homosexuals do not show a higher
criminal propensity, and that they do not negatively affect the development of children. Id.
at 1130-31, 1143. The court therefore reasoned that Texas had riot established a rational
relation between criminalizing homosexual sodomy and the state's declared interests in
decency, morality, public health and safety, or procreation, and that public distaste for
homosexuality does not alone constitute a legitimate state interest, Id. at 1143, 1145. The
court, because the classification could not even pass the lowest level of scrutiny, did not reach
the issue of whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class, although the court did state that
it would not have held them suspect because the Supreme Court had not even found gender
classifications to be suspect. Id. at 1144-45 & n.58.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,in 1985 reversed
the district court's decision in Baker v. Wade. Baker v, Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc). In a brief opinion, the appellate court refused to hold that homosexuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and therefore used the rational relation standard
or equal protection review. Id. at 292. The fifth circuit held that Texas's sodomy statute is
rationally related to the permissible state goal of implementing morality, given the strong
objection to homosexual conduct that has historically prevailed in Western culture. Id. (citing
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (implementing morality is a permissible state goal)).
The fifth circuit subsequently denied a petition for an en bane rehearing. Baker v. Wade,
774 F,2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane). The court again rejected the equal protection claim,
reasoning that the statute proscribed certain conduct, not a class, and that those who engaged
in the prohibited conduct did so by choice. Id. at 1287. The court further reasoned that the
government could legitimately decide that certain conduct is wrong and stigmatize that
conduct, and that it is not for the courts to resolve moral questions. Id.
See also Dronenburg v, Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (under equal protec-
tion and due process, Navy's policy of discharging persons for homosexual conduct rationally
related to permissible government interest in morale and discipline); Hatheway v. Secretary
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these courts' refusal to provide additional protections for homosex-
uals arises from the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers
v. Hardwick that the states could criminalize homosexual sodomy. 297
This section will therefore first discuss Hardwick, and subsequently
will turn to several post-Hardwick federal court decisions concerning
equal protection claims by homosexuals.
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick
held that the United States Constitution does not confer a funda-
mental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy 2 98 In a case
brought by Michael Hardwick, a gay male arrested in his bedroom
while allegedly committing sodomy, the Hardwick Court upheld the
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute, which facially pros-
cribed both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, but which Geor-
gia apparently enforced only against homosexuals. 299 The Hardwick
Court ruled that homosexual sodomy is outside the scope of activ-
ities that the Court had previously protected under the right of
privacy provided by • the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.30° The Hardwick Court limited its previous decisions con-
cerning the right of privacy to activities concerning marriage, fam-
ily, and procreation, and found no connection between those activ-
ities and homosexual activity."' The Hardwick Court also denied
that its precedents in previous right-to-privacy cases extended pro-
tection to any consensual, private sexual conduct between adults. 302
In addition, the Hardwick Court refused to consider homosex-
ual sodomy within the category of fundamental liberties "implicit
of Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (because classifi-
cations based on sexual preference implicate privacy rights, applied intermediate scrutiny;
but because persons who engage in homosexual sodomy compromise military discipline,
court-martial only of homosexuals for engaging in sodomy substantially related to compelling
government interest); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 332-33 (9th Cir.
1979) (homosexuals not protected by federal civil rights statutes).
297 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No.
89-876); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-344); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (1987).
2" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily aff 'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (consensual, private
homosexual sodomy not within scope of constitutional privacy).
Id. at 200-01, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
Georgia explicitly stated in its brief and oral argument that the statute was rarely enforced,
and then only against homosexuals. Id.
3" Id. at 191.
3" Id. at 190-9 I .
304 Id. at 191.
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in the concept of ordered liberty" and necessary to the existence of
liberty and justice," nor would the Court characterize homosexual
sodomy as one of the liberties "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." 304 The Hardwick Court reasoned that proscriptions
of sodomy have ancient roots, and that half the states continue to
criminalize private consensual sodomy. 305 The Hardwick Court held
that these facts precluded the Court from holding that sodomy is
either "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. "306
The Court also rejected Hardwick's claim that the Court should
at least protect homosexual conduct committed in the home, as part
of privacy rights within the home."' The Hardwick Court reasoned
that if it protected homosexual conduct in the home under the
rubric that consensual sexual conduct between adults is a funda-
mental liberty, the Court would find it difficult to distinguish other
sexual crimes, such as adultery or incest, if committed in the
home."' The Hardwick Court finally stated that: the sentiments of
the majority of the electorate, as represented by its elected officials,
about the morality of homosexual conduct are a rational basis to
support laws criminalizing sodomy."' The Hardwick Court therefore
ruled that statutes criminalizing homosexual sodomy do not violate
homosexuals' substantive due process rights."'"
Chief Justice Burger concurred with the Hardwick majority.'''
He argued that proscriptions of homosexual conduct have ancient
roots in Judeo-Christian, Roman, and English law. 312 For the Court
3"3 Id. at 191-92. The Court applied the test established in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319,324-26 (1937), to determine whether the Court should declare certain conduct to
be a fundamental right qualifying for heightened judicial scrutiny. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
5" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). The Court applied an alternative
description of fundamental liberties found in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U,S. 494,
503 (1977). Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
"5 478 U.S. at 192-94.
506 Id. at 194.
"? Id, at 195-96. Hardwick relied on Stanley V. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in which
the Court held that the first amendment prevents conviction for possessing or reading
obscene materials "in the privacy of" the home. 478 U.S. at 195 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at
565). The Court rejected Hardwick's claim, holding Stanley to be fundamentally a first
amendment, not privacy, case. Id. at 195-96. justice Blackmun differed with this interpre-
tation, arguing that Stanley was anchored on the fourth amendment's special protection for
the individual in the home. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
mi8 Id. at 195-96.
"9 Id. at 196,
51 " See id. at 190-94.
311 Id. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
712 Id.
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to hold that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right, Chief
Justice Burger concluded, "would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching," and therefore, he reasoned, the states should continue
to have the authority to proscribe homosexual sodomy. 3 "
Justices Blackmun and Stevens each wrote dissenting opinions
in Hardwick. 314
 Justice Blackmun argued that the language of the
Georgia sodomy statute purposely included both heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy, and criticized the Hardwick majority for "al-
most obsessively" focusing on homosexual activity. 3 " He accused
the Court of distorting the issue in dispute in Hardwick, because
Hardwick's claim that Georgia's sodomy statute intruded on his
privacy and his right of intimate association, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued, did not depend in any way on his sexual orientation,'"
Justice Blackmun observed that the Court had not based its
prior substantive due process holdings, which specified personal
choices with which the government could not interfere, on the
general public welfare furthered by those choices. 3 " Instead, Justice
Blackmun argued, the Court protected those personal choices be-
cause they formed a central part of an individual's life.3" Justice
Blackmun reasoned that decisions concerning sexual intimacy,
which he defined as central to the self-identification of the person,
fall within the general principle recognized by the Court that indi-
viduals enjoy the fundamental liberty to choose how to conduct
3 " Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J ., concurring).
Justice Powell also concurred, agreeing that there was no fundamental due process right
"such as that claimed" by Hardwick. Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell sug-
gested, however, that if Hardwick had been tried, convicted, and sentenced, the Georgia
statute, which authorized up to twenty years imprisonment, might raise an eighth amendment
issue, Id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
914 Id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun did not join Justice Stevens's dissent. See id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316 Id. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun interpreted the legislative
history of Georgia's sodomy statute to suggest that Georgia intended to broaden the coverage
of its previous sodomy statute to include heterosexual sodomy. Id. at 200 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)./
316 Id. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3 " Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Some of the personal choices that the Court
had recognized, Blackmun argued, include decisions within the marriage, including contra-
ception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); whether to end a pregnancy,
Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1985); and whether
distantly related family members may live together, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U,S. 494, 506 (1976). Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204-05.
118 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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their lives." Justice Blackmun therefore defined the majority's
holding in Hardwick as a refusal to recognize the fundamental in-
terest all individuals share in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others. 32° According to Justice Blackmun, the right
of individuals to conduct intimate relationships, particularly in the
privacy of the home, is central to the constitutional protection of
privacy."'
Justice Blackmun criticized the two general reasons given by
the Hardwick Court to justify the sodomy statute. 322 He observed no
justification for equating private consensual sexual activity in the
home with the possession in the home of drugs, firearms or stolen
goods, or with the sexual crimes of adultery or incest. 323 Justice
Blackmun argued that each of these crimes, unlike sodomy, was
either not victimless, was potentially dangerous, violated the state-
recognized civil contract of marriage, or, in the case of incest, was
presumptively nonconsensual. 324 Justice Blackmun noted that the
Hardwick Court made no effort to explain why it grouped private,
consensual, homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather than
with private, consensual, heterosexual activity by unmarried per-
sons, or with sodomy within marriage. 325
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the Hardwick Court's at-
tempt to justify the sodomy statute on traditional and moral
grounds. 32" He argued that the Court must be sensitive to the rights
of those whose fundamental personal choices are limited by the
government due to majoritarian disapproval."' Justice Blackmun
especially rebuked the Court's effort to justify the statute on the
basis of traditional Judeo-Christian values, because, he argued, sec-
ular legislation could not be based solely on religious doctrine, and
religious intolerance could not justify the punishment of private
behavior.32B Justice Blackmun further reasoned that public intoler-
''g Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
321) Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
321 Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also accused the majority of
misinterpreting the Court's prior fourth amendment decisions, which he interpreted as
stating the principle that persons possess additional protection from government interference
in the privacy of the home. Id. at 206-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 208-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
929
	 at 208-09 & n,4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
924
323 Id. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
323 Id. at 210-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
927
	 at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
323 Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ante or animosity alone could not constitutionally justify depriving
a person of liberty. 329
 Nor, he argued, could protection of the public
environment justify the proscription of private, intimate activity;
Justice Blackmun criticized the Court for failing to distinguish be-
tween laws that protect the public sensibilities by proscribing certain
conduct in public, and laws that enforce private morality. 33° He
thereby concluded that mere disagreement with the value-system
of those who choose to live their lives differently, does not pose an
interest that could justify interfering with their personal choices or
intimate conduct within the home. 33 '
In footnote 2 of his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun dis-
cussed Hardwick's possible impact on equal protection principles. 332
Justice Blackmun suggested that Georgia's selective enforcement of
the facially neutral sodomy statute only against homosexuals might
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause's prohibition of
discriminatory enforcement, whether or not homosexuals constitute
. a suspect class. 3" He noted that Georgia's legislature had decided
that the gender of the participants in sodomy was irrelevant to its
legality, and expressed doubt that the state legitimately could de-
fend the sodomy statute on the grounds of its selective, and arguably
discriminatory, enforcement against participants in same-sex so-
domy."'
Justice Stevens, also dissenting in Hardwick, argued that the
traditional view of sodomy as immoral is not sufficient to uphold
sodomy statutes, just as society's traditional view that miscegenation
is immoral could not save those laws from constitutional attack." 5
Justice Stevens noted that the Court recognized, within the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause, the essential liberty to make
329
 Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
575 (1975)).
"O Id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
951 Id, at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
552 Id. at 202 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also discussed eighth
amendment issues raised by Hardwick. Id. He noted that the public health profession no
longer views homosexuality as a disease or disorder, and that homosexual orientation is most
likely not chosen, but rather forms part of the fiber of an individual's personality. Id. He
thereby concluded that the eighth amendment might prohibit punishing a person for acting
on the attraction resulting from sexual orientation, for the right to make decisions concerning
sexual relations, Justice Blackmun reasoned, would be empty if the government provided
no real choice but life without sexual intimacy. Id.
455 Id. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
554 Id.
345 Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Loving v. West Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (striking down miscegenation statute on equal protection and due process grounds)).
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personal choices about intimate relationships, and extended that
right to both married and unmarried couples."6
 Included within
that right, Justice Stevens argued, is the right to engage in such
nonreproductive sexual conduct that the majority of Americans
might find offensive or immoral."' He reasoned, therefore, that
Georgia could not completely prohibit sodomy, because Georgia
would violate the liberty interests of married and unmarried het-
erosexual couples if it enforced the statute against them."' Justice
Stevens then reasoned that homosexuals and heterosexuals share
the same liberty interest in deciding how to live their lives and
conduct their intimate relations." 9 Selective application of the stat-
ute, he further noted, could not be justified merely by a habitual
dislike for homosexuals, for Georgia's statute did not, in Justice
Stevens's view, indicate that Georgia meant to proscribe only hom-
osexual conduct. 34" Justice Stevens concluded that selective enforce-
ment of the statute against homosexuals is probably unconstitu-
tional. 34 '
Several commentators have criticized the holding and reason-
ing of the Hardwick Court. 342 Professor Tribe, who argued for Hard-
wick before the United States Supreme Court, criticized the Court's
reliance on the history of discrimination against homosexuals as
justification for not recognizing their right to engage in private
consensual acts.3" Professor Tribe argues that the Court inverted
the equal protection principle of greater judicial protection for
disliked groups and instead "bootStrap[ped] antipathy toward hom-
osexuality into a tautological rationale for continuing to criminalize
"0 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
331 Id. at 216-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453
(1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481-86 (1965)).
35' Id. at 218 (Stevens,,., dissenting).
359 Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34° Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" I See id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
342
 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 1421-35; Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and
Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073
(1988) (Hardwick result of conceptions and misconceptions of Justices about homosexuality,
privacy, and political values); Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection,
54 U. Cur. L. REv. 648 (1987) (Hardwick result of judicial self-indulgence and of lawmaking
by personal distaste of Justices toward homosexuality); Developments, supra note '24, at 1521-
25 (cramp reading of privacy doctrine departed from precedent); Note, Process, Privacy, and
the Supreme Court, 28 B.C.L. REv. 691 (1987). But see Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy,
55 U. Cut. L. REv. 1181 (1988) (responding to Stoddard, supra, argued that Hardwick
indicated fundamental problem with privacy doctrine itself).
94'
	 TRIBE, supra note 98, at 1427.
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homosexuality."344
 Professor Tribe noted, as did Justice Blackmun,
that the Court previously had held that a law's long existence could
not ensure its continued constitutional validity if that law invaded
the body or the home. 345
 Professor Tribe also observed that the
liberties recognized in the Constitution contain the principle that
the law must allow persons to choose different ways to use that
liberty and that ways of life that do not affect the rights and interests
of others should not be condemned merely because they are dif-
ferent. 346
 Professor Tribe further argued that the Court had im-
plicitly confirmed that its holding in Hardwick only applied to hom-
osexuals by its denial of certiorari, a few months after the Hardwick
decision, of an Oklahoma appellate court decision that interpreted
the right of privacy to extend at least to heterosexual sodomy. 347
Since Hardwick, several federal courts have considered pro-
tected class claims.s48 Although homosexuals were at least initially
successful in two courts, no federal circuit currently treats homo-
sexuals as a suspect class. 349 In refusing to subject classifications
disadvantaging homosexuals to heightened scrutiny, these courts
have interpreted Hardwick as foreclosing protected class status for
a class defined by conduct that the Court has held could be crimin-
alized."°
In 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Padula v. Webster, in part relying on Hardwick
and circuit precedent, held that homosexuals are not a suspect class
for the purposes of the equal protection clause, and ruled that the
3" Id. at 1427-28.
14' Id. at 1427 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
"3 Id. at 1424 & n.31, 1435 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-25 (1972)
(Pennsylvania requirement of extended formal schooling could not be enforced against
Amish, who believed that such schooling threatened their traditional way of life)).
'47 Id. at 1431; see Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
890 (1986).
343 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-
344); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other
grounds, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103
(D.C. Cir. 1987); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1361, 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
"' See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Watkins //f, 875 F.2d
at 711; Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Padula, 822 F.2d
at 102-03. But see Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1339-42, 1345 (Hardwick did not foreclose protected
class status for homosexuals); High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1370-73 (same).
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Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") acted rationally in refusing
to employ a woman because of her homosexuality. 351 The plaintiff,
who claimed she was denied employment with the FBI solely be-
cause of her homosexuality, argued for recognition of homosexuals
as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification."' Noting that the FBI
claimed to discriminate only against persons who engaged in actual
homosexual conduct, and observing that the plaintiff had engaged
in homosexual conduct, the court defined the class disadvantaged
by the FBI's policy to be persons who engaged in homosexual
conduct, not merely those with a homosexual status. 353
Although the Padula court acknowledged the plaintiff's claim
that homosexuals meet the Supreme Court's criteria for suspect or
quasi-suspect status, the court did not consider those criteria, and
instead relied on Hardwick and similar circuit precedent to deny the
plaintiff's claim. 354 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court and
District of Columbia Circuit's refusal to recognize a privacy right to
engage in homosexual conduct foreclosed granting protected class
status under equal protection doctrine to those engaged in that
conduct."' Hardwick's refusal to object to state laws that criminalized
homosexual conduct, according to the Padula court, also prevented
a ruling that discrimination against the class defined by the com-
mission of homosexual sodomy was unjustified and invidious. 356
The Padula court therefore ruled that the class of persons who
engage in homosexual conduct do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class."' Noting that state actions disadvantaging homosex-
uals must still bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose,
the Padula court held as rational the FBI's conclusion that homo-
sexual conduct could serve as a detriment to the maintenance of
morale and discipline. 358 The court observed that many disliked and
were morally offended by homosexuality. 359 The Padula court also
held as rational the FBI's argument that employing agents with a
propensity to engage in activities considered criminal in many states
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court also held that
FBI policy statements on the hiring of homosexuals did not limit the FBI's discretion to
consider the homosexual conduct of applicants. Id. at 101.
552 Id. at 102.
558 Id.
954 Id,
855 Id, at 103.
.956
997 Id.
858 Id. at 103-04.
558 Id. at 104.
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would undermine the agency's law enforcement credibility. 360
 The
Padula court finally held that the FBI could rationally believe that
even "open" homosexuals, because of the criminalization of hom-
osexual conduct and the widespread prejudice against homosexuals,
were vulnerable to blackmail to protect themselves or their sexual
partners."' According to the Padula court, therefore, the FBI's
discrimination against homosexuals had a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest, and the court held that the classification
did not violate the equal protection clause. 362
In contrast to Padula, a federal district court in 1987 reasoned
that Hardwick did not prevent it from subjecting a classification
disadvantaging homosexuals to heightened equal protection scru-
tiny. In 1987, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office held that homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect
class, and that the Department of Defense policies disadvantaging
homosexuals violate the equal protection clause because they did
not bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. 363 High Tech
Gays concerned a class action suit challenging a Department of
Defense policy of subjecting homosexual applicants for secret and
top secret clearances, which the Department required for certain
defense-related private employment, to expanded investigation and
mandatory adjudication solely because of their sexual orientation
The Department of Defense policies subjected applicants who en-
gaged in any homosexual conduct to further investigation and man-
datory adjudication, but only instituted these additional procedures
against heterosexual applicants if there was evidence of vulnerability
to blackmail or coercion, or of reckless conduct or criminal acts. 365
The Department, according to the court, considered homosexual
' 6G Id.
361 Id.
362 Id .
"3
 High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368,
1373 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
"4 Id, at 1362-63; see id. at 1363-67.
3 ' 15 Id. at 1364. The special policies the Department of Defense forced homosexuals to
pass increased the average amount of time to receive clearances by more than two months,
and also served as a disincentive for companies seeking contracts with the Department of
Defense to hire homosexuals. Id. See The Department of Defense Security Program Regu-
lation, Doll 5220.2-R, Jan. 1, 1987, 32 C.F.R. § 154 (1987), and The Department of Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program, DoD 5220.6, Aug. 12, 1985. See
also Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2(1 1114 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversed summary judgment upholding
CIA policy of not granting security clearances to homosexuals and remanded for litigation
of constitutional issues).
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conduct to include not only sodomous behavior, but also other
forms of physical or social behavior, including long-term monoga-
mous relations with a person of the same sex." 66
Relying on the principles the Supreme Court had articulated
for determining if a classification requires strict or intermediate
scrutiny, the High Tech Gays court ruled that homosexuals are a
quasi-suspect class, and that classifications disadvantaging homosex-
uals had to pass a standard of review analogous to the standard for
gender classifications.'" According to the court, homosexuals are
subjected to some of the deepest prejudice and hatred in United
States society, and that discrimination against homosexuals there-
fore likely reflects hostility anti prejudice rather than rationality. 368
The court also reasoned that wholly unfounded and degrading
stereotypes about homosexuals prevail in American society, includ-
ing the perception that homosexuals molest children, seek to con-
vert persons to homosexuality, engage in promiscuous behavior, do
not engage in stable, monogamous relationships, and are mentally
and psychologically unstable. 369 The court noted that, like the out-
moded stereotypes about the relative abilities of the sexes to con-
tribute to society, the contributions of homosexuals to all aspects of
American life belie those stereotypes about homosexuals."" Hom-
osexuals also constitute a discrete and insular minority, according
to the court, because hostility and prejudice against homosexuals
seriously impairs their political power."' The High Tech Gays court
therefore held that homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class,
although the court did not explain why homosexuals are not a fully
suspect class. 172
The High Tech Gays court further held that, because the De-
partment of Defense's procedures limited homosexuals' fundamen-
tal rights to engage in consensual, non-sodomous behavior, the
classification also needed to pass strict scrutiny.'" The High Tech
Gays court distinguished Hardwick by noting that Hardwick did not
determine whether homosexuals are a suspect or.quasi-suspect class,
366 High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1564.
367
 Id. at 1369.
36B Id. (citing Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist,, 470 U.S 1009, 1377 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of col.)).
309 Id.
37" Id. at 1369-70.
37 ' Id. at 1370.
372 Id. at 1368.
373 Id. at 1370.
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and that the Hardwick court limited its holding to homosexual so-
domy, not other forms of homosexual conduct. 374 The court ob-
served that the Hardwick Court did not suggest that heterosexuals
have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, nor that laws re-
stricting other forms of homosexual conduct, but not similar het-
erosexual conduct, would be constitutional. 875
 Reasoning that all
persons, including homosexuals, have a fundamental right to en-
gage in affectional and sexual activities not traditionally proscribed
as sodomy, the court held that the Department's regulations im-
pinged on that fundamental right and therefore had to pass strict
scrutiny. 376
Having determined that the Department's procedures must
pass strict scrutiny, the High Tech Gays court examined the various
reasons given by the Department to justify subjecting homosexuals
to a more extensive clearance procedure, and ruled that the De-
partment's regulations did not pass even the minimum rationality
standard. 577
 The district court discounted the Department's argu-
ment that most homosexuals engage in criminal conduct, which
called into question their willingness to uphold the law. 578
 The court
observed that sodomy is not a crime in over half the states, that
persons who engage in sodomy rarely face prosecution, and that,
because most sodomy laws also proscribe heterosexual sodomy, het-
erosexuals are also likely to ignore those laws. 379
The Department also claimed that homosexuals often experi-
ence emotional problems or other personal disorders due to the
stress their orientation places on them, and that these disorders
make homosexuals potential security risks.'" The High Tech Gays
court dismissed this argument, noting that the medical community
in the United States no longer considers homosexuality to be a
medical disorder. 58 ' The court also asserted that the Department
could not justify subjecting all homosexuals to expanded investi-
gation, because, although some homosexuals might face psychiatric
problems dealing with their sexual orientation, many others do
not.382
 In addition, the court noted that many heterosexuals also
' 74
 Id. at 1370-73.
375 Id. at 1370-71.
376 Id. at 1370-72.
377 Id. at 1373-76.
378
 Id. at 1373. •
379 Id. at 1373-74.
sB° Id. at 1374.
581 Id. at 1374-75.
332
 Id. at 1375.
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experience emotional problems for various reasons."' The Depart-
ment also argued that homosexuals who are secretive about their
sexual orientation are open to blackmail, but the High Tech Gays
court found no evidence to support the claim that homosexuals are
any more vulnerable to blackmail, or any less trustworthy, than
heterosexuals.'" The High Tech Gays court therefore found that
none of the Department's stated purposes for subjecting all homo-
sexuals to additional investigative procedures was rationally related
to a legitimate government interest, and held that the Department's
classification violated the equal protection and fundamental liberty
rights of homosexuals. 885
Subsequent to High Tech Gays, a Ninth Circuit appeals panel
subjected a classification disadvantaging homosexuals to strict scru-
tiny, but the circuit en banc, while affirming the panel's decision,
withdrew their holding that homosexuals are a suspect class. In
1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Watkins v. United States Army, hereinafter Watkins II, held that hom-
osexuals are a suspect class, and declared that the Army's policy of
administratively discharging or refusing to re-enlist homosexuals
failed to pass strict scrutiny and therefore violated the equal pro-
tection rights of homosexuals. 886 Watkins II involved an openly gay
serviceman administratively discharged, pursuant to Army regula-
tions, after fourteen years solely because of his homosexual orien-
tation."' In 1982, the United States District Court for the Western
310 Id .
"4 Id. at 1375; see Federal Government Security Clearance Programs: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs, United Slates Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 171—
87,913-26 (1985) (no evidence of any persons blackmailed because of homosexuality).
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus, Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,1375—
77 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The court also held that the Department's regulations violated the first
amendment right of homosexuals to belong to homosexual organizations, but dismissed
plaintiffs' claim that the Department violated their due process rights by creating an irre-
butable presumption. Id. at 1377-78.
3" Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,1349,1352 (9th Cir. 1988).
"7 Id. at 1330-34. The plaintiff, Perry Watkins, was drafted into the Army in 1968 at
the age of 19. In filling out the pre-induction forms, he marked "yes" in response to the
question of whether he had homosexual tendencies. Nonetheless, the Army inducted him.
Watkins served for fourteen years, reenlisting several times, and his service record was
exemplary. Id, at 1330. Several times, however, the Army investigated him due to his admis-
sion of homosexuality on the induction form and on an affidavit he filled out a year after
his induction, on which he also claimed to have engaged in homosexual sodomy on two
occasions while in the service. Id. at 1331. The investigations each found no evidence for any
actual homosexual conduct by Watkins, nor any evidence that Watkins's known homosexuality
had a negative affect on his or other servicemen's performances. Id. at 1331-32.
Despite his service record, the Army in 1981 discharged Watkins due to his homosex-
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District of Washington enjoined the Army from discharging388 or
refusing to reenlist389
 Watkins because of his homosexuality, holding
that the Army was equitably estopped from relying on its regula-
tions that prevented homosexuals from enlisting and that mandated
their separation from the service. In 1983, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, hereinafter the Watkins I court, reversed the
district court's injunction, holding that courts could not use their
equitable powers to order a military official to violate a military
regulation unless the regulation violated a constitutional or statutory
provision. 390
 On remand, the district court held that the Army's
regulations did not violate the Constitution or the Army's statutory
authority. 391 In again reversing the District Court, the Watkins II
court of appeals declared that the regulations violated the equal
protection clause because they facially and invidiously discriminated
against homosexuals, which the court held to be a suspect class, and
because the regulations were not necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest. 392 The Watkins II court ordered that the
Army consider Watkins's reenlistment application without regard
to his sexual orientation. 393
The Watkins II court followed a three-step inquiry in reaching
this holding. The court held first that the regulations discriminated
on the basis of sexual orientation, then held that homosexuals con-
stitute a 'suspect class, and finally ruled that the regulations did not
uality after promulgating new regulations that mandated discharge of all homosexuals re-
gardless of' merit unless there were strong extenuating circumstances. Id. at 1332-33. Watkins
filed suit to prevent his discharge. Id. at 1333.
For detailed discussions of the facts of the case, see 847 F.2d at 1330-34, and 541 F.
Supp. 249, 251-54 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
For a detailed discussion of the Army's regulations and their application, see Falk v.
Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1989).
"" Watkins v. United States Army, 541 F. Supp. 249, 258-59 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The
district court held that Watkins's discharge violated the Army's double jeopardy regulation,
AR 635-200, 9 1-19(b), because the Army had already attempted to discharge Watkins
through administrative proceedings in 1975. Id. Army regulations instituted in 1981 require
the discharge of homosexuals without regard to merit. AR 635-200, chpi. 15.
"9
 Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F. Supp. 212, 223 (W.D. Wash. 1982), reversed,
721 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1983). Army regulations made homosexuality a nonwaivable
disqualification for reenlistment. AR 601-280, 9 2-21(c). The Army responded to the district
court's injunction of Watkins's discharge by denying Watkins's reenlistment when his tour of
duty expired in October, 1982, Watkins, 551 F. Supp. at 223.
3" Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir, 1983).
Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1334.
992 Id. at 1349, 1352.
" Id. at 1352-53. The court also remanded the remainder of Watkins's claims, including
the loss of his security clearance due to his sexual orientation, to the district court. Id. at
1353.
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pass strict s.crutiny. 394 In holding that the regulations actually dis-
criminated on the basis of sexual orientation and not on actual
conduct,395 the Watkins II court observed that the Army did not
need to establish homosexual conduct either before or during ser-
vice. The court also noted that homosexual conduct does not nec-
essarily establish more than a presumption of homosexual orienta-
tion, for evidence of conduct could be rebutted by a showing that
the homosexual conduct was an aberration and did not indicate a
homosexual orientation. 313" The Watkins II court reasoned that the
Army views homosexual conduct, like statements of homosexual
orientation, not as an action mandating separation from the Army,
but instead only as presumptive but rebuttable evidence of homo-
sexual orientation. 397 The Watkins II court further noted that hom-
osexual conduct that creates a rebuttable presumption of homosex-
ual orientation includes not just sodomy but also kissing, holding
hands, caressing, and other acts.s'e The Watkins II court therefore
59' See infra notes 395-439 and accompanying text for' a discussion of the court's three-
step equal protection analysis.
595 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,1339 (9th Cir. 1988).
396 Id. at 1337-39. Fur the content of the Army's regulations requiring the discharge of
homosexuals, see id. at 1336 n.11. The regulations define a homosexual as "a person,
regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts." Id. A homosexual act, according to the regulation, is "bodily contact, actively undertaken
or passively permitted, between soldiers of the same sex for sexual satisfaction." The regu-
lations mandate discharge if the soldier "engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act," either before the soldier joined the Army, during
a previous tour of duty, or during the soldier's current tour. According to the regulations,
however, the soldier can avoid discharge if' the homosexual conduct was a departure from
the soldier's usual behavior, was unlikely to recur, was not accomplished by force or coercion
if done during military service, and if the soldier did not desire or intend to engage in
homosexual acts and the soldier's continued military service was consistent with discipline,
order, and morale. The regulations state that the intent of these exceptions is only to allow
the retention of "non-homosexual" soldiers who, because of unusual circumstances, engage
or attempt to engage in homosexual conduct. The regulations also mandate discharge,
without recourse to the exceptions, of soldiers who state they are homosexual, and of soldiers
who attempt io marry someone of the same sex, unless the Army finds that they are not
truly homosexual. Id.
The Army's regulations prohibiting the reenlistment of homosexuals include riot only
those being discharged under the discharge regulation discussed above, but also persons of
"questionable moral character and a history of antisocial behavior, sexual perversion or
homosexuality." Id. at 1336. The reenlistment regulation further states that persons who
have committed homosexual acts or have admitted being homosexual cannot reenlist, unless
the act was an isolated incident that stemmed from unusual circumstances, such as immaturity
or intoxication. Id,
MI Id. at 1338-39.
39' Id. at 1338. The court reasoned that same-sex kissing, holding hands, and caressing
constituted bodily contact between persons of the same sex that gave sexual satisfaction. Id.
The court also noted that, in Watkins's discharge hearing, the Army tried but failed to prove
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held that the regulations sought to separate from the Army those
persons with homosexual orientation, not those who engaged in
legal or illegal homosexual acts, and hence burdened the class con-
sisting of persons defined by their sexual orientation, not conduct. 399
The second part of the Watkins II court's analysis concerned
whether classifications defined by sexual orientation are suspect. 40°
Following what it reasoned were the guidelines defined by the
United States Supreme Court for judicial inquiries into whether a
class is suspect, the Watkins 11 court first held that the group defined
by homosexual orientation had suffered a history of purposeful
discrimination as "pernicious and intense" as that suffered by any
other group established as suspect. 40 ' The court also considered
whether government classifications burdening homosexuals are in-
vidious because they constitute a gross unfairness inconsistent with
the ideals of equal protection. 402 The Watkins 11 court noted that
the characteristics that define homosexuals are irrelevant to their
ability to perform or contribute to society. 403
The Watkins H court further observed that discrimination
against homosexuals arises from prejudice and inaccurate stereo-
types, rather than rational evaluation, and in the Army's case the
prejudice actually served as a rationale for their discrimination. 404
The Army, according to the court, argued that homosexual soldiers
would hurt recruitment and damage the Army's image because of
pervasive prejudice against them, and also justified its regulations
as rationally burdening the class of persons who engage in the
criminal act of sodomy. 405 The court dismissed this argument, not-
ing that the Army's regulations defined the burdened class by its
orientation, not by the propensity to commit sodomy, and that the
that Watkins squeezed a male soldier's knee. Id. The court compared the breadth of these
regulations to the only statute, according to the court, that restricted the private consensual
sexual activity of military personnel. Id. at 1338 n.12. The statute provides for the court
marshal of personnel who engage in heterosexual or homosexual sodomy. 10 U.S.C. § 925
(1982).
39g
 Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1338-39. The court reasoned that if a heterosexual and a
homosexual soldier engage in homosexual conduct with each other because of intoxication
or curiosity, the Army might retain the heterosexual soldier while automatically discharging
the homosexual soldier. Id. at 1339.
400 Id. at 1345-49.
40L Id. at 1345.
402
 Id. at 1345-46.
403 Id. at 1346.
-1 °4 Id.
-w5 Id.
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regulation's definition of homosexual conduct reached much more
than sodorny.4"
The Watkins II court finally observed, in considering the gross
unfairness of government discrimination against homosexuals, that
homosexual orientation constitutes an immutable characteristic for
the purposes of equal protection analysis. 407 The court reasoned
that the Supreme Court, at a minimum, considers immutable traits
to be those that a person could change only with great difficulty,
or, more broadly, as characteristics that are so central to a person's
identity that government penalization of persons for refusing to
alter those characteristics' would be abhorrent. 408 According to the
court, a person's sexual orientation is largely unchangeable, with
some possible exceptions accomplished through drastic medical
treatment, and the government could not require individuals to
alter such a central aspect of their identities even if the alteration
could be easily done. 409
The Watkins II court finally held that homosexuals are a discrete
and insular minority that is unable to seek redress from the political
branches of government. 410 The court noted that most persons
would never identify themselves as homosexuals, and that most
persons would have little exposure to persons whom they knew
were homosexuals, which therefore limits their ability to understand
or empathize with homosexuals."' Homosexuals also face barriers
to political power, according to the court, because popular prejudice
forces homosexuals to remain hidden, and pressures legislators
from appearing to be concerned about them. 412
By applying these factors, the Watkins II court held that hom-
osexuals constitute a suspect class. 413 The court then moved onto
the third part of the analysis: whether the Army's regulations and
their facially discriminatory impact on homosexuals survived the
strict scrutiny test. 414 The court held that the regulations were not
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, even with
406 Id. at 1346-47.
4a7 Id. at 1347.
4°6 Id.
409 Id. at 1347-48.
41° See id. at 1348.
41 I Id.
4" Id. at 1348-49.
413 Id. at 1349,
414 Id. at 1349-52.
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the greater deference given to decisions made in the military
sphere. 415
The Watkins II court rejected each of the reasons the Army
gave for the regulations.416 The court dismissed the Army's sugges-
tions that homosexuals present problems of morale and discipline,
reasoning that the Army's contentions illegitimately cater to private
biases that could not justify official discrimination even when the
biases create real and legitimate problems. 417 The Watkins II court
also rejected the Army's claim that its regulations were grounded
in moral principles, for the court held that moral principles could
not serve as a compelling justification for laws that discriminate
against a suspect class, and could not be applied with an evil eye.'"
Although the court acknowledged that society's moral condemna-
tion of certain conduct may justify government restriction of that
conduct, the court reasoned that equal protection requires that the
government apply those moral principles evenhandedly. 419
The Watkins II court also held that other Army reasons for the
regulations, including that emotional relationships between persons
of different ranks would undermine discipline, or that the Army
was concerned about preventing possible security breaches, were
legitimate military goals, but ones that could be pursued using
classifications that more closely fit those goals. 42° The court held
that the regulations bore little relation to these legitimate military
goals, because they did not limit emotional attachments between
415 Id. at 1349-50. The Court allows Congress and the military greater deference to
restrict constitutional rights when setting military policies. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 64-65 (1981) (women riot required to register for draft); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
837-38 (1976) (military can restrict speech on bases).
The Watkins II court questioned whether the Army's regulations should receive greater
deference, because the Supreme Court had only required this deference for congressional
actions within Congress's authority to raise and support an Army, and Congress had not
regulated homosexual conduct by military personnel. Watkins v. United States Army, 847
F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988); see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Rostker,
453 U.S. 57 (1981).
416
 Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1350-52.
417 Id. at. 1350-51. The court relied here on Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). The
court also noted that the military had previously justified race segregation as necessary to
maintain morale and discipline. Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1350.
418
 Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1351-52.
419 Id. The court based this principle on the Supreme Court's opinion in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967). The Watkins II court suggested that animus against homosexuals
might be based, not on morality, but instead on "prejudice masking as morality." Watkins II,
847 F.2d at 1351.
420 See Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1352.
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persons of different rank and sex. 42 ' The court also reasoned that
the regulations only disadvantaged homosexuals of whose orienta-
tion the Army had knowledge, and would cause homosexuals to
hide their identity, and therefore increase their susceptibility to
blackmail.422
The Watkins II court distinguished this case from Hardwick,
reasoning not only that Hardwick did not explicitly reach the issue
of whether homosexuals are a suspect class, but also that Hardwick's
reasoning did not preempt Watkins's claim that homosexuals con-
stitute a protected class under equal protection analysis. 42' The
court noted that Hardwick only considered a substantive clue process
issue when it rejected the claim of a privacy right to commit con-
sensual homosexual sodomy; the court interpreted the Hardwick
decision not to suggest that the state could penalize homosexual
orientation, or even that the state could make invidious distinctions
by penalizing sexual conduct only when done by homosexuals. 424
According to the Watkins II court, Hardwick decided only that a
facially neutral sodomy statute was constitutional, and did not ad-
dress whether heterosexual sodomy would fall within the scope of
the right to privacy, or whether states could penalize only homo-
sexual sodomy without violating the equal protection clause:125
The Watkins II court instead interpreted Hardwick as refusing
to expand, by judicial fiat, the scope of the right of privacy, and
reasoned that the Court's concerns about such an expansion have
little relevance to the enforcement of the clear constitutional guar-
antee of equal protection of the laws.426 The court, noting Hardwick's
concern with judicial involvement in "value-based line-drawing"
when defining the scope of substantive due process, reasoned that
equal protection does not restrict the enactment of laws based on
the majority's substantive value choices, but only requires that the
majority apply those values fairly. 427 The court also criticized the
reasoning in Padula as resting on the false premise that Hardwick
approved of discrimination against homosexuals as homosexuals. 428
According to the Watkins II court, the Padula court erred in reason-
42 ' Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. at 1339-40,1345.
424 Id. at 1339-40.
425 Id,
426 Id. at 1341.
427 Id. at 1341-42.
"' Id. at 1395.
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ing that Hardwick's holding that states could criminalize sexual con-
duct commonly practiced by homosexuals also would allow states to
pass "homosexual laws" only burdening, homosexuals because of
their orientation.429
 Therefore, the Watkins II court held that no
precedent barred it from finding classifications based on homosex-
ual conduct to be suspect. 43 °
Judge Reinhardt dissented from the Watkins II court's decision,
arguing that Hardwick and previous Ninth Circuit decisions .fore-
closed the court from holding that homosexuals are a suspect
class. 43 ' The underlying principle of Hardwick, according to Judge
Reinhardt, was that the government, acting out of antihomosexual
animus, could proscribe homosexuals from engaging in activities in
which heterosexuals have a constitutional right to engage. 432 The
majority misinterpreted Hardwick, he argued, to deny due process
,protection to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, because
the underlying but crucial fact of Hardwick was that Hardwick was
homosexual. 4" Judge Reinhardt instead argued that the Hardwick
decision allows the state to regulate sexual conduct by homosexuals
while failing to regulate the same conduct by heterosexuals.434
If not for Hardwick, judge Reinhardt stated, he would have
agreed with the majority that homosexuals meet all the criteria for,
and constitute, a suspect class under equal protection principles. 435
Judge Reinhardt reasoned, however, that the Supreme Court had
ruled that homosexuality, which he defined as possessing the desire
or predisposition to engage in homosexual conduct, could be reg-
ulated or criminalized by the state.436 He argued that the court of
appeals was not only prevented from describing discriminatory
'2g Id.
450 Id.
13 ' Id. at 1353-62 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Throughout Judge Reinhardt's dissent, he
explicitly criticized Hardwick, stressed that without Hardwick he would have joined the ma-
jority, but argued that the court was not free to contradict Hardwick's precedent as he
interpreted it. See id. at 1353, 1358, 1362.
432
 Id. at 1354-55 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
4" Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Judge Reinhardt criticized the majority for extending
Hardwick's reasoning to also erode privacy rights for heterosexuals, in violation, he argued,
of the constitutional protection of most consensual, private heterosexual acts. id. at 1355-
56. Judge Reinhardt also argued that the majority unduly denigrated privacy rights in relation
to equal protection, reasoning that substantive due process-based privacy rights were no less
central to the Constitution, nor any less objective in application, than equal protection analysis.
Id. at 1356.
134 Id. at 1354 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
433 Id. at 1356.
436 Id. at 1356-57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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treatment of homosexuals as impermissible or as based on unrea-
sonable prejudice, but also that the class defined by conduct that
may be criminalized may not legitimately assert special constitu-
tional protection.437
judge Reinhardt further argued that, even if Hardwick allowed
all sodomy to be regulated, sodomy statutes affect homosexuals
disproportionately.438 He therefore argued that statutes that restrict
all sodomy especially limit the primary form of sexual activity of
homosexuals, and so neutral sodomy statutes also would violate
equal protection if the class defined by propensity to engage in
homosexual conduct were suspect. 439 This result, according to
Judge Reinhardt, would directly contradict Hardwick's holding that
the government could prohibit homosexual sodomy. 440 Judge Rein-
hardt, however, noted Ninth Circuit precedent that, under the fun-
damental rights branch of equal protection analysis, had subjected
the Army's prosecution of a homosexual for sodomy to intermediate
scrutiny. 441 Reasoning that, at most, the Army's regulations had to
pass intermediate scrutiny, he argued, consistent with previous
Ninth Circuit holdings, that military classifications disadvantaging
homosexuals bear a substantial relation to an important government
interest. 442 Arguing that the Watkins II majority failed to give the
proper deference to the professional judgment of the military,
Judge Reinhardt reasoned that Hardwick and Ninth Circuit prece-
dent foreclosed the court from substituting its opinion on the suit-
ability of homosexuals in the military for the military's own profes-
sional judgment."'
Judge Reinhardt also criticized the Watkins II majority's distinc-
tion between conduct and orientation as irrelevant, reasoning that
the class defined by homosexual orientation is essentially the same
as the class defined by homosexual conduct. 444 Judge Reinhardt
pointed out, moreover, that Watkins did admit to homosexual acts,
so that he could still have been excluded under a narrower regu-
"7 Id. at 1356-57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
"m Id. at 1357-58 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
ot, Id. (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
44" Id. at 1358 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1358-59 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 198 1)).
44! Id. at 1359 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Haiheway).
443 Id. at 1359-60 (Reinhardi, J., dissenting) (citing Haiheway and Beller v, Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), which both upheld military classifications disadvantaging
homosexuals as legitimate and important).
444 Id. at 1359-62 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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lation based on conduct."' He noted, moreover, that the court could
reasonably interpret the regulations as an attempt to exclude those
who had a propensity to engage in certain conduct detrimental to
the military mission, not simply those with a certain orientation."'
The Army regulations, according to Judge Reinhardt, were there-
fore a legitimate attempt to predict and prevent certain future
conduct in which Watkins had engaged. 447
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ordered Watkins II reheard , en banc,448 and in 1989 the en banc
court, hereinafter Watkins III, rescinded Watkins II, reversed Watkins
I, and reinstated the district court's 1982 order equitably estopping
the Army from refusing to reenlist Watkins because of his homo-
sexuality. 44" The Watkins III court ruled that courts may estop cer-
tain military actions even when the action does not violate a consti-
tutional or statutory provision. 450 The court therefore reasoned that
it could decide the case without reaching the broad constitutional
issues raised by Watkins //.45 ' Judge Hall, dissenting, argued that
courts should only estop military actions that violate constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory provisions. 452 The dissent accused the ma-
jority of distorting precedent to avoid the difficult constitutional
issues, but otherwise expressed no opinion concerning Watkins's
equal protection claim. 453
Judge Norris, the author of the majority opinion in Watkins II,
concurred in the judgment in Watkins III, but agreed with Judge
Hall's dissent and instead argued that the Army denied Watkins
equal protection of the laws.454 Judge Norris's concurring opinion
substantially mirrored his opinion in Watkins II, except for an ad-
445 Id. at 1361-62.
446 Id.
4" Id. at 1362 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
448 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
419 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 11989) (en bane) [here-
inafter Watkins III].
45U Id. at 706. The court held that government agencies could be estopped if the court
found affirmative misconduct by the government that would cause a serious injustice, and
that estoppel could prevent without harm to the public interest. Id. The court ruled that the
Army affirmatively misrepresented in its records that Watkins was eligible for reenlistment,
and therefore acted in violation of its own regulation. Id. at 707-08.
"' Id. at 705, 706. The court did not discuss the issues raised in Watkins II, only stating
that it was unnecessary to reach those issues. Id. at 705.
452 Id. at 731, 735 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judges Trott and Beazer and Chief Judge
Goodwin joined in parts of Judge Hall's dissent. Id. at 739 (Hall, J., dissenting).
488 Id. at 731, 736, 737 (Hall, J., dissenting).	 -
454 Id. at 711 (Norris, J., concurring).
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ditional argument concerning whether Hardwick foreclosed a ruling
that homosexuals.constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class."' Hard-
wick, according to Judge Norris, did not implicitly extend the zone
of privacy to include heterosexual sodomy while excluding homo-
sexual sodomy." 6 He noted that the Court expressedly reserved
consideration'of the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as ap-
plied to heterosexual sodomy, and that the Court never suggested
that heterosexual sodomy was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" or was otherwise More deserving of due process
protection."'
Even if Hardwick did extend due process protection to hetero-
sexual but not homosexual sodomy, Judge Norris argued, the fun-
damental differences between equal protection and due process
adjudication made the application of due process concepts irrele-
vant to an equal protection claim. 458 He noted that the due process
clause protects practices "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," and argued that Hardwick held homosexual sodomy not
to be such a practice. 459 He then reasoned that the equal protection
clause protects disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices,
even when the groups had traditionally been subject to that discrim-
ination:160 Judge Norris observed that homosexual acts might not
be considered traditional practices because of historic discrimination,
but that this engrained discrimination in turn supported heightened
scrutiny of laws disadvantaging homosexuals."' He concluded that
Hardwick's' refusal to recognize a due process privacy right to prac-
tice homosexual sodomy, even if the Court might recognize such a
right for heterosexual sodomy, was irrelevant to whether homosex-
uals constitute a protected class under an equal protection analy-
sis."'
Two other federal appeals courts also considered protected
class claims by homosexuals in 1989, and both rejected those claims.
455 Id. at 717-19 (Norris, J., concurring).
'*" Id. at 717  (Norris, J., concurring).
457 Id. at 717-18 (Norris, J., concurring).
459 Id. at 718-19 (Norris, J., concurring).
459 Id. (Norris, J., concurring).
499 Id. (Norris, J., concurring).
46 ' Id. at 719 (Norris, J., concurring).
462 Id. (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Canby also concurred, agreeing with both the
majority opinion and Judge Norris's concurrence. Judge Canby stated that he felt he could
reach the constitutional issue even though equitable estoppel could resolve the case, because
the court was en bane and the equal protection issue was a recurring one. Id, at 731 (Canby,
J., concurring),
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in
Woodward v. United States, refused to hold that homosexuals consti-
tute a class needing heightened judicial protection. 463 The Federal
Circuit considered a claim by James Woodward seeking backpay
and reinstatement in the United States Naval Reserve, arising from
his discharge from the Navy in 1974 for professed hotnosexuality. 464
The court held that homosexuals are not a protected class under
equal protection principles, and that the Navy's policy of discharg-
ing homosexuals bears a rational relation to a legitimate military
purpose. 465
Upon enlistment in the Naval Reserve in 1972, Woodward had
stated that he had homosexual attractions but had never engaged
in homosexual conduct; the Navy nonetheless accepted him. 466 In
1974, however, he admitted during questioning by his commanding
officer that he had homosexual tendencies and sought the company
of homosexual enlisted personne1.467
 The Navy eventually dis-
charged Woodward. 468
After relying on Hardwick" to deny Woodward's claim of a
constitutional privacy right to be homosexual, 47° the court also relied
on Hardwick to deny his equal protection claim. 471
 The court rea-
soned that homosexuality fundamentally differs from traits defining
other protected classes, because race, gender, illegitimacy, and eth-
nicity were immutable characteristics, while homosexuality was pri-
marily a behavioral characteristic. 472 The conduct or behavior of a
protected class, according to the court, had no relevance to the
identification of those groups. 475
 The court then, agreeing with
Padula,474
 reasoned that Hardwick constitutionally allows discrimi-
4" Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-344).
464
 Id. at 1170.
463 Id. at 1176.
466
 Id. at 1069.
467 Id. There was, however, no evidence of any homosexual conduct by Woodward
mentioned in the case discussion. See id.
468 Id. at 1 1 7 O. The Navy claimed that it discharged Woodward in part because of poor
performance, but the court held that the Navy would not have discharged him except for a
review of his file caused by the disclosure of his homosexuality. Id. at 1174.
469 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4" Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1074-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-344).
471 Id. at 1075-76.
472
 Id. at 1076.
473 Id.
474
 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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nation against homosexuals, because Hardwick allows the criminali-
zation of the conduct that defines the class. 475 Applying the rational-
basis test to the Navy's policy of discharging homosexuals, the Wood-
ward court held that the Navy's policy rationally furthered the Na-
vy's interests in discipline, morale, and security, and therefore did
not violate Woodward's equal protection rights. 476
Like the Federal Circuit in Woodward, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the 1989 case of Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh held that classifications disadvantaging homosexuals are
not subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny."' The appeals
court reversed the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, which in 1989 held that homosexuals are a
suspect class, and that the Army's regulation barring reenlistment
of homosexuals violated homosexuals' equal protection rights. 478
The appeals court instead ruled that homosexuals are not a suspect
class, and that the Army's regulation rationally furthered a legiti-
mate government purpose.'"
Ben-Shalom concerned the Army's refusal to reenlist Miriam
benShalom in the Army Reserves because she had professed to be
a lesbian, although the Army did not allege that she had engaged
or attempted to engage in any type of homosexual conduct."° The
Army acted pursuant to its regulation barring the reenlistment of
homosexuals in the Army Reserves that were essentially the same
475 Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076.
476 Id. at 1076-77.
4" Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876). The various courts considering this case
have spelled Ms. benShalom's name several ways. Case cites will follow the spelling that
particular court used,
"" BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (E.D.Wis. 1989), rev'd sub nom, Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89.876).
479 Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464.
" 0 BenShalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1374. The Army had in 1976 discharged benShalom
because of her public acknowledgment that she was a lesbian. Id. at 1373. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ordered her reinstatement, holding that
the Army regulations at issue violated her right to free speech and association and her right
to privacy. benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D.Wis. 1980). The
Army resisted reinstatement, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ordered the Army to comply. Ben Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 826 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir.
1987). The Army reinstated her, but then denied her application to reenlist in April 1988.
BenShalom again filed suit, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, in August 1988, preliminarily enjoined the Army and ordered it to consider her
reenlistment application without regard to her lesbian orientation while the court considered
the permanent injunction. benShalom v. Marsh, 690 F. Supp. 774, 778 (E.D.Wis, 1988), rev'd,
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
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as the regulation considered in Watkins."' Homosexuals, according
to the regulation, included not only those who had engaged in
homosexual acts, but also those who desired homosexual contact. 482
The regulation provided that the Army could consider public or
private professions by a person of homosexual desires when deter-
mining whether the person was an admitted homosexual."'
The district court found that the regulation violated ben-
Shalom's right to freedom of speech and equal protection of the
laws.484
 The court reasoned that the regulations defined homosex-
uals, not by the commission of, or intent to commit, a homosexual
act, but rather by the nature of their sexual desires."' The Army
could prevent the reenlistment of a homosexual, the court noted,
who simply professed a homosexual identity without ever intending
to participate in a homosexual act, while the Army could reenlist a
person with a heterosexual orientation who nonetheless participated
in a homosexual act. 486 The court therefore found that the regu-
lation classified on the basis of homosexual status, not conduct,
because the sexual orientation of a person determined whether
certain speech, or even homosexual acts themselves, would result
in a bar to reenlistment." 7
Having found that the Army regulation classified persons on
the basis of homosexual status, not conduct, the district court rea-
481 Ben -Shalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1374. The regulation barring the reenlistment of' hom-
osexuals in the Army Reserves is AR 140-111, Table 4-2, Rule E. The regulation listed
numerous "nonwaivable moral and administrative disqualifications" to reenlistment, among
them homosexuality, which is placed in a category with questionable moral character, anti-
social behavior, sexual perversion, and frequent difficulties with law enforcement agencies.
Id.
482 AR 140-111, Table 4-2, note 1.
48' Id.
484 BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 E. Supp. 1372, 1377, 1380 (E.D.Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d
454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876).
The court held that the regulation violated benShalom's first amendment right to freedom
of speech by prohibiting her reenlistment because she professed her homosexual orientation.
Id, at 1377. The court reasoned that, though the military had a substantial interest in
discipline, morale, and other articulated purposes for the regulation, the Army swept more
broadly than reasonably necessary by assuming that acknowledgment of homosexual desires
indicated a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. Id. at 1376-77. The court rejected
this assumption, observing that some homosexuals, like heterosexuals, have foregone sexual
activity, and reasoning that the Army's claim that "commonsense" indicated that profession
of status equaled propensity to engage in conduct was prejudice, which could not justify a
first amendment encroachment. Id. at 1377.
485 Id. at 1374.
486 Id. at 1374-75.
487 Id. at 1375.
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soned that Hardwick,488 Padula,48" and Baker."'" did not foreclose a
finding that the class defined by homosexual conduct needed
heightened judicial solicitude. 4 '" The court noted that Hardwick did
not involve an equal protection claim, and that the Padula and Baker
courts explicitly stressed that the classifications being considered
were based on homosexual conduct, not status. 49`2 The BenShalom
court reasoned that Hardwick and Padula could only be reasonably
construed to foreclose strict scrutiny of classifications defined by the
commission of criminal sodomy. 4"
The district court then noted that homosexuals were historically
the objects of "pernicious and sustained hostility," and that preju-
dice rather than rationality likely caused classifications disadvantag-
ing homosexuals. 4"4 The court then reasoned that the Army pro-
vided no evidence that the class of persons with homosexual
orientation shared any compelling desire to engage in criminal
sodomy." The identification of homosexuals with the desire and
intent to commit criminal sodomy, the court observed, was precisely
the type of stereotyping that mandated heightened judicial scru-
tiny.•" Noting benShalom's own excellent service record, the district
court also reasoned that homosexual orientation bears no relation
to an individual's capabilities. 4 9`7 The court also observed that except
in a very few communities, homosexuals do not have sufficient
political power to counter invidious political discrimination, and so
constitute a discrete and insular class subject to prejudice in the
democratic processes. 498
The court therefore held that classifications defined by the
status of homosexual orientation are suspect. 4 9`a The court then
ruled that the Army's regulation does not bear even a rational
488 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
489 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
49° Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.) (en banc), reh'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986).
49 ' BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp, 1372, 1378-79 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d
454 (7111 Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876).
492 Id.
493
 Id, at 1379.
4" Id, (quoting Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1114 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)). The court noted that one of the Army's briefs
analogized homosexuals to kleptomaniacs and arsonists. Id.
495 Id.
4" Id.
497 Id. at 1379-80.
49' Id. at 1380.
491 Id.
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relation to any of the articulated compelling government inter-
ests. 5 " Though the court reasoned that the military has a legitimate
interest in the sexual conduct of its personnel, the court observed
that the regulation of sexual conduct must target that conduct itself
and not, because of prejudicial stereotypes, certain classes."' The
court found that sexual orientation bears no relation to an individ-
ual's ability to contribute to the military, and that the regulation
aimed at orientation, not conduct. 502 The district court therefore
held that the Army regulation barring the reenlistment of homo-
sexuals, violated benShalom's equal protection rights, and ordered
the Army to reenlist her without regard to her sexual orientation. 505
In 1989, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed on both the first amendment and equal
protection claims. 504 The Ben-Shalom appeals court first disputed the
district court's definition of the class in question, reasoning that the
military could view a person's admission of homosexuality as reliable
and compelling evidence that the person likely would engage in
homosexual conduct. 505 Although the court noted that some homo-
sexuals might constitute exceptions, it refused to require that the
Army fine-tune its regulation to deal with those individual excep-
tions. 5"
The appeals court then held that homosexuals do not constitute
a class requiring either strict or intermediate judicial protection."'
Hardwick, the court reasoned, precluded a finding that classifications
based on homosexuality should face stricter judicial scrutiny, be-
500 Id.
5° ' Id.
5°3 Id.
5°3 Id. at 1380-81.
504
 Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W.
3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876). The court reversed the district court's finding that
the Army violated benShalom's first amendment rights, reasoning that the military could
limit its personnel's freedom of speech in the interests of discipline and morale. Id. at 460.
The court observed that the regulation only prohibited the self-admission of homosexuality,
not discussions about or with homosexuals, or the advocation of a change in the military's
policies concerning homosexuality. Id. Noting that the Army had an interest in preventing
homosexual acts, the court rejected the district court's labeling of the "commonsense" pre-
sumption that homosexuals commit homosexual acts as prejudice, and reasoned that the
judiciary should not interfere with the military and Congress's discretion to set policies in
pursuit of military goals. Id. at 460-62. The court therefore deferred to the Army's deter-
mination that homosexual personnel would impair military interests, and held that the
military could exclude someone who admits to being a homosexual. Id. at 462.
505 Id. at 464.
5°6 Id.
507 Id.
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cause the court could not rationally provide heightened protection
to homosexuals when the Supreme Court had upheld the consti-
tutionality of statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct.'" The
court further observed that Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick
would not necessarily preclude this regulation, because, unlike Mi-
chael Hardwick's conduct, homosexual conduct in the military
would affect other military personnel, and would occur in an area
with a considerably decreased expectation of privacy than a civilian's
bedroom.'" The court also disagreed with Judge Norris's concur-
rence in Watkins Ill, both on his interpretation of Hardwick as not
applicable to equal protection analysis, and on his rejection of the
Army's justifications for the regulation as catering to private
biases."° The Ben-Shalom court reasoned that the Army's regulation
promoted a legitimate government interest, not mere prejudice,
and declared Judge Norris's equal protection analysis unpersuasive
in the military context.'"
Homosexuals, the Ben-Shalom appeals court noted, continue to
suffer from discrimination, but the court refused to hold that the
regulation constituted invidious discrimination. 512 The court rea-
soned that homosexuals are no longer without political power, could
attract the attention of lawmakers, and therefore are capable of
seeking congressional redress for the Army's regulation." Observ-
ing that the courts should defer to the executive and legislative
branches on issues of military policy and judgment, the court re-
versed the district court and upheld the regulation's constitution-
ality."'
In addition to these court decisions, legal scholars have also
discussed whether homosexuals require heightened judicial protec-
tion, and what affect Hardwick might have on that question. Com-
mentators have argued that classifications based on sexual orienta-
tion merit strict or heightened scrutiny."' Professor Tribe notes the
"8 Id. at 464-65.
509 Id. at 465.
31 " Id.; see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
5" Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989),
5 ' 2 Id. at 465-66.
515 Id. at 466 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
445 (1985)).
5 " Id. (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
515 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 1616; J. ELY, supra note 144, at 162-64 (classi-
fications disadvantaging homosexuals suspicious because of social prejudice, and because that
prejudice forces homosexuals to hide their identities and hence not interact publicly in society
in a manner that counters stereotypes); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
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centrality of sexual orientation to a person's identity, the history of
purposeful unequal treatment homosexuals have experienced, and
their resulting status as a discrete and insular minority."' Professor
Tribe also notes that homosexuals do not choose their orientation,
and that sexual orientation, if not immutable, could be changed
only with great di fficulty. 5 " Finally, he observes that homosexuality
bears no relation to a homosexual individual's ability to contribute
to society. 518
 Professor Tribe concludes that homosexuals satisfy all
the various tests for suspectness given by the courts, and argues
that the courts should therefore add sexual orientation to the list
of classifications triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny. 519
Commentators have also reasoned that Hardwick's holding that
due process privacy rights do not extend to homosexual sodomy
has no bearing on whether government discrimination against hom-
osexuals violates equal protection principles."° Professor Sustein
observes that the due process clause protects traditional practices
and conventions from attack by current majorities, and thus looks
to the past for guidance in determining protected practices. 521 In
contrast, she notes, equal protection principles protect disadvan-
taged groups from discriminatory government practices, even when
those practices are deeply engrained and traditional, and hence
allows for the invalidation of practices commonplace at the time of
its ratification. 522 The due process clause, she argues, can permit
discriminatory traditions that the equal protection clause prohib-
its. 523
 Hardwick's due process holding, according to Professor Su-
stein, cannot therefore be interpreted to foreclose equal protection
REV, 713, 742, 745 (1985); Developments, supra note 24, at 1525-30, 1564-71; Heightened
Scrutiny, supra note 62; Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
797 (1984). But see j. BAER, supra note 22, at 231-32, 252 (though argues that homosexuals
denied equal protection because of judicial ignorance and prejudice, doubts that homosexuals
would constitute suspect class under equal protection precedent; homosexuals, unlike Afri-
can-Americans and women, never denied political rights, and unclear whether homosexuality
an immutable characteristic).
516 L. TRIBE, supra note 98, at 1616.
517 Id.
516 Id.
516 Id.
526 Sustein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Ctn. L. REV., 1161, 1163 (1988).
561 Id. at 1163, 1170-74.
512 Id. at 1163, 1174.
565 Id. at 1175-76.
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claims by homosexuals.'" Professor Sustein also notes that Hardwick
considered only homosexual sodomy, which was not at issue in
Watkins II, because the Army regulations classified on the basis of
status, not conduct. 52 " She notes, however, that eqUal protection
claims would not be foreclosed even if some or ali of the class
engaged in conduct that could be constitutionally proscribed, be-
cause equal protection looks to prevent unjustified government hos-
tility to a class from causing that class to be injured.' 26
Nonetheless, most of the recent cases that have considered
whether homosexuals are a protected class have reasoned that Hard-
wick foreclosed heightened protection for them. These courts have
consistently relied on Hardwick., and have not applied the criteria
for heightened scrutiny that the Supreme Court has established for
equal protection analysis, and on which those few courts that have
granted homosexuals heightened protection have relied. The next
section therefore analyzes these recent cases in the context of Hard-
wick and of established equal protection precedents.
IV. HOMOSEXUALS AS THE SUSPECT CLASS: ANALYSIS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PLIGHT OF HOMOSEXUALS
The principle of equal protection of the laws requires that the
government treat persons fairly and as equals. 527 In applying this
principle, the courts closely scrutinize government classifications
that disadvantage classes that the courts reason need judicial pro-
tection because of pervasive and irrational societal prejudice. Al-
though homosexuals fulfill the criteria for such a class, most courts
have failed to apply equal protection doctrines established by the
Supreme Court, and instead have relied on other considerations,
foreign to those equal protection doctrines, to deny equal protection
claims by homosexuals.
This section first analyzes the Supreme Court's established cri-
teria for providing additional protections for certain classes, and
argues that the courts should accord homosexuals strict protection
under these precedents. This section then considers the various
rationales used by courts to refuse to provide heightened protection
524 Id. at 1162-63 Sc n.9. She therefore argued that the Watkins II majority correctly
interpreted Hardwick, and that Judge Reinhardt's dissent in Watkins II, as well as the majority
opinion in Padula, misread and misapplied Hardwick. Id. at 1162-63,1164-70.
526 Id. at 1162 n.9.
526 Id.
527 See W. NELSON, supra note 9, at 18.
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to homosexuals, in particular those rationales based on interpreta-
tions of Hardwick. Those rationales, this section argues, are foreign
to equal protection analysis, and do not preclude subjecting classi-
fications that disadvantage homosexuals to strict scrutiny.
A. Homosexuals Fulfill Each of the Criteria for Protected Class Status
Under Equal Protection Jurisprudence
In developing the principle of equal protection, the Supreme
Court has established a set of criteria by which it first determines
the level of scrutiny it will apply to a challenged classification. 528
These criteria, however, are not a mechanical check-list that must
each be met. 529 They instead constitute a series of questions that
assist the courts' primary analysis: whether special societal condi-
tions exist that should cause courts to forego their usual presump-
tion that a classification is rational, and that instead should cause
them to presume that a classification arises from invidious and non-
legitimate government motives.
To determine this, the courts inquire whether a class experi-
ences pervasive societal antipathy and stereotyped notions. 53° They
further question whether the unique characteristics of the class are
outside the control of its members, and whether those characteristics
are rarely relevant to any legitimate government interests." Courts
also determine whether the class is politically powerless to protect
itself, 532 and whether government classifications often stigmatize the
class."' If a judicial analysis of these criteria indicate that a class is
likely to be treated invidiously and irrationally because of societal
and governmental antipathy, and is politically powerless to counter
invidious classifications resulting from that antipathy, then courts
will subject classifications disadvantaging that class to either strict
or intermediate scrutiny. 534
Homosexuals as a class fulfill each of these criteria for deter-
mining if a class requires heightened judicial scrutiny. Homosexuals
528 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-46 (1985);
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
522 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
"°	 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
28.
" E.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
"2 E.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).
5" E.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87.
"4 See supra notes 281-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's use of
strict and intermediate scrutiny.
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continue to experience pervasive societal discrimination and de-
meaning stereotypes.'" A person's sexual orientation, although
sometimes not a fixed trait, is a characteristic outside the person's
control or responsibility, 536 and is unrelated to the person's abilities,
mental health, or likelihood to engage in violent or criminal acts.'"
Homosexuals, furthermore, are an insular and politically powerless
minority, forced into hiding by societal discrimination, and there-
fore are unable to command non-invidious attention from the gov-
ernment.'" Finally, state and federal government classifications
aimed at homosexuals stigmatize them, serve to justify discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, and so relegate them to an inferior legal
and social status for reasons unrelated to their actual capabilities. 539
Homosexuals therefore continue to experience pervasive socie-
tal antipathy and stereotypes that result in governmental discrimi-
nation, and which homosexuals, because of their political power-
lessness, are unable to prevent. The courts therefore should
presume that the government bases classifications disadvantaging
homosexuals on invidious or irrational motives. These invidious
classifications violate the constitutional principle of equal protection
of the laws, for the government thereby fails to treat homosexuals
with the fairness and consideration required by their constitutional
entitlement to equality of rights.
A truly free and equal society, moreover, cannot tolerate invid-
ious and irrational government actions that unfairly deprive persons
of those full and equal rights and liberties necessary for a meaning-
ful and happy life. The government regularly deprives homosexuals
of those rights and liberties. The courts should therefore protect
the entitlement of homosexuals to equality under the law, by sub-
jecting all government actions that classify on the basis of sexual
orientation to strict scrutiny. Under that standard, they should re-
quire the government to demonstrate that classifications defined by
sexual orientation are necessary and suitably tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest.
Homosexuals in the United States experience societal discrim-
ination of such pervasiveness that the courts should presume that
5" See R. Moutt, supra note 2, at 27-30.
"9
 See id. at 39-40.
8" See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
correlation between sexual orientation and socially-important individual characteristics.
"9 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 27.
839 See id. at 30; J. BAER, supra note 22, at 34; SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at
Intro 2.
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government actions disadvantaging homosexuals arose from those
discriminatory impulses. Although the degree of repression aimed
at homosexuals varies across extinct and modern societies, govern-
ment and private discrimination continues to severely victimize
homosexuals, probably more than any other minority group. 54 °
Prejudice against homosexuals manifests itself in physical attacks
and verbal harassment of homosexuals, and in discrimination
against homosexuals in private employment and housing. The state
and federal government also discriminates against homosexuals in
employment, the military, immigration, family law, and child cus-
tody. Many states criminalize forms of consensual homosexual con-
duct, while the courts and law enforcement officials validate these
forms of discrimination and establish different legal standards and
procedures for homosexuals. 54 '
Nearly every aspect of homosexuals' lives, from employment
and housing to the ability to express themselves sexually or simply
to walk in safety, are therefore impaired by a degree of societal
discrimination severe enough to render homosexuals a second
class. 542 The pervasive, ingrained prejudice against homosexuals
that causes these forms of discrimination affects every governmental
action concerning homosexuals. Prejudice against racial, ethnic, and
gender classes caused the courts to presume that classifications di-
sadvantaging them arose from that prejudice and not from rational
and legitimate reasons. 543 The courts should similarly presume that
widespread and severe antipathy against homosexuals in United
States society causes classifications that injure homosexuals.
The prevalence of commonly-held but inaccurate stereotypes
about homosexuals should also cause the courts to closely scrutinize
classifications disadvantaging homosexuals. These stereotypes in-
clude that homosexuals are mentally ill, or are sexually or criminally
dangerous, especially to children. 544 Other common stereotypes are
that homosexuals are unfit parents or teachers because they might
seduce or otherwise cause them to become homosexual, and that
homosexuals clo not desire to live in stable family structures. 545
"D See, e.g., R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-31; I. SLOAN, supra note 37, at 1-4 (1987);
Developments, supra note 24, at 1541,
"' See supra notes 51-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of forms of state and
federal government discrimination against homosexuals.
542 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 30.
" 5 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684-86 (1973).
544
 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 23.
"3 See D. WEST, supra note 28, at 150; J. BAER, supra note 22, at 228,246.
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Finally, many believe that homosexuals are excessively interested in
sexual matters, or that homosexuals invariably engage in sodomous
activity. 546
These stereotypes, which permeate society's conception of hom-
osexuality, come not only from ingrained beliefs, but also from
ignorance engendered by the invisibility of homosexuals because of
prejudice."' Each of these prevalent stereotypes; however, is fac-
tually unsupported, simply because the sexual orientation of a per-
son bears no relation to the person's abilities, personality, or
health. 548 Specifically, no evidence exists that homosexuals are likely
to be mentally ill, to molest children, to affect children's sexuality,
to engage in crime, or to have any other characteristics, aside from
that persons of the same gender sexually arouse them. 549
Homosexuals constitute a large minority within United States
society.'" They live in all areas of the nation, subsist on every
economic level, and work in all occupations, including the mili-
tary.55 ' They are as different from each other as are heterosex-
uals. 552
Homosexuals and heterosexuals, indeed, do not constitute mu-
tually exclusive classes, for persons occupy all sections of the sexual
continuum from exclusively heterosexual, to mixed, to exclusively
homosexual.'" The class of homosexuals is itself a creation of social
prejudice, and not of any actual distinction beyond the object of
their sexual desires. The definition of homosexuality, whether based
on a person's sexual desires or sexual practices, on society's labeling
of a person, or on a person's self-identification, is itself unresolved.
United States society, nonetheless, has separated out a class of in-
dividuals and subjected them to prejudice without any reference to
actual characteristics of those individuals that affect legitimate gov-
ernment concerns. Aside from the object of their sexual desire, all
that differentiates homosexuals from heterosexuals is prejudice and
unfounded stereotypes that heterosexuals inflict on homosexuals.
Degrading stereotypes about women that justify and promote
discrimination caused the Court in Frontiero to presume an invidious
545 SEX AND MORALITY, supra note 38, at 166-68.
547 See id. at 225-29, 241-44; R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-23.
549 SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 202.
549 See, e.g., R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 43-44; a Wysr, supra note 24, at 241-46; supra
notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
55o
	 R, MOHR, supra note 2, at 21.
"' See MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, ,supra note 24, at 625-31.
5" SEX RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 202.
555 See MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 636-55.
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basis for government classifications disadvantaging them. 554 The
courts should similarly presume that government classifications di-
sadvantaging homosexuals are based on false stereotypes that reflect
often vicious misconceptions about, and antipathy toward, homo-
sexuals. The false and demeaning stereotypes commonly believed
about homosexuality further promote prejudice, and infect govern-
ment actions concerning homosexuals. The courts should therefore
more closely scrutinize classifications disadvantaging homosexuals,
to insure that they do not arise from unreasoned reliance on those
false stereotypes and their underlying prejudices.
Furthermore, because the only distinguishing characteristic of
homosexual orientation is that persons of the same gender sexually
arouse homosexuals, sexual orientation rarely, if ever, is relevant to
any legitimate government interest. Contrary to commonly-held
stereotypes, homosexual orientation bears no relation to an individ-
ual's ability to work, to raise children, to obey the law, or otherwise
to participate positively in society. 555 Sexual orientation is as unre-
lated to individual capabilities as are race or gender.
Sexual orientation, moreover, like race and gender, is a char-
acteristic that is beyond the control of the individual. 556 Either bi-
ology, genetics, or early childhood environment determine sexual
orientation, usually before puberty. 557 Although some persons' sex-
ual orientation may change over their lifetimes, these changes are
rarely a matter of choice, but rather occur involuntarily. 558 Individ-
uals therefore do not choose their sexual orientation, for sexual
preference is an inherent aspect of a person's identity, as much as
one's race, gender, and ethnicity. 559
The Court has reasoned concerning other classes that the gov-
ernment acts irrationally by burdening classes for characteristics
that are irrelevant to a person's capabilities or other government
interests, and over which the person is not responsible. Homosex-
uality, like race, gender, and the illegal alien status of the children
in Plyler, is a characteristic that is outside the individual's control. 56°
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973).
555 See supra notes 107-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
correlation between sexual orientation and individual capabilities.
558 R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 39-40.
557 Id. at 39; D. WEST, supra note 24, at 247.
558 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 39-40; D. WEST, supra note 24, at 247.
558 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 40.
5fi0 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-22 (1982) (undocumented alien children);
Frontiero v, Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (gender and race).
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Furthermore, unlike the mentally retarded, homosexuality bears no
relation to distinctive capabilities or characteristics relevant to legit-
imate government interests. 56 '
As the Court has reasoned, legal burdens should only relate to
individual responsibility and individual capabilities relevant to gov-
ernment interests. 562 These classifications likely reflected invidious
rather than rational motives, the Court reasoned, because charac-
teristics not only unrelated to capabilities but also outside an indi-
vidual's control could not provide a rational justification for bur-
dening the disadvantaged class. 563 The courts should therefore
presume that classifications disadvantaging homosexuals are irra-
tional, and require the government, through heightened scrutiny,
to justify those classifications as legitimate and rational. This addi-
tional scrutiny will protect homosexuals from invidious discrimi-
nation by requiring the government to establish an actual relation
between the unique characteristics of homosexuals and a substantial
government interest.
Furthermore, as an invisible minority confronted with severe
antipathy, homosexuals also constitute a politically powerless and
socially despised class requiring extraordinary judicial protection
from the prejudices infecting the democratic process. The Court
has elsewhere reasoned that classes politically unable to counter and
remedy invidious government discrimination because of the impe-
diments of societal prejudice need heightened judicial protection. 564
Homosexuals, as a class forced into hiding by prejudice, constitute
a class lacking the political ability to attract sufficient non-invidious
legislative attention to counter invidious discrimination.
Many homosexuals, moreover, because of severe prejudice,
dare not complain about discrimination, or even publicly reveal
their identities as homosexuals. 565 Prejudice effectively silences
homosexuals, and renders them unable to counter and remedy
invidious government discrimination caused by that prejudice. Pub-
lic officials sympathetic to the plight of homosexuals, or themselves
homosexual, are also silenced by fear of damage to their political
futures. 566 Societal prejudice not only renders homosexuals politi-
661 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,442-43 (1985).
5"2 id. at 444; Myer, 457 U.S. at 219-20; Frontiow, 411 U.S. at 686.
See Myler, 457 U.S. at 220-22; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87.
l"" Sec supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of classes needing
heightened protection because of political powerlessness,
5
"5 See, e.g., R. MouR, supra note 2, at 27.
5"6 See Watkins v. United Stales Army, 847 r.2d 1329,1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988).
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tally powerless, but also prevents them from remedying society's
ignorance by openly interacting with the heterosexual commu-
nity. 567
The Court has previously refused to presume the rationality of
classifications when the disadvantaged class, because of prejudice,
was politically powerless. The Court generally presumes that a class
capable of openly engaging in the political system, or of otherwise
attracting non-invidious political attention, can prevent or eventu-
ally remedy classifications that irrationally disadvantage it.' 68 This
standard does not require that a class be able to exert direct political
influence on government actions, but only that government actions
concerning a class indicate that the class was able to attract non-
invidious governmental consideration. 569
But this presumption fails to hold when a class, such as hom-
osexuals, cannot exert any political influence, and when government
actions indicate that the government does not fairly consider and
treat the class. The prejudice that pervades society permeates the
government, and deprives homosexuals of those political processes
that normally would protect them from invidious government dis-
crimination. Homosexuals therefore need heightened judicial pro-
tection to replace those political processes that would usually insure
that a classification was rationally based on achieving a legitimate
government purpose.
Homosexual political power does exist in a few locales, and has
been sufficient in two states and several municipalities to cause the
enactment of laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination. 57°
Consistent with Frontiero's reasoning, however, these laws indicate
not simply growing homosexual political power, but also the rec-
ognition by some democratic bodies that discrimination against
homosexuals is pervasive and inherently invidious, and that the
government must intervene to mitigate the antipathy. 57 ' Like the
statutes cited in Frontiero, which provided legal protections for
women against discrimination, those laws protecting homosexuals
indicate that some officials recognize the pervasive private and pub-
567 See R. MOHR, supra note 2, at 22-23.
56B
	
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4.
569 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445.
57" See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151R, §§ 1-18 (Supp. Dec. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31
(West 1988); SEXUAL ORIENTATION, stipra note 49, at Intro-2, §§ 5.03[2][c]—[d], at 5-26 to 5-
27, § 5.03[2][c] n.30; Repealable Rights, supra note 24, at 441, 445.
571 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1972).
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tic discrimination inflicted on homosexuals. This recognition fur-
ther supports the courts subjecting classifications disadvantaging
homosexuals to heightened scrutiny.
Courts should also provide additional judicial protection be-
cause of the stigmatizing effects of government classifications disad-
vantaging homosexuals. The Court on several occasions has rea-
soned that classes often stigmatized by government classifications
might need heightened judicial protection. 572 Government stigma-
tization relegates the affected class to an inferior legal status,
impedes its equal enjoyment of rights and liberties, and perpetuates
and justifies further societal discrimination against the class. 573
Through government actions that criminalize sexual activity by
homosexuals, that prohibit homosexuals from some types of gov-
ernment and professional employment, that keep homosexuals
from immigrating into the United States, and that burden homo-
sexuals seeking to form families, the government asserts the legal
inferiority of homosexuals. 571 These classifications, without regard
to individual capabilities, therefore impede homosexuals' enjoyment
of equal rights and liberties, weaken them politically, and demor-
alize them."' The stigmatizing effects of these classifications, which
are the result of the invidious motives of the government when it
classifies on the basis of sexual orientation, provide an additional
justification for heightened scrutiny of those classifications.
Although the Court has not fully explicated the distinction
between classes receiving strict and intermediate protection, the
Court has reasoned that classes defined by gender and illegitimacy
require only intermediate scrutiny because some classifications
based on these distinctions are rational."" Unlike race and ethnicity,
the government in some circumstances may legitimately act upon
differences between males and females, or between legitimate and
illegitimate children, because those differences sometimes relate to
legitimate government interests. 577 Another distinction noted by the
Court is that illegitimates have been subjected to less societal prej-
udice than racial minorities or women. 578
572 hi.
573 SEXUAL. ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro 2,
574 See supra limes 62-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of forms of government
discrimination that assert the legal inferiority of homosexuals.
575 See, e.g., R. Montt, supra note 2, at 30; Schur, .supra note 28, at 38-41.
57U See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences
between suspect and quasi•suspect classes.
577 See id.
"H See Mathews v, Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,505-06 (1976).
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Homosexuality, however, is as unrelated as a person's race to
an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. The
unique characteristic of homosexuals, their sexual arousal by per-
sons of the same gender, has no relation to a person's capabilities
or other legitimate government interests. Moreover, homosexuals
continue to suffer prejudice and discrimination of at least compar-
ative severity with racial minorities and women. The courts there-
fore should presume that government classifications disadvantaging
homosexuals are as invidious and irrational as classifications disad-
vantaging racial and ethnic minorities, and subject those classifica-
tions to strict, not merely intermediate, scrutiny.
B. Extraneous Rationales Used by Courts that Failed to Provide
Heightened Protection to Homosexuals
Although several courts have, since Hardwick, considered equal
protection claims by homosexuals, all but one decision holding that
homosexuals require heightened judicial protections have been
overturned or rescinded on appeal. Those courts, however, that
have acknowledged and utilized the Supreme Court's criteria for
determining if a class should receive heightened scrutiny, have ruled
that homosexuals are a protected class. Those courts that have
refused to provide heightened protection have, in contrast, almost
wholly based their analysis on factors unrelated to, or even antith-
etical to, equal protection jurisprudence. Usually, those courts have
reasoned that Hardwick's reasoning precludes them from more
closely scrutinizing classifications disadvantaging homosexuals.
Those courts that have properly applied the Supreme Court's
criteria for determining protected classes have uniformly found that
homosexuals are such a class. They recognize that prejudice and
unfounded stereotypes about homosexuals likely cause classifica-
tions disadvantaging them, that the distinguishing characteristic of
homosexuals do not relate to abilities or personal responsibility, and
that homosexuals are politically powerless to prevent those classifi-
cations. 59 These courts therefore ruled that classifications disad-
5" See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345-48 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp.
1372, 1379-80 (E.D. Wis. 1989), reed sub nom, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.
1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89.876); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
None of these courts, however, explicitly considered the stigmatizing effect on homosexuals
of government classifications that invidiously injure them. But see Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289
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vantaging homosexuals fulfill the Court's criteria for determining
whether to apply heightened scrutiny to those classifications, be-
cause they presumptively arise from motives that violate homosex-
uals' constitutional entitlement to equal protection of the laws-.
Only one court holding that homosexuals are not such a pro-
tected class has even cursorily considered the criteria for establish-
ing protected status. The appeals court For the Seventh Circuit in
Ben-Shalom reasoned that homosexuals, although still suffering
from discrimination, are not politically powerless, and could rely on
the democratic process to remedy invidious government discrimi-
nation."" That court, however, ignored the finding of the district
court that homosexuals do not have sufficient political power to
counter invidious discrimination."' Except in a very few locales,
homosexuals remain hidden, and if revealed, are more likely to
attract hostility rather than fair consideration from the political
institutions that the appeals -court would have homosexuals rely
on. 582 The Ben-Shalom court therefore erred in reasoning that hom-
osexuals could seek redress in a political system manifestly hostile
to them.
Although the Federal Circuit in Woodward did not formally
apply the criteria for heightened scrutiny, it did reason that hom-
osexuality differs from the defining traits of protected classes, such
as women and African-Americans, because, Woodward reasoned,
homosexuality is a behavioral, not immutable, characteristic."'
Woodward, .however, did not cite any legal .or scientific support for-
distinguishing behavioral traits that are inherent aspects of an in-
dividual's personality from immutable traits that are unrelated to
conduct. Classes defined by a behavioral characteristic have the
same entitlement to equal protection of the laws as do classes de-
fined by physical characteristics, ethnic or racial traits, or any other
trait. Whatever the basis of a classification, the government cannot
injure a class for invidious or irrational reasons.
That homosexuals are distinguishable because persons of the
same gender arouse them does not, remove their entitlement to
(5th Cir. 1985) (en lame), reli'g denied, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986), relt'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986).
33° hen-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 406 (7th Cir, 1989), petition for cert, filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876).
5 X 1 BenShalom, 703 F. Supp at 1380.
582 Sec supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text ror a discussion of the risks homosex-
uals face if publicly revealed.
"3 Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No. 89-344).
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equal protection of the laws. The government must still have a
rational, non-invidious reason For disadvantaging them. Nor does
homosexuals' need for judicial protection diminish because their
status relates to an aspect of their sexuality which itself is unrelated
to other individual characteristics. The immutability of a defining
trait, whether behavioral or completely unrelated to conduct, re-
mains important in evaluating the suspectness of a class, because it
suggests that the government irrationally disadvantages them.
Despite Woodward's reasoning, therefore, the behavioral char-
acteristic of homosexuality does not diminish the likelihood that the
government invidiously injures them. Homosexuality is immutable
and unrelated to individual capabilities, and the courts should there-
fore presume that a person's sexual orientation does not relate to
any legitimate government purpose. Because homosexuals also face
severe antipathy, the courts should require that the government
show exactly how a classification injuring homosexuals relates to
allowable government interests.
Moreover, Woodward and Ben-Shalom both also relied on the
same reasoning that Padula and the dissent in Watkins II used to
deny protected status to homosexuals. They reasoned that Hard-
wick's holding that persons do not have a privacy right to engage in
same-sex sodomy, also precludes heightened judicial protection for
homosexuals under equal protection principles.'$ 4 They not only
reasoned that courts could not provide heightened judicial protec-
tion to a class defined by conduct that the Court had held that the
government could criminaliie, but also that Hardwick allows the
government to discriminate against homosexuals. 585 The dissent in
Watkins II, for instance, reasoned that the Hardwick Court based its
holding on Hardwick's homosexuality. 58" The dissent therefore rea-
soned that Hardwick allows government discrimination against hom-
osexuals, and prevents the courts from holding such discrimination
to be invidious. 5 "7
In contrast, those courts holding homosexuals to be a protected
class reason that Hardwick's due process holding is irrelevant to equal
"" Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Watkins v. United
States. 847 E.2d 1329,1356-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt J., dissenting); aff 'd on other grounds,
875 F2(1 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
585 See Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1356-57 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
5M" Watkins Il, 847 F.2d at 1354-55 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
"7 Id at 1356-57 (Reinhardt, 3., dissenting); ,ee Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
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protection claims.'" They note that Hardwick did not consider
whether homosexuals require heightened equal protection, whether
heterosexuals have a privacy right to commit sodomy, or whether
the government could penalize non-sodomous forms of homosexual
conduct."`' Watkins II, for instance, interpreted Hardwick only to
hold that substantive due process principles do not protect the
commission of homosexual sodomy. 59°
Hardwick is a difficult case from which to draw any meaning,
but Judge Reinhardt is correct in arguing that Hardwick's homo-
sexuality was a primary reason for the holding. Although the Court
did suggest that sodomy itself is not within those traditional liberties
protected by substantive due process, the Court also noted that
homosexual conduct is outside those traditional liberties."'
Whether or not the Court would recognize a privacy right to engage
in heterosexual sodomy, the Court's reasoning indicates that hom-
osexual sodomy is more divorced from protected traditional liber-
ties than heterosexual sodomy. The homosexual component of
Hardwick's activity therefore was an important component to the
Court's holding. The Court's refusal to hear the appeal of a decision
holding that a privacy right existed to engage in heterosexual so-
domy 'further indicates that the homosexual quality of Hardwick's
act further removed the conduct from constitutional protection. 592
To that extent, Hardwick does suggest that the Court will allow
the government to restrict more extensively the liberties of homo-
sexuals than of heterosexuals. As Justice Blackmun argued in dis-
sent, however, the Court distorted the privacy issue by obsessively
focusing on the homosexual component, because all individuals are
equally entitled to constitutional liberty interests.'" Hardwick there-
fore is of little precedential value even in due process adjudication,
because of its seeming willingness to define liberty interests by the
status of the persons wishing to use those interests. As a decision
5
" 8 Watkins II, 847 F.2c1 at 1341; BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1378-79 (El).
Wis. 1989), rev'd sub nom, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus,
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Stipp. 1361, 1370-73 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
589 Watkins II,  847 F.2d at 1339-40; High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1370-73; see Watkins
v, United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J., concurring).
59° Watkins v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988), off 'd on other grounds,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
59'
	
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-94, 196 (1986).
592
 See L. Taint;, supra note 98, at 1431.
"3 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200-01 (Mackin -1m, J., dissenting); see id, at 218-19 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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apparently approving of unfriendly discrimination, moreover,
Hardwick is unprincipled and lawless, because it implicitly contra-
dicts the constitutional principle of equality under the law. 5'4
Although Hardwick does implicitly allow government discrimi-
nation against homosexuals, however, it does not necessarily pre-
clude protected class status for homosexuals. The implicit prejudice
of the Court may not substitute for reasoned consideration of con-
stitutional principles as explicitly developed by the Court. Hardwick
did not concern an equal protection claim, and the Court never
considered whether, according to its precedents, homosexuals com-
mand heightened judicial protection. Courts considering equal pro-
tection claims by homosexuals should therefore apply those equal
protection principles developed by the Court, and not rely on the
Court's unprincipled prejudice in a due process case to justify equal
protection to homosexuals.
Moreover, as Professor Sustein argues, substantive due process
and equal protection doctrine rest on fundamentally different con-
siderations. 595 Substantive due process protects those activities tra-
ditionally recognized as liberties, and traditional animosity toward
an activity engaged in by a class, according to Hardwick's reasoning,
mitigates against recognition as a traditional liberty. 596 But this same
traditional animosity toward a class, which would preclude substan-
tive due process protection of conduct by that class, justifies height-
ened judicial protection of that class under equal protection prin-
ciples. The prejudice and animosity toward homosexuals on which
Hardwick relies therefore does not preclude, and in fact supports, a
judicial finding that homosexuals are vulnerable to invidious and
irrational government discrimination in violation of the principle
of equal protection of the laws.
Those courts that, subsequent to Hardwick, denied protected
status to homosexuals further reasoned that Hardwick constitution-
ally allows the government to disadvantage homosexuals, because
those classifications are legitimate attempts to prevent certain con-
duct or to implement morality. 597 Implicit in this reasoning is that
594 See id. at 195-96; id. at 208-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
595 Sustein, supra note 520, at 1162-63 & n.9, 1170-76; see Watkins v. United States
Army, 875 F.2d 699. 718-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J., concurring) (adopting
Sustein's argument).
596 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
597 See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for (Cr!. filed,
58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
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Hardwick established that the government has a legitimate interest
in regulating or criminalizing homosexual conduct, and that the
government may thereby discriminate, not only against those who
engage, but also those with a propensity to engage, in that con-
duct. 598
 This reasoning is inconsistent with the criteria the Court
has established for determining if a class should be protected, is
irrelevant to equal protection jurisprudence, and is itself concep-
tually misapplied. Hardwick, moreover, does not establish that the
government may pursue legitimate government interests by invid-
iously or irrationally discriminating against a class.
The reasoning used by those courts denying equal protection
claims by homosexuals first requires that Hardwick mean that the
government has a legitimate interest in criminalizing homosexual
condUct. Hardwick reasoned that majority beliefs about the immor-
ality of homosexual conduct provide a rational basis for laws cri-
minalizing that conduct. 599
 As noted above, however, Hardwick's
holding only involved consideration of whether homosexual sodomy
is a traditional liberty, and not whether societal prejudice is a legiti-
mate government purpose for criminalizing homosexual conduct
under equal protection principles.
Moreover, this argument requires that the courts equate hom-
osexual orientation with the propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct. Several of the courts that refused to provide heightened
protection to homosexuals reasoned that homosexual orientation is
merely the propensity to engage in conduct that the government
constitutionally could prohibit."° In contrast, those courts that
granted heightened protection distinguished homosexual orienta-
tion from the propensity to, or actual participation in, the conduct
that Hardwick held the government could proscribe. 60 ' These courts
1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3155 (U.S. Aug. 30, 1989) (No.
89.344); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
698 See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; Watkins II, 847 F.2d at
1356-57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
699 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
6n"
 Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464; Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076; see Watkins II, 847 F.2d at
1356-57 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
6n ' Watkins 11, 847 F.2d at 1338-39; BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp, 1372, 1379 (E.D.
Wis. 1989), rev'd sub nom, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert.
filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-73 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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therefore reasoned that Hardwick does not foreclose them from
holding that the class defined by homosexual orientation is a pro-
tected class under an equal protection analysis.602
Whether homosexual orientation is tantamount to a propensity
to engage in sodomy or other homosexual conduct is irrelevant to
whether homosexuals are a protected class. Homosexuality is not
so uniquely related to a propensity to commit sodomy that it should
foreclose an equal protection analysis of government classifications
that disadvantage only homosexuals. Heterosexuals also commit
sodomy, and not all homosexuals, especially lesbians, have such a
propensity. Whatever tenuous relation might exist between homo-
sexuals and an increased likelihood to commit sodomy is not suffi-
cient to foreclose an equal protection analysis of whether the gov-
ernment instead based discrimination against homosexuals on
invidious or irrational motives. 6°3
If Hardwick instead only allows the regulation of homosexual
sodomy, or of homosexual conduct, arguments that Hardwick justi-
fies discrimination against homosexuals beg the question of whether
the regulation only of homosexual sodomy or conduct passes equal
protection analysis. The Court only held that there is no privacy
right to commit homosexual sodomy, not that the government could
discriminate against homosexuals. Even under minimum rationality,
the government cannot criminalize homosexual conduct because of
invidious or irrational motives. Whether the regulation only of hom-
osexual sodomy or conduct are legitimate government interests
depends not just on whether they are traditional liberties, but also
on whether the government regulates that conduct for invidious or
irrational reasons. Hardwick did not reach this equal protection
analysis, which includes whether homosexuals are a protected class.
Before a court can therefore reason that the government can
regulate homosexual orientation because it indicates a propensity
to engage in homosexual conduct, the court must first determine
whether the regulation of homosexual conduct is legitimate, or
instead is invidious or irrational. Moreover, whether or not regu-
lating homosexual conduct is a legitimate government interest, dis-
crimination against the class with a propensity to engage in that
5°' Watkins II, 847 F.24 at 1339-40; BenShalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1379; High Tech Gays,
668 F. Supp. at 1370-73.
6U
 See United States Dept of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532-38 (1973) (Court
rejected government's argument that statute preventing "hippies" from participating in food
stamp program rationally. related to fraud).
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conduct disadvantages them because of a characteristic for which
the class is not responsible. In equal protection analysis, the Court
has held that government discrimination against a class because of
characteristics for which individuals within the class are not respon-
sible increase the presumption that the discrimination is irrational
or invidious. Adult undocumented aliens, for instance, are there-
fore not a protected class, while their children are, even though the
government has a strong interest in regulating illegal aliens. 004
Individuals do not voluntarily become homosexual or hetero-
sexual, and cannot usually alter their orientation. 505 Discrimination
against homosexuals for being members of a class with a propensity
to engage in homosexual conduct therefore not only presumes a
legitimate government interest in regulating that conduct, but also
discriminates because of a characteristic that homosexuals did not
choose and cannot alter. Government discrimination against hom-
osexuals therefore stigmatizes and disadvantages them without re-
gard to individual responsibility, and suggests that the government
discriminates for invidious rather than rational reasons.
The identification of homosexuals with a propensity to engage
in homosexual sodomy or other sexual conduct, finally, relies on a
stereotyped notion of homosexuals. Homosexuality is not simply a
desire to engage in same-gender sexual activity, for it also can be a
desire to seek emotional support and affection from persons of the
same sex. Although, moreover, a person's sexual orientation is an
important aspect of the person's life, that orientation does not de-
fine or predict the person's other characteristics. Homosexuals, like
heterosexuals, vary tremendously in their proclivities, desires, goals,
health, and abilities. The equation of homosexuality with forms of
sexual conduct is part of the stereotype of homosexuality as the
sordid pursuit of sexual gratification. 506 This stereotype serves in
turn to deny access to homosexuals of those other meaningful qual-
ities of life that homosexuals, like heterosexuals, pursue, such as to
live securely and safely, and to establish both sexual and social
relationships.
But although the courts should not equate homosexual orien-
tation with homosexual conduct, neither should they reason that
government classifications disadvantaging on the basis of homosex-
ual conduct are less likely to be invidiously-based than those that
604 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219-23 & 11.19 (1982).
66s
	 R. Mount, supra note 2, at 39-90.
666 See BenShalom, 703 F. Stipp. at 1329; R. Mona, supra note 2, at 23.
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disadvantage on the basis of orientation. The dissent's argument in
Watkins II that heightened protection for homosexuals would inval-
idate even neutral sodomy statutes might be valid, because sodomy
is a more prevalent form of sexual conduct for gay males than for
heterosexuals. 6°7 Neutral sodomy statutes that are evenly applied to
heterosexuals and homosexuals do impinge on a common form of
heterosexual activity, however, and if heterosexuals also found their
ability to engage in sodomy restricted, they conceivably would
clamor for the repeal of those statutes.
But sodomy laws and other government actions that explicitly
target, or that law enforcement disproportionately enforces against,
homosexuals must be scrutinized under the same standard used for
classifications based on homosexual orientation. These government
classifications disadvantage all homosexuals by limiting their free-
dom to engage in certain conduct, and by stigmatizing them. 608 This
is especially true because alleged government efforts to regulate
homosexual conduct so often include discrimination against indi-
viduals not just because of homosexual conduct, but also because
of a propensity, according to the government, to engage in that
conduct.609
All individuals with homosexual orientation, therefore, are
often discriminated against even if they have not engaged in hom-
osexual conduct, because the government presumes they likely have
or will. Even if the government discriminates only on the basis of
actual conduct, moreover, the government impairs the sexual free-
dom of all homosexuals. Arguments that the regulation of homo-
sexual conduct should face a different equal protection standard
than the regulation of homosexual orientation are therefore spe-
cious. Each form of discrimination against homosexuals arises from
prejudice against them, restricts their liberties, and stigmatizes
them, because of a characteristic for which they are not responsible.
Similarly, the courts must closely scrutinize government classi-
fications that disadvantage homosexuals because of arguably legiti-
mate government interests. The government, for example, does
have legitimate interests in maintaining military discipline and no-
6°7 Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329,1357-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); see Heightened
Scrutiny, supra note 62, at 801-02 (neutral sodomy statutes disproportionately impact hom-
osexuals because they prohibit primary form of homosexual intimate conduct)."
6°8
	
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 49, at Intro 2.
609 See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.LW. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876); Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1359-62.
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tional security. But when the government pursues those interests
through classifications that disadvantage homosexuals, the courts
should nonetheless presume that those classifications are invidious.
Those classifications, moreover, must not only be closely tailored to
achieve the government's interests, but also must not give affect to
prejudice.'" The military's legitimate interest, for instance, in pre-
venting disruptive sexual conduct, or avoiding security breaches,
can be less intrusively pursued than by banning homosexuals from
the military. 61 ' The military could instead investigate whether the
'circumstances of an individual homosexual's life might open that
individual to threats of blackmail, as the military now does with
heterosexuals. The military could also avoid disruptive sexual con-
duct by prohibiting that conduct, without having to ban a class of
individuals that the military presumes might engage in that conduct.
That the presence of homosexuals in the military might damage
morale because of prejudice by others, however, like race segrega-
tion in the military, merely gives legal effect to prejudice.'" 2
The implementation of morality also serves as a potential jus-
tification for discrimination against homosexuals. 6" Hardwick rea-
soned that majoritarian notions of the morality of homosexual con-
duct rationally support the criminalization of that conduct.'"
Hardwick's dissenters countered by arguing that majoritarian mo-
rality is insufficient to justify laws that interfere with fundamental
personal choices and private conduct. 615 Watkins II and some com-
mentators also argue that the government must apply moral prin-
ciples equally and fairly, and that moral principles are not a com-
pelling justification for discrimination against a suspect class."'
"I" See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984); San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U,S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
en See Watkins II, 847 F.2d at 1352.
" 1 '4 See id. at 1350-51; BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (E,D, Wis. 1989),
relief sub nom, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1989) (No. 89-876).
613 See Rowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (majority's sentiments about
morality of homosexuality a rational basis for sodomy laws); id. at 197 (Burger, concur-
ring) (immorality of homosexuality part of millenia or moral teaching); Watkins v. United
States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1988) (court rejected Army's claim that discrimi-
nation against homosexuals based on moral principles), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1989) (en bane); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 282, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (sodomy
statute rationally related to moral objection to homosexual conduct).
614 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
615 Id. at 213 (Blackmun,., dissenting); id. at 216-18 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
Watkins 11, 847 F.2d at 1341-42, 1351-52; see supra notes 135-47 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legal role of morality in relation to homosexuality.
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The enactment of moral principles into law, although legiti-
mate, often threatens constitutional principles of equality and lib-
erty. 617
 A free society values personal liberty, especially when those
liberties do not conflict with the freedoms of others. An equal society
should not condone an unequal infringement on a class's liberties
when done for unfriendly reasons. Moral rules must therefore be
even-handed, and must not mask antipathy to a class.
The Court therefore, for instance, noted that laws against in-
terracial marriage were based on prevailing principles that many
considered ordained by God, but which simply masked prejudice. 618
Similarly, the private moral principles supporting discrimination
against homosexuals involve private- antipathy that cannot justify
the public infringement of the equal rights and liberties of homo-
sexuals. Moral justifications for government actions disadvantaging
homosexuals therefore do not preclude heightened scrutiny of
those actions, because the government must apply those moral be-
liefs evenhandedly and without invidious intent.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the lessons the citizens of the United States took from
the Civil War is that a free society must be equally free for all its
people. The constitutional principle of equality under the law,
therefore, requires that the government treat all classes fairly and
equally. Equal protection of the laws mandates that the government
disadvantage a class only to accomplish a legitimate government
interest, and not because of unfriendliness to that class. To enforce
this principle, the courts presume that certain government classifi-
cations result from invidious or irrational motives, and that the
disadvantaged class requires additional protection. The courts give
this protection when a class faces pervasive antipathy and un-
founded stereotypes unrelated to individual abilities or responsibil-
ity, and when the class is politically powerless to confront that ir-
rational prejudice within the democratic system.
Homosexuals are not treated fairly and equally by the govern-
ment, which disadvantages them not because of legitimate govern-
ment interests, but rather because of pervasive prejudice and irra-
tional stereotypes. Sexual orientation implicates no legitimate
" 17 See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 137, § 213.2, at 3t19, 372; R. MOOR, .supra note
2, at 3L
"'" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3, 11 (1967) (trial judge stated that miscegenation
violated God's intent to keep the races separate)..
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government interests, for it is irrelevant to individual capabilities,
and is not voluntarily chosen by individuals. Homosexuals, more-
over, lack the political ability to redress this discrimination through
the political processes. As a result, government discrimination stig-
matizes homosexuals, promotes further prejudice, and impairs their
ability to live meaningful lives without fear.
Consistent with equal protection doctrine, the courts should
therefore strictly scrutinize government classifications disadvantag-
ing homosexuals. Most courts, however, have ignored the principle
of equal protection, and instead have applied a special dogma to
reject the notion of equal protection for homosexuals. They have
refused to recognize that homosexuals have the same liberty inter-
ests in deciding how to live their lives, and the same entitlement to
equality under the laws, as heterosexuals. They instead have incor-
rectly reasoned that the Supreme Court's ruling in Hardwick pre-
cludes heightened protection for homosexuals, and even allows the
government to discriminate against homosexuals. In so doing, to
borrow Professor Tribe's words, these courts have bootstrapped
antipathy against homosexuals into a justification for allowing dis-
crimination—in the one area of the law where antipathy to a class
normally invalidates resultant government discrimination. 619
JOHN CHARLES HAYES
"'" L. TRII/, supra note 96, at 1427-2g.
